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This dissertation investigates the experiences of women city councilors in Jaipur, in the 
northwestern Indian state of Rajasthan. These women, brought into office through a gender quota 
instituted over two decades ago, have overcome significant barriers in an enduringly patriarchal 
environment. Even in office, women continue to face stigma and normative restrictions imposed 
by a society not entirely willing to accept them in such a public and independent position. This 
standard enables men, technically blocked by the gender quota from holding office themselves, 
to continue to exert control and influence over women office-holders, even sidelining them in 
many cases. The narratives of these women demonstrate the persisting power of patriarchal 
norms, and the inability of corrective democratic institutions to completely exclude their 
influence. However, their stories also force reconsideration of democratic ideals and 
requirements, most of which have been conceptualized from a firm Western mooring in 
individualism, with little regard for the alternatives posed by developing democracies rooted in 
more communal societies. These findings are based on 41 semi-structured elite interviews with 
elected members of the Jaipur Municipal Corporation, and eight additional semi-structured 
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Chapter 1: Gender, Representation, and Reserved Seats 
 This dissertation investigates the experiences of women city councilors in Jaipur, the 
“pink city” of palaces and history in the northwestern Indian state of Rajasthan. These women, 
brought into office through a gender quota instituted over two decades ago, have overcome 
significant barriers in an enduringly patriarchal environment. Even in office, women continue to 
face stigma and normative restrictions imposed by a society not entirely willing to accept them in 
such a public and independent position. This standard enables men, technically blocked by the 
gender quota from holding office themselves, to continue to exert control and influence over 
women office-holders, even sidelining them in many cases. The narratives of these women 
demonstrate the persistent power of patriarchal norms, and the inability of corrective democratic 
institutions to completely exclude their influence. However, their stories also force 
reconsideration of democratic ideals and requirements, most of which have been conceptualized 
from a firm Western mooring in individualism, with little regard for the alternatives posed by 
developing democracies rooted in more communal societies. 
 This chapter begins by placing this dissertation within the existing literature on women’s 
representation and the use of quotas to improve representational inequalities. The research 
question animating both the existing literature and this dissertation is whether institutional 
reforms that increase female representation can be successful in the context of a strongly 
patriarchal society. Through the examination of gender quotas in India, this research sheds light 
on the societal and institutional obstacles that can restrict gender quotas from achieving real 
gender equality. I then discuss the primary case used for this analysis: the Jaipur Municipal 




used throughout this dissertation. Finally, I finish with a brief outline and summary of the 
dissertation. 
 As I will argue in this dissertation, gender quotas established in India have not 
comprehensively improved female representation on multiple levels. First, while these quotas 
have been effective at establishing and maintaining descriptive female representation, they do 
not incentivize women to stay and develop the experience and ability that is critical to 
establishing substantive representation and making in-roads into state and national levels of 
representation. Second, I find that significant numbers of women brought into politics by the 
gender reservation are proxies of ambitious husbands or fathers blocked by the gender 
reservation. Due to a lack of independent experience and social restrictions, these women are 
highly dependent on male supporters to carry out their official responsibilities. In counterpoint, I 
find that gender quotas have also brought in independent women who have established 
themselves to be as capable as any of their male colleagues. Critically, many of these 
independent women have made politics a career and provide societal exposure that could both 
encourage voters to revise stereotypes and prejudices, and inspire future female leaders. Still, all 
the narratives from these women, dependent and independent, demonstrate the inescapable 
constraining influence of their patriarchal environment, as they all rely to differing degrees on 
male supporters and family. Powerful patriarchal norms temper the ability of institutional quotas 
to improve female political participation. Parental and societal attitudes on political engagement 
for young women, gendered family traditions that significantly alter the accessibility of the 
political environment to married women, societal normative constraints on women engaging in 
public and political actions, and challenging institutional environments require a woman seeking 




findings illustrate the unexpected problems that can emerge when embedding an institution 
within a society. We cannot assume that the institution will be able to exclude or overcome 
normative influences.  
Do Gender Quotas Work? State of the Literature 
Electoral quotas take various forms, as either party quotas, candidate quotas, or reserved 
seats (Dahlerup et al, 2013; Krook, 2010). Party quotas are internally established political party 
rules that require a specific percentage of its own candidates to be women. These rules are not 
imposed by constitutional or electoral requirements, and are adopted on a volunteer basis. 
Candidate quotas are mandatory requirements imposed by constitutional or electoral rules, which 
require all parties to field a specific percentage of women as candidates, but do not guarantee 
that they win. Finally, reserved seats specify a percentage of seats in an electoral body that can 
only be contested by women, guaranteeing a minimum number of women in office.1  
Analyzing electoral results provides valuable information on the overall efficacy of 
instituted gender quotas, particularly if efficacy is based on an aggregate unit of measurement, 
such as the number of women in office. Electoral gender quotas have been shown to significantly 
increase the number of women elected to these political bodies when adequately enforced. 
Research has demonstrated that quotas have improved the number of women in national 
legislatures in cases such as Afghanistan, Argentina, and Rwanda (Dahlerup & Nordlund, 2004; 
Franceschet & Piscopo, 2008; Longman, 2006), but less so in countries such as France (Murray, 
2010). Quotas also appear to have been more effective in recent decades than in previous time 
                                                          
 
1 There are several methods of filling these seats: separate electoral districts or lists for women, best-loser systems 




periods (Hughes, 2009; Paxton & Kunovich, 2005; Paxton et al, 2010; Paxton & Hughes, 2015). 
Furthermore, gender quotas can improve the placement of women in leadership positions, which 
could accelerate the growth of women in public office overall (O’Brien & Rickne, 2016; 
Bhavnani, 2009; Darhour & Dahlerup, 2013; Kittilson, 2006). Indeed, the investigation of the 
historic underrepresentation of women is rooted in quantitative studies that began analyzing the 
discrepancies in female representation across developed democracies over three decades ago. 
These broad analyses generally focused on variations in institutions, culture, and social norms 
that affected the number of women winning legislative office.2 However, these studies are 
limited in evaluating the effectiveness of quotas because they primarily treated the dependent 
variable (women’s representation) as dichotomous (either a woman was in the seat or she was 
not). The quality of representation is essentially equated with greater numbers of female office-
holders, or descriptive representation. Challenging this, a branch of scholarship has emerged that 
asserts increased representation leads to positive political changes only if women representatives 
are more than simply bodies in seats (Weldon, 2002). Specifically, this scholarship argues for the 
importance of substantive representation, or the notion that female representatives need to 
support and initiate policies of concern for their female constituents, who are typically ignored or 
under-prioritized by male representatives.3 Critically, this scholarship brings the individual into 
                                                          
 
2 This includes the form of electoral system and rules (Caul, 1999; Costa Benavides, 2003; Darcy et al., 1994; Htun, 
2002; Htun and Jones, 2002; Norris 1985; Rule, 1987; Russell, et al 2002; Tripp et al, 2006), the effectiveness of 
institutionalized gender quotas (Jones, 1998; Jones and Navia, 1999; Jones, 2004; Krook, 2010; Matland, 2006; 
Schwindt-Bayer, 2009; Tripp and Kang, 2008; Yoon, 2004), democratic experience (Tremblay, 2006), societal norms 
and political cultures (Inhetveen, 1999; Meier, 2004; Tremblay, 2007), elite compliance (Jones, 1996; Schmidt and 
Saunders, 2004), institutional legitimacy (Yoon, 2001), and party systems, characteristics and ideology (Araújo, 
2003; Davidson-Schmich, 2006; Goetz and Hassim, 2003; Kittilson, 2006; Murray, 2004). 
3 Within the literature, supporting women’s issues is generally defined as supporting policies that improve the 
provision of healthcare, social support, education and economic status of women; and addressing inequalities in 




the analysis, by expanding the focus to the dynamics that link descriptive representation to 
substantive representation: changes in preferences, policy output, legislative style, and 
constituent service that are brought about by expanding the number of women in office. 
Substantive Representation and Quotas 
Bringing the individual into the analysis adds nuance to our understanding of gender and 
preferences. Differences in the individual preferences of female and male representatives are not 
inherent to gender: women do not support women’s issues simply because they are women. 
Instead, their support is based on a lifetime of experiences unique to women, which links their 
priorities to the core needs of female constituents. Correspondingly, we expect male 
representatives, based on their own experiences, to have a better understanding of male 
constituents and their needs. Furthermore, women representatives are in touch with shifting 
contemporary issues through their connections with women’s organizations and leaders on the 
ground (Mansbridge, 1999; Urbinati and Warren, 2008; Weldon, 2002). These experiences and 
connections create the crucial link between winning office and substantively representing 
constituents.  
An interview with a parshad from the historically-disadvantaged Scheduled Tribes 
community who had experienced discrimination as a girl exemplifies how life experiences were 
connected to her political actions: 
At university other classmates would discriminate against me and another girl from the 
untouchable caste, whom I used to eat lunch with together. We would sit alone, and 
others would sit apart from us. 
In the slum area of my ward there was a section of the Valmiki community, manual 




areas for social gatherings, so when they contacted me, I built them a 2-story building for 
their functions.4 
 
However, for women to bring their life experiences and understanding to the political 
process, they ultimately must win office. Women account for nearly half of the world’s 
population, but only 23-percent of elected representatives at the national level. Recognizing the 
cultural stereotypes and institutional restrictions that discourage both female participation and 
candidate selection, gender quotas have been introduced across 130 countries (Hughes et al, 
2017) to enable women to break into these positions of power that have historically been 
resistant to equal inclusion (Dahlerup, 2006; Geissel & Hust, 2005). While representation for 
women has been slowly increasing historically across democracies, quotas are designed to 
accelerate this growth substantially (Dahlerup & Freidenvall, 2005).  
  The problem is that research has also shown the many ways of subverting quota 
implementation. Variation in party-list rules can allow parties to relegate women to unwinnable 
list positions (Jones, 1998; 2004); parties often ignore quota rules if compliance is not effectively 
enforced (Schwindt-Bayer, 2009); and loopholes in wording (Htun, 2002) or even a perceived 
lack of legitimacy (Yoon, 2001) can lead to decreased quota effectiveness (Krook, 2010). The 
literature has extensively investigated the many ways formal quota rules can be violated or 
disregarded. However, this dissertation will describe a case where formal quota rules are being 
thoroughly followed and enforced, yet quota effectiveness continues to be subverted by informal 
practices. While the quota-mandated minimum of number of women are elected each electoral 
cycle, the narratives I present in the upcoming chapters demonstrate that in many ways these 
                                                          
 




women continue to be significantly constrained by patriarchal norms and have been sidelined by 
male family members who use them as proxy representatives.  
The History of Gender Reserved Seats in India 
In India, parliamentary debate over a proposed “Women’s Reservation Bill”, which 
would expand gender reservations to the state and national levels, has drawn on empirical and 
anecdotal evidence on the effectiveness of already existing reservations at the local level. There 
is general recognition that these local reservations bring hundreds of thousands of women into 
local politics every election (Gochhayat, 2013), most of whom would not be able to participate 
otherwise. However, it also hard to ignore that only an incredibly small percentage have been 
able to move up to the state legislatures (Vidhan Sabha) or to the lower house (Lok Sabha) and 
upper house (Rajya Sabha) of the national parliament. Despite the implementation of the gender 
reservation at the local level in 1992, as of 2018, the number of women in the national 
parliament and across state assemblies has practically remained stagnant over the past two 
decades, hovering around 11% at the national level and often lower across state assemblies. 
Parties are still not nominating many women beyond the minimum required to cover the reserved 
seats at the local level, and even less in state and national elections. Ideally, the gender 
reservation system at the local level would provide a platform for women to move into state and 
national politics without a reservation, but this is not happening. Several reasons have been 
floated for why this goal is not being achieved. Lok Sabha MP Varun Gandhi publicly claimed in 
2017 that, despite the gender reservation system, historic gender inequalities have been 




groups “atrophying” as they are exploited for “social events and campaigning” only.5 
Furthermore, opinion pages discuss fears of rampant tokenism within existing gender-reserved 
seats, as reports have spread of “parshad-patis” and “sarpanch-patis”, literally the husbands of 
the city councilor (parshad) or village head (sarpanch), which are joking “official titles” for 
husbands who control their elected wives. 
Permeating the discussion, but not always clearly voiced, is a broader debate over the 
appropriate role of women in politics and society in general. A quote from a floor speech given 
against the institution of state and national gender reservation two decades ago by current male 
Rajya Sabha MP, Sharad Yadav, has recently resurfaced in this debate, which frames continuing 
concerns about women pursuing a more public life: 
Do you think these women with short hair can speak for women, for our women ...?6 
Contained within this statement is an implicit challenge to the “modern” women who dare to 
eschew traditional dress and adopt Western hairstyles. These “women with short hair”, 
symbolize the progressive women who are challenging a patriarchal society not entirely prepared 
to accept them. This statement also invokes a class-based argument as well. Women who adopt 
these modern modes of dress tend to come from the relatively less-conservative forward-castes, 
as opposed to the women from the more disadvantaged communities, who still wear their hair 
long in the traditional style. This controversial statement is designed to instill skepticism of the 
                                                          
 
5 See: http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/The-14-years-journey-of-Womenrsquos-Reservation-
Bill/article16550273.ece {Accessed 6/23/2018}.  
6 See: http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/The-14-years-journey-of-Womenrsquos-Reservation-




proposed national reservation by implying that forward-caste women, given their inherent socio-
political advantages, will monopolize such a reservation at the expense of the lower classes. 
Current demographics support their argument to a degree, as a small number of forward-
castes continue to hold a disproportionate share seats in the Lok Sabha, and disadvantaged 
communities have faced a declining share of seats.7 However, likely more concerning for men 
such as MP Yadav, who come from an historically marginalized community, is their 
vulnerability to any political advances made by women. Based on experience, forward-caste men 
in the national parties generally have less to fear from women making in-roads, as their parties 
have traditionally protected them at the expense of men from these disadvantaged communities 
(Jensenius, 2016).  
Lacking within this debate however, is any real clarity on the success or failure of the 
gender reservations already instituted at the local level, as the arguments of both sides are driven 
by political motivations. The primary question remains unanswered – why have so many women, 
hundreds of thousands, been brought into politics by the gender reservation at the local level but 
not pushed their way up to the state or national legislatures? Women’s representation in these 
state and national bodies has barely increased since the local reservations were instituted over 
two decades ago.  
This dissertation will discuss several constraining institutional factors that could be to 
blame: parties unwilling to nominate more women than mandated and the exclusion of women 
                                                          
 
7 Many of these individuals come from nationally dominant Brahmin and Rajput castes, and currently hold over five 
times their population share in Lok Sabha seats. See: http://indianexpress.com/article/opinion/columns/the-




from positions of power within the party, institutional disincentives to make politics a career, and 
a lack of politically experienced women incentivized to challenge men at these higher levels. 
However, the existence and power of each of these obstacles raises a bigger question as to how 
effectively the gender reservation has empowered women to politically participate within a 
patriarchal society. Do reservations give women the confidence to run for office, empower them 
to be effective representatives, and give them access to the patrons and influence within critical 
political networks that will allow them to make inroads into politics on a national scale? As this 
dissertation will demonstrate, while the gender reservation has been effective at increasing the 
number of women in office, it does not have the intrinsic power to provide confidence, autonomy 
and capability, particularly in the face of powerful societal norms that work to constrain women. 
These findings contribute to our understanding of the interaction between electoral institutions 
and the society they operate within, and specifically illustrate the inability of electoral 
institutions to overcome the influence of powerful patriarchal norms. 
Gender Quotas and the Jaipur Municipal Corporation 
To answer these questions, I conducted a series of interviews with councilors (parshads) 
elected to the Jaipur Municipal Corporation (JMC), the primary governing institution of Jaipur 
city. Established in 1994, the JMC is responsible for maintaining the civic infrastructure and 
essential services, such as roads, sanitation, water, education and health, for the city of 3.1 
million, tenth largest in the country, as well as carrying out associated administrative duties. To 




fund approximately $159 million in expenditures.8 The JMC is essentially split in two between 
separate, and often opposing, wings. The deliberative wing is composed of 91 parshads. The 
executive of the deliberative wing is composed of a parshad mayor selected from among 
themselves, and a CEO appointed by the chief minister of the state.9 The administrative 
bureaucratic wing is generally headed by a Commissioner appointed from the Rajasthan 
Administrative Service (RAS), the state civil service. Parshad elections are held in single-
member districts (SMD), more commonly referred to as wards, on a first-past-the-post basis. 
These have been held every five years since 1994, with the fifth elected body currently serving 
as of 2018.  
Jaipuri elections are dominated by the two national parties, Congress and the Bharatiya 
Janata Party (BJP). The national decline of Congress was already in full swing by the time the 
JMC was created in 1992 and the two parties have traded power off and on ever since. Congress 
has found itself recently in the minority, particularly after the national wave in BJP support that 
accompanied the rise of Narendra Modi to PM in the 2014 elections, which gave the BJP 64 
seats to Congress’ 19, alongside eight independents. While identity politics are active, neither 
party aligns itself firmly along caste lines, which would risk alienating significant portions of the 
electorate. The most notable divisions appear more along religious lines, as most Muslim 
candidates align themselves with Congress, with few joining the BJP. 
The parshad office has been assigned a variety of responsibilities. As discussed, 
parshads are responsible for the maintenance and improvement of civic infrastructure within 
                                                          
 
8 JMC Summary of Budget for the Period 2015-2016. See: http://jaipurmc.org/PDF/Budget/Jp_BUDGET2015-16.pdf 
{Accessed 6/23/2018}. 




their wards, which includes arranging, funding, and overseeing actual contractors. While their 
role likely differs across the rest of India, in Jaipur, parshads also serve as a key intermediary 
between the state and citizens seeking public goods, particularly in the documentation process. 
Parshads provide the signatures that verify a citizen lives in their ward and is therefore eligible 
for certain national and state poverty alleviation programs, such as food ration cards.10 They are 
also a primary interlocutor in the zoning process and land transfer schemes, which is critical in 
rapidly developing urban areas such as Jaipur. 
Parshads are also deeply involved with their communities. While they are formally 
tasked with multiple communal functions, such as developing local schools and hospitals, they 
are also informally expected to involve themselves in a myriad of other local issues, such as 
resolving land disputes between constituents, advising local law enforcement, mediating 
domestic disputes, assisting in job and school placements, and serving as a social leader of their 
own caste or community within their ward. Higher level politicians, such as state legislators 
(MLAs), also regularly pressure parshads within their constituency to ensure their agenda and 
pet projects are carried out on the ground. Overall, parshads serve as a “fixer” for their 
neighborhood. They provide the connection between the common people of their ward and the 
powerful bureaucracy and government who provide desired material benefits. 
Indian political representation at all levels, but especially at the local level, is informed by 
communal norms. In contrast to the Western normative environment built more on 
individualistic mores, an Indian parshad is not at all surprised to be called in the middle of the 
                                                          
 





night by constituents with a snake in the house or a father worried by a son who eloped with an 
unapproved girl.11 Parshads are elected both to moderate the interaction between the citizen and 
government, and between citizens themselves. This responsibility, and the opportunity it 
presents, is the primary motivation aspiring politicians seek the parshad office. 
On paper, the parshad is not very powerful. Budgetary and funding power within the 
JMC is largely held by the bureaucratic wing, who must approve most parshad funding 
proposals. If a bureaucrat wants to hold up a project, there is very little an individual parshad can 
do about it. Furthermore, under the Modi government, the shift to push more modernization 
programs from the center has created a federal government that relies more on, and provides 
more funding to, local bureaucracies than it does deliberative bodies.12 Still, given the number of 
their formal and informal responsibilities, parshads are given authority and access across a broad 
number of governmental, bureaucratic, and social institutions. These connections create regular 
opportunities for standard patron-client relationships. Authority over the issuing of business 
licenses for example,13 can be financially and politically leveraged. However, more strategically, 
parshads are inserted into a position of provider. As with most developing countries, economic 
vulnerability has been created by the inability of state institutions to deliver social welfare to 
                                                          
 
11 Interview on 3/21/2017 with male parshad in Jaipur. 
12 Additionally, in rapidly developing cities such as Jaipur, which have expanded so quickly over the past two 
decades by absorbing nearby villages and towns, significant jurisdiction is still held by the institutions tasked with 
developing rural land into urban cities, which in Jaipur is the Jaipur Development Authority (JDA). As the city 
expands, the JDA is expected to take land intended for rural use and improve it for urban use by installing 
necessary infrastructure, then hand it over to the JMC for residency and maintenance. However, the bureaucrats 
in the JDA are often hesitant to give up this land, and the accompanying revenue. In many cases, despite urban 
development, the JDA will hold onto parcels of land and transfer funds to the JMC for their maintenance. However, 
this leverage often puts the JMC in a fiscally dependent position, further restricting the ability of parshads to carry 
out their agenda (Interview on 5/10/2017 with human right’s activist in Jaipur). 





significant portions of the population. Resource scarcity and the lack of a reliable bureaucratic 
safety net provides ambitious politicians with the opportunity to step in as provider and 
protector, which can be a powerful mobilizer for aspirants looking to climb the political or social 
ladder (Alm, 2010; Price and Rudd, 2010).  
Municipal corporations, like the rural panchayats, have a very important role to play, 
because that is the first step of politics.14 
 
Therefore, part of the incentive to pursue a parshad seat is the opportunity it presents as a step to 
higher office. Their broad base of responsibilities, and the connections required to service those 
responsibilities, establishes the parshad as the go-to person for the constituents of their ward, 
particularly those from their own community or caste. From my own interviews with parshads in 
the JMC, many listed “social work” or wanting to “serve the people” as a primary motivation. In 
his investigation of student politics in Uttar Pradesh, Jeffrey (2010) interprets the choice of these 
terms as intentional to both establish the authority of the leader as deriving from their societal 
contributions, as opposed to other types of authority common in India that stem from religious or 
lineal ties, and to reinforce their modesty and subservience to the communal good. Both aspects 
are common across political campaigns and candidates in India and appear to be electorally 
beneficial. While most parshads denied it during the interview, in the spirit of humility, many 
are likely aiming to build a foundation of political and social support that they hope to build on, 
whether they are aiming to rise within political or social power structures.  
                                                          
 




Conclusion: Re-examining Expectations 
As I will discuss further in the next chapter, limiting the adoption of gender reservations 
to the local level stemmed both from a need to gain the support of men at the state and national 
levels who would have been threatened by a more extensive reservation, and carried an 
expectation that the reservation would still serve as a gate of entry and foundation that would 
support and propel larger numbers of women into higher levels of office. However, significant 
gains in female representation at the state and national levels have not been realized, and Indian 
activists and feminists have been warning for some time now of “tokens and show-pieces”, 
political actors that utilize the women’s movement vocabulary without putting the concepts into 
practice on a comprehensive scale (Ramachandran, 1995: 49). With this dynamic in mind, I 
approached my research on the JMC with an expectation that the reservation was not working 
entirely as intended. From previous experience in Jaipur, I had heard rumors of the parshad-
patis, men who acted as proxy parshads through their wives to get around the gender 
reservation, and I expected to find a few situations where this was the case. However, I found 
significantly more cases than I expected, as nearly half of the women I interviewed were 
essentially proxies for their husbands or fathers. The prevalence of parshad-patis began to 
establish why so few women brought in by the reservation were moving from the local to higher 
levels of politics, as a significant number of them were parshads in name only. They gained little 
political experience, knowledge, or support structures to build on for a campaign at the state or 
national levels, as their husbands or fathers had sidelined them and essentially taken over the 
office. 
The narratives from this dissertation will illustrate the ability of husbands and fathers to 




exposes three breakdowns in the implementation and design of the gender reservation. First, the 
phenomenon restricts the ability of the gender reservation to either empower women or address 
gender inequality. Second, it demonstrates the inability of electoral institutions to overcome 
powerful patriarchal norms. Finally, it displays continuing voter acceptance of severe gender 
power imbalances that reinforce patriarchal societal norms and discourage the development of 
future women leaders. Nonetheless, while the reality of the observed situation could prompt a 
declaration that the gender reservation has failed, instead this reality indicates how critical 
reserved seats are. Without them, gender equality in institutions such as the JMC would surely be 
worse. However, attempting to determine the overall success or failure of the gender-reservation 
system based on this cross-sectional analysis of one point in time is not appropriate or practical. 
It will take decades more to truly determine whether the reservation contributed to gender 
equality in the long term. Instead, this analysis should encourage a reexamination of what we 
expect from institutional efforts to impose gender equality. While useful, these institutions must 
function within the society they are implanted, and the power of electoral institutions to 
modulate the influence of incredibly powerful patriarchal norms is limited. 
Structure of Dissertation 
Following this introduction, Chapter Two provides a foundation for the main analysis 
through a brief overview of the history of women in Indian politics since independence and the 
growth in demand for more equal representation in positions of power, which eventually spurred 
the constitutional reform that enacted gender quotas across India in local governance bodies. 
Chapter Two also explains the structure of the gender reservation and its complex interaction 
with pre-existing quotas for disadvantaged castes, which creates a system that significantly 




successful the gender reservation institution has been at establishing and maintaining descriptive 
female representation. This analysis demonstrates that the reservation can deliver a minimum 
level of descriptive representation, but does not incentivize women to stay and develop the 
experience and ability that is critical to establishing substantive representation and making in-
roads into state and national levels.  
Chapter Four shifts the analysis to the individual level and discusses the challenges 
encountered and changes made during the gathering, coding and analysis of 41 narratives from 
JMC parshads, which form the basis of this dissertation. Chapter Five then establishes a standard 
of representation that constitutes a “successful” gender quota institution based in the literature. 
For quotas to be considered effective, existing literature argues that women must be elected who 
are qualified, who successfully push the interests of women, who fundamentally alter the 
masculine political environment, and who consistently serve their constituents as their 
representative. These standards are then used to develop the measures used in the coding and 
analysis of gender reservations within the Jaipur Municipal Corporation.  
The analysis of these narratives starts with the proxy representatives in Chapter Six. 
These women were brought into politics by ambitious husbands or fathers blocked by the gender 
reservation. Due to a lack of independent experience and social restrictions, these women are 
highly dependent on their husbands or fathers to carry out their official responsibilities. 
However, Chapter Seven provides a counterpoint with narratives from independent women in the 
JMC who were brought in by the gender reservation and have established themselves to be as 
capable as any of their male colleagues. Critically, many of these independent women have made 
politics a career and provide societal exposure that could both encourage voters to revise 




demonstrate the inescapable constraining influence of their patriarchal environment, as all of 
these women still rely on male supporters and family who enable them to attain that 
independence, which could be revoked by their enablers at any time. Chapter Eight uses the 
narratives from both the dependent and independent women to isolate and explain the powerful 
patriarchal norms that create a tension between the institutional quotas designed to improve 
female political participation and the social norms that continue to restrict such behavior. 
Parental and societal attitudes on political engagement for young women, gendered family 
traditions that significantly alter the accessibility of the political environment to married women, 
societal normative constraints on women engaging in public and political actions, and 
challenging institutional environments require a woman seeking political office to utilize and 
rely upon the support of men to be successful. Notably, reservation quotas are unable to 
independently prevent parshad-patis from gaining power through their wives and daughters, as 
these institutions still rely considerably on the voter themselves to screen such candidates.  
Finally, Chapter Nine concludes with a discussion of the unexpected problems that 
emerge when embedding an institution within a society. We cannot assume either that the 
institution will be able to exclude or overcome normative influences, or that normative 
influences that we inherently rely on in other contexts to screen undesired candidates will be 
present across all societies and voters. However, small adjustments to the current system could 
provide improved outcomes. Furthermore, this dissertation raises awareness of alternate forms of 
legitimate representation. While the communal representation practices that illustrated in these 
narratives may appear incompatible with true democratic representation, it is important to focus 
on outcomes. The key question is whether communal support, such as that provided by a 




Rather than declaring these gender quotas a failure, we should re-examine our standards to 
ensure that they are applicable across normative environments, not simply Western ones.  
In sum, Chapter Two discusses the history of women politicians and demands for equal 
representation in India, and Chapter Three discusses the institutional design of the reservation 
system and its effects on representation. Chapter Four reviews the methodology used to gather 
and analyze the narratives used throughout this dissertation and Chapter Five places it within the 
existing literature on gender quota effects and expectations. Chapter Six examines the narratives 
from proxy representatives who are highly dependent on male family members, and Chapter 
Seven provides contrasting narratives from independent women representatives and illustrates 
how the quota system can be successful. Chapter Eight discusses the cultural and normative 
environment that creates and enables the proxy phenomenon and how women can break out of 
this environment to some degree and develop autonomy. Finally, Chapter Nine concludes with a 
review of the core findings of this dissertation, provides suggested adjustments to the current 
system that could improve outcomes, and argues for a pragmatic assessment of gender quota 




Chapter 2: Gender and Politics in India 
This chapter provides a foundation for the rest of the dissertation with a brief overview of 
the history of women in Indian politics since independence, and the growth in demand for more 
equal representation in positions of power. These demands eventually spurred constitutional 
reform that enacted gender quotas across India in local governance bodies. Throughout this 
history, multiple themes emerge that still hinder the pursuit of gender equality today: resistance 
by male members, fearing for their own jobs, to the expansion of female political participation; 
parties unwilling to “risk” nominating women in anything but the safest electoral districts; social 
norms that restrict the ability of female candidates to engage in a full political campaigning; and 
dependence on male family members for economic and social support remaining critical to 
becoming politically competitive and independent. 
The structure of these gender quotas is integral to understanding their impact on the 
political landscape. Gender quotas interact with pre-existing quotas for disadvantaged castes, 
creating a complex system that significantly restricts who can and cannot run for office. 
Furthermore, office-holders enter a unique system of local governance, which is tasked with 
regulating the rapid modernization and urbanization of both India’s economy and society. The 
women interviewed for this book are tasked with a broad range of responsibilities, from urban 
infrastructure to social mediation, and are presented with opportunities for political and private 
gain that enable them to use their position as a stepping stone.  
Women Politicians in India 
India has a history of famously outspoken and powerful women at the highest levels of 
national politics. Former prime minister Indira Gandhi is the most notable, but several women 




political expertise and influence, these women are often comparable to their male colleagues in 
terms of charisma and public charm. Millions mourned when the notorious CM of Tamil Nadu, 
Jayalalithaa, died in 2017 during her 6th consecutive term. Mamata Banerjee has built a colossal 
career from grassroots student politics to currently leading the state of West Bengal into her 2nd 
term as CM. These women have challenged conservative gender stereotypes in a patriarchal 
society by imposing their strong personalities and political acumen in a traditionally male arena. 
There are many examples of women who are easily comparable to their male counterparts in all 
respects – politically savvy, imposing, and exploitative as well. Before her death, Jayalalithaa 
was accused of corruption on multiple accounts,15 which were triggered by her famously 
luxurious tastes (Jensenius, 2018). Studies have even found that on average, women MPs are 
wealthier than their male counterparts (Basu, 2016).  
 Still, these exceptional cases cannot hide the fact that the overall number of women in 
Indian politics is still incredibly low. Across the two houses of federal parliament, the Lok Sabha 
and Rajya Sabha, the percentage of women has slowly increased from 4.7 in 1952 to 11.8 in 
2018.16 Numbers can range even lower in the state legislative assemblies, the Vidhan Sabhas, 
with some assemblies having no women members at all to highs of 14 percent in others.17 
Conservative social norms also continue to restrict the conduct of even the most powerful 
women in politics (Jensenius, 2018). To preserve her reputation, former Chief Minister of 
Madhya Pradesh and current cabinet minister Uma Bharati preferred to travel with her brother in 
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16 See: http://archive.ipu.org/parline-e/reports/2145_A.htm {Accessed 6/23/2018}. 






respect of social expectations that women remain in the “protection” of male family members, 
which is common for most women politicians (Singer, 2007: 200). Moreover, the average female 
legislator still must contend with a staunchly conservative political environment, with many 
reporting sexual harassment, condescension, disregard and bigotry from their colleagues 
(Jensenius, 2018).  
Demands for Representation 
Historical exclusion of women from political life has established a movement demanding 
more inclusion of women in politics dating back to at least 1917 (Guha, 1974). Early unifying 
issues centered on social reform, such as banning child marriage, widow protections, and 
education for women (Jensenius, 2018). These social issues united small groups of educated 
women in cities to form women’s organizations, who would eventually push their demands into 
the political arena (Forbes, 1999). A push for female suffrage was eventually adopted in 1918 by 
bigger players in the growing independence movement: the Congress Party, the India Home Rule 
League, and the Muslim League (Roy, 2005). These demands were initially rejected by the 
British colonial government, but the Government of India Act of 1919 gave the enfranchisement 
choice to newly established provincial assemblies (Simon, 1930).  
As the independence movement grew, key leaders such as Gandhi encouraged greater 
female participation in resisting colonial rule (Basu, 1995). Eventually, recognition of the 
contribution of women to the movement provided a platform for renewed political equality 
demands. By 1930, every provincial assembly had granted women the right to serve as a 
legislator and broader suffrage to women on a selective basis (Jensenius, 2018). Women were 
still required to be married, educated and own property to vote, which limited real 




kind of quotas (Jensenius, 2018), whether ethnic or gender-based, as he argued that the 
institution of quotas would only highlight and enhance social divisions (Jensenius, 2015). 
However, initial constitutional drafts, such as the Government of India Act of 1935, designated 
reserved seats for women and certain minorities at both the federal and provincial levels (GOI, 
1942). However, the 1935 act continued to restrict female suffrage to educated women or women 
married to a tax-paying man (Singer, 2007). Moreover, the dominant Congress Party established 
a firm opposition to including quotas for women, and pressured the primary women’s 
organizations into supporting this stance (Jensenius, 2018). Many of these women’s 
organizations maintained this position, despite stagnant representation, until the 1970s (John, 
2000). 
As true independence approached, women were actively involved in in the drafting of the 
national constitution (Agnihotri, 2012), but emerging party politics in independent India further 
sidelined demands for gender equality. Women who had been key members of the independence 
movement now had to compete for party nominations and appeal to voters, often against each 
other, which split the women’s movement (Forbes, 1999). Demands for gender reservations were 
not supported by their male colleagues or by party leaders, and when electoral competition 
began, the parties primarily nominated upper-caste propertied men to run (Sarkar, 1989). As all 
those engaged in the movement scrambled for political power in the vacuum of independence, 
women were expected to compete with the rest of the party workers seeking office (Forbes, 
1999). 
In recognition of the important role women played in the independence movement, and to 
increase the party’s appeal to women voters, leadership within the Congress party did try to 




informal 15-percent internal party nomination quota for women candidates (Katzenstein, 1978); 
however, compliance rates were uneven across states, and the number of women candidates was 
always significantly below the quota (Singer, 2007). On average, women only formed around 3-
percent of parliamentary candidates until the late 1990s when rates finally increased above 4-
percent, not reaching 7-percent until 2014 (Jensenius, 2018: 8). In retrospect, it appears likely 
that party leaders instituted the 1957 voluntary quota primarily to discourage any future demands 
for formal gender quotas (Jensenius, 2018).  
The party nomination process itself created additional problems for women candidates. 
Women were generally nominated in urban constituencies, where the larger educated female 
population was expected to be more supportive. Campaigning in the city also removed the need 
for female candidates to travel publicly in the rural areas, where such outgoing behavior was 
perceived as inappropriate for women (Singer, 2007). However, by restricting available 
constituencies, the party shuffled these women into areas far from their political bases 
(Jensenius, 2018). Women candidates were further hampered by fiscal and social constraints, as 
they were usually economically dependent on male family members, and families were often not 
interested in providing the same level of fiscal support to the women in the family as they 
provided for the men (Guha, 1974). As electoral competitiveness in India became more 
dependent on financial backing and political “muscle” via family and party support networks 
(Michelutti, 2010; Vaishnav, 2017), the fiscal barrier to entry for women has remained steep 
(Jensenius, 2018). 
Low representation and recognition of these barriers motivated a renewed push during the 
1970s by the women’s movement for greater representation in political power structures. The 




block. The report publicly discussed the considerable disadvantages and discrimination women 
faced across social, economic and political spheres, which triggered strong movements, largely 
urban, demanding rape and dowry-based violence protections from the government.18 The 
discussion on gender quotas resurfaced as well. The Committee briefly considered supporting 
gender quotas in the state legislative assemblies, but argued that quotas were designed to ensure 
representation of disadvantaged communities not gender. As women were a category that 
intersected communities, quotas were deemed not appropriate (Guha, 1974). The Committee did 
recommend the adoption of voluntary internal party candidate quotas (Guha, 1974), but the 
number of women candidates remained low and, at the state and national levels, female 
representation rarely moved above 5-percent. A brief blip in 1984, following the assassination of 
Indira Gandhi, pushed numbers temporarily higher as women candidates were unusually 
successful during the subsequent election, but these numbers quickly fell back to normal in the 
next election (Jensenius, 2018).  
A key restraint on growth continues to be party nominations. Notably, the percentage of 
elected women MPs has been consistently higher than the percentage of women candidates, 
which could illustrate voter preference for women candidates, but as Jensenius (2018) argues, 
this phenomenon is instead a result of parties generally only fielding women in areas they are 
confident of winning. Other studies have found similar results – parties are risk-averse, and tend 
to nominate women in party strongholds (Spary, 2007). Prior to the 1990s, the nationally 
dominant Congress Party nominated many more women for parliamentary and state assembly 
seats than its primary national competitor, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) (Jensenius, 2016: 
                                                          
 




16). However, the BJP quickly caught up in 1990s, but primarily in districts reserved for 
disadvantaged minority castes and indigenous tribes. Therefore, the increase in women fielded 
by the BJP pushed out very few men from the forward-castes, and instead came at the expense of 
the least powerful male politicians, those from minority communities (Jensenius, 2016). 
Tellingly, interviews conducted by Singer (2007) describe party leaderships who have responded 
to pressures to include more women by fielding primarily minority women because they are 
much less likely to challenge the party hierarchy than forward-caste women.   
Gender Quotas in India 
The initial opposition, encouraged by Congress Party leadership, to gender quotas by 
women’s organizations largely dissipated by the 1970s. Recognizing the lack of progress, these 
organizations began a renewed push which led to the proposal of quotas across several states 
during the 1980s, and persuaded most states to institute reserved positions for women in local 
village councils, but these were usually nominated positions instead of elected and came with 
little power (Singer, 2007). Then, in 1983, the southern state of Karnataka established a 25-
percent reservation for women across elected village and city councils (Jensenius, 2018), and 
enhanced the power of these local bodies by shifting key administrative positions to the district 
level.19 Based on this concept, proposals to expand gender reservations at the local level to the 
entire country emerged in 1988 (GOI, 1988). These eventually culminated in the national 
parliament passing the 73rd and 74th amendments to the Constitution in 1992, with little 
discussion (Tawa Lama-Rewal, 2005) and almost no political opposition (Kishwar, 1997), which 
Jensenius (2018) attributes to the fact that gender quotas at the local level did not affect male 
                                                          
 




politicians at the national level. These amendments both instituted a 33-percent reservation of all 
local elected bodies for women, with a recommended level of 50-percent, and shifted a 
significant amount of power to these local bodies.20  
Building on the rapid passage and lack of opposition to the 73rd and 74th amendments, 
women’s organizations quickly pushed for quotas at state and national levels (Krook, 2010). The 
Women’s Reservation Bill proposing that 33-percent of seats across state assemblies and the 
national parliament also be reserved for women was introduced in 1996 (Menon, 2000). 
However, following the concerns discussed in Chapter One about “progressive” women 
monopolizing these reservations at the expense of “traditional” women, opposition quickly built 
across male politicians who argued that only forward-caste, upper-class women would be able to 
compete at the state and national levels (Jensenius, 2018). However, others have argued this 
claim was largely a ploy to derail the bill and protect their positions (Samujh, 2005). Ultimately, 
the Women’s Reservation Bill was passed by the Rajya Sabha (upper house), but continues to 
languish in the Lok Sabha (lower house) well into 2018. 
Urban and Rural Bodies: Local Power Structures 
Aside from establishing gender quotas, the 73rd and 74th amendments significantly 
decentralized state governments across India. These amendments required each state to conduct 
elections at the local level and to devolve considerable powers of expenditure to local 
governance bodies (Bhavnani, 2009). These local bodies are divided into the urban local bodies 
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(ULB), which govern urban centers, and the panchayati raj institutions (PRI), which govern rural 
India.  
Urban local bodies, depending on the size of the city, range from the nagar parishad (city 
council) for the smallest cities to the nagar nigam (municipal corporation) for the largest cities. 
Regardless of the size, these bodies are tasked with maintaining governmental facilities and 
services for the city, from sanitation to roads to benefit programs. Each body is composed of 
both an elected deliberative wing and an unelected bureaucratic administrative civil service. 
Depending on the body, elected members of these bodies control a small budget of state funds 
that can be spent on improving their constituency, and can petition for more if needed. Broader 
power is given to the executive of the deliberative wing, which is elected by the deliberative 
members, who governs the city-wide budget creation process, of which the final product must be 
approved by the at-large body. However, allocated spending must be approved and carried out by 
the unelected bureaucratic wing, which significantly constrains and weakens the deliberative 
wing (Bhavnani, 2009). 
The core unit of the panchayati raj institution is the village council (gram panchayat). 
Gram panchayats are then grouped under a block council (panchayat samiti).21 Each council is 
composed of elected members and is supported by administrative bureaucracy. Like urban local 
bodies, panchayats are tasked with providing basic government services and benefits across the 
villages they represent; however, the bodies of the panchayati raj to a degree are more powerful 
than their urban counterparts. Panchayats have access to the National Rural Employment 
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Guarantee (NREG) funds, which are designed to improve rural employment in the agriculture 
off-season by funding public works projects proposed by the panchayats.22 Also in contrast to 
the ULB, constituents elect both the representatives who sit on the panchayat and the executive 
leader (sarpanch or pradhan). The sarpanch specifically is quite powerful. They have the final 
say on the investment of public funds (such as the NREG), and in the selection of beneficiaries. 
Furthermore, constituents are intended to participate to a degree in panchayat meetings, even 
voting on certain decisions made by their panchayat representatives (Beaman et al, 2010), a 
feature which is generally not supported in the ULBs. 
Within the elected bodies of both the ULBs and PRIs, quotas in the form of reserved 
seats have been established for both disadvantaged communities and for women. As a note on 
terminology, both the terms “community” and “caste” are used throughout this dissertation, but 
with important distinctions. Community is a broader term referring to a group of people who 
share a uniting characteristic, which in India is generally location, history, religion, language, 
and/or caste. Caste is a more specific term referring to a group of people with a common lineage, 
who historically likely shared a common occupation, religion, geographical location, and 
relations. Critically, caste as an occupation identifier has created a binding association with 
social class. Castes that were historically involved in menial labor tended to be of a lower social 
class and thus labeled as lower castes.23 Furthermore, the term “untouchability” is often used to 
refer to specific castes associated with perceived “polluted” occupations, such as the tanning of 
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the ULB structure into panchayats (Interview on 5/10/2017 with human right’s activist in Jaipur). 
23 Caste stratification is also ascribed a religious origination, which dictated a hierarchy of castes based in the Hindu 





animal skins, treating and disposing of the dead, and sewer and sanitation work, which created a 
stigma that continues today to prevent many from these communities from engaging in certain 
public places where “purity” is seen as important, such as temples.24 Notably, not all 
communities in India are associated with a specific caste, and therefore I only use the more 
specific term “caste” when appropriate, and otherwise fall back on the term “community”. 
Reservations for disadvantaged communities date back to independence. Recognizing 
that strong social bias against lower castes, alongside their historic economic and educational 
deprivation, would make candidates from these castes less politically competitive, the drafters of 
the Indian constitution implemented quotas for these groups in the national parliament and across 
state assemblies starting in 1950 (Jensenius, 2016). Specifically, this institution designated a set 
number of reserved seats to members from castes classified either as Scheduled Castes (SC) or 
indigenous tribes classified as Scheduled Tribes (ST), which were proportional to their share of 
total population within each state. It is important to note that for a caste to qualify for SC status 
(around 450 castes today), they generally must have been historically treated as “untouchable” 
by the rest of Hindu society, thus facing significant prejudice due to their caste origin (Chandra, 
2000: 27). Qualification for ST status is similar, but requires a lineal connection to an indigenous 
community. 
In 1979, the Mandal Commission was convened by parliament to reexamine the 
condition of the lower classes. The Commission recommended the expansion of reservations to a 
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newly established classification, Other Backward Classes (OBC). In contrast to Scheduled Caste 
and Scheduled Tribe communities, OBC communities are understood to be historically 
disadvantaged educationally, economically and socially, but not due to pervasive societal bias 
against their particular caste or community. Notably, some non-Hindu minorities, such as 
Muslim communities, qualify for OBC status. Given the broader qualifications, OBCs have 
always formed the largest block of reservations and thus a significant electoral consideration. 
Today, positions are reserved in elected governance institutions at the national, state and local 
levels, as well as for civil service positions in governmental agencies, and student slots in public 
education institutions for individuals from a community who qualify for either OBC, SC, or ST 
status (Jensenius, 2016). Only individuals from these communities can fill these positions. 
Numbers differ by state depending on population proportions, but on average the national 
distribution of reserved seats is around 27-percent for Other Backward Classes, 16-percent for 
Scheduled Castes, and eight-percent for Scheduled Tribes. All other communities are generally 
referred to as “forward-castes” or “General-castes”, and receive no reservation benefits. 
As discussed, the 73rd and 74th amendments established a gender quota which reserves 
33-percent of elected positions across urban local bodies and panchayati raj institutions.25 This 
translates to 33-percent of seats within each ULB deliberative body, but no gender requirements 
                                                          
 
25 Some states voluntarily raised this to 50-percent following the Mandal Commission recommendations. However, 
in some of these states, such as Rajasthan, the increase to 50-percent was struck down by state courts on the 
grounds that this expansion pushed the number of reserved seats too high when combined with seats reserved for 
disadvantaged castes. Additional justification fielded by the Rajasthan High Court was reportedly the fact that a 
reservation level of 50-percent was higher than the proportion of women in the population in Rajasthan (48-
percent) and thus too high (Interview on 5/10/2017 with human right’s activist in Jaipur). However, it appears that 
the reduction to 33-percent was only applied or enforced for Rajasthan urban local body elections in 2014, as 





for the executive mayoral position. In the PRIs, the quota translates into both a reservation of 33-
percent of seats within each panchayat council, and the reservation of 33-percent across all 
sarpanch positions.26 This is notable, given the significant powers and financial discretion the 
sarpanch possesses, as discussed in the beginning of this section. While each state is given 
latitude in the implementation of the gender reservation, most have a lottery process that 
randomly assigns the reservation to a constituency (Beaman et al, 2010). Overall, up to five 
elections have been held in ULBs and PRIs across the country since the passage of the 73rd and 
74th amendments, which entails millions of seats in more than 220,000 governmental bodies 
(Bhavnani, 2009: 24). As reserved seat quotas are difficult to subvert, compliance is very high. 
With a minimum of 33-percent representation for women across practically all local governance 
institutions, reservations have pushed female representation at the local level far above the 
national and state legislatures. 
It is important to note that gender reservations also cross-cut caste reservations. Across 
all seats reserved for each reserved-caste or community grouping (OBC/SC/ST) and open seats 
that are unreserved (General), within each group, 33-percent must be reserved for a woman from 
that grouping (i.e. 33-percent of all Scheduled Caste seats must be reserved for SC women). This 
establishes a system where every constituency can hold one of eight labels, which determines 
                                                          
 
26 While technically reserved for all women, there appear to be additional requirements in some states that restrict 
candidacy to a degree. In Rajasthan, minimum education qualifications for candidates have been established for 
upcoming elections in 2019, and reportedly a requirement that the candidate possess a toilet in their home 
(Interview on 5/10/2017 with human right’s activist in Jaipur), as part of a national campaign to improve access to 
household plumbing (approximately half of all Indians still relieve themselves outdoors, a factor which has been 
linked to an increased risk of rape for women). The nearby state of Haryana reportedly added the absence of loan 
debt and paid electricity bills to its restrictions on candidature (Interview on 5/10/2017 with human right’s activist 




who is able to run in a seat. The following chart lists each of these eight labels, their acronym, 
and who qualifies to run in a seat assigned that label. 
Table 2.1: Reservation Qualifications 
Label Qualified Candidates 
General (GEN) Candidate from any community, of any 
gender 
General Woman (GENW) Female candidate from any community 
Other Backward Classes (OBC) Candidate from OBC community, of any 
gender 
Other Backward Classes Women (OBCW) Female candidate from an OBC community 
Scheduled Caste (SC) Candidate from an SC caste, of any gender 
Scheduled Caste Woman (SCW) Female candidate from an SC caste 
Scheduled Tribe (ST) Candidate from a Scheduled Tribe, any 
gender 
Scheduled Tribe Woman (STW) Female candidate from a Scheduled Tribe 
 
To determine the number of seats allocated to each label within a ULB or a PRI, 
reservations are essentially layered. The first layer is strictly community and caste groupings 
(GEN, OBC, SC, ST), which are allocated based on each group’s proportion of total population 
across all constituencies of the ULB or PRI. This process establishes the number of labels from 
each grouping that will be assigned across constituencies. This number of group labels are then 
placed into a lottery and randomly drawn and assigned to a constituency,27 which will then be 
assigned that label, and the accompanying group reservation, in the next election.  
The second layer attaches a gender reservation randomly to 33-percent of all seats 
allocated to each one of the community and caste groupings, again through a lottery. An 
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populations of that respective caste, which increases the probability an OBC reservation will be assigned to a 




important exception to the random assignment of gender reservations is the requirement that a 
constituency cannot be reserved for a woman in consecutive elections, likely to ensure that men 
from these constituencies are not permanently excluded from office (Bhavnani, 2009). Therefore, 
gender reservations are randomly assigned, but only to constituencies that were not gender 
reserved in the last election. Constituencies that were gender reserved in the last election are 
pulled out of the gender reservation lottery. However, this requirement is waived in delimitation 
(redistricting) years following the decennial census, as all constituencies are essentially new, 
which allows geographical areas to be reserved for a woman in consecutive years. While this 
complex process has likely been manipulated at some point, research has found that over 
multiple elections, the reservation lottery does appear to be truly random within the 
constitutional limits set (Bhavnani, 2009), although this likely varies by state. 
To make process of assigning reservations clearer, I will use an example. The rest of this 
dissertation examines the Jaipur Municipal Corporation (JMC), an urban local body in Rajasthan, 
so I will describe the process used to assign reservations for the 2014 JMC elections, with Table 
2.2 providing reference. The JMC has 91 total seats across 91 single-member districts. Thirty-
four seats were allocated as reserved for Other Backward Classes/Scheduled Castes/Scheduled 
Tribes in proportion to their population in Jaipur. The remaining 57 General seats were open to 
all candidates. Thirty-three percent of each grouping (GEN/OBC/SC/ST) were then reserved for 
women from that grouping (i.e. 19 of the 57 General Seats were reserved for General Women, 
which are open to any woman from any community). These eight community/gender 
reservations labels were then assigned across all 91 districts. The following table illustrates the 
step-by-step process that starts with 91 total seats, the assignment of group reservations, and then 




Table 2.2: Process of Assigning Reservations in the JMC for 2014 
1. Total Seats 2. Group Reservations Assigned 3. Gender Reservations Assigned 
91 General 57 seats (63%) General 
General(W) 
38 seats (42%) 
19 seats (21%) 
 OBC 19 seats (21%) OBC 
OBC(W) 
13 seats (14%) 
6 seats (7%) 
 SC 12 seats (13%) SC 
SC(W) 
8 seats (9%) 
4 seats (4%) 
 ST 3 seats (3%) ST 
ST(W) 
2 seats (2%) 
1 seat (1%) 
 
Ultimately, this process in 2014 created a deliberative body allocated across reservations as 
shown below in Figure 2.1. 
Figure 2.1: The 2014 JMC by Reservation Label 
 





Spearheaded by the women’s movement, the growth in demand for more equal 
representation for women in positions of power eventually spurred constitutional reform that 
enacted gender quotas across India in local governance bodies. However, these quotas have not 
resulted in the election of significantly higher numbers of women at the state and national levels, 
and expansion of the quota to these higher levels continues to face resistance by male members 
who fear for their own positions. Moreover, research has shown that parties continue to be 
unwilling to “risk” nominating women in anything but the safest electoral districts, and social 
norms continue to restrict the ability of female candidates to participate fully. Female candidates 
are also still generally dependent on male family members both for economic support for 
campaigning, and for social support to maintain societal approval. Overall, gender quotas have 
not been the panacea in India for inequality many optimists may have hoped for. The next 
chapter will discuss issues with institutional design that may have led to these less than optimal 
outcomes, before then moving into the analysis of parshad narratives from the JMC that reveal 
the inability of the quota system to overcome powerful and pervasive patriarchal norms. 
Throughout the dissertation, the eight reservation labels discussed in this chapter will be utilized: 
General and General Woman (GEN/GENW), Other Backward Class and OBC Woman 






Chapter 3: Institutional Design 
In his research on gender reservations in the municipal corporation of Mumbai, Bhavnani 
(2009) argues that quotas can establish a foundation of fairer representation that can eventually 
be removed once a marginalized group becomes politically established, thereby discouraging 
demographic appeals from becoming politically permanent. His analysis demonstrates that 
gender quotas make women overall more competitive in a ward, even after they are removed in 
subsequent elections. However, in Jaipur, parshad anecdotes suggest that a “stay-in-your-lane” 
norm may be establishing itself within the reservation system, which encourages candidates to 
not compete outside of their reservation. As one General-caste male parshad put it: 
On reservations, I think that if there are reservations then each group should only 
compete within their reserved seats. An unreserved General Seat shouldn’t have any 
OBC/SC/ST or women competing for it, only General men. This is because there will be 
no space left for General men otherwise, it’s already 50% off limits.28 
 
As discussed in the previous chapter, General-caste candidates are blocked from competing in 
any group-reserved seats. Furthermore, General-caste men are also blocked from competing in 
any gender-reserved seats, even those open to all communities (General Woman). Frustration 
over the limited number of seats available to them, and the concentration of competition within 
the seats they can compete for (General Seats only), has led some General-caste men to suggest 
General Seats should essentially be informally “reserved” for them by normatively excluding 
candidates who would otherwise qualify for a formal reservation. 
                                                          
 




If such a norm existed and was powerful enough, it would severely cap the ability of 
gender quotas to serve as a foundation for women to expand from – into open competition with 
men as Bhavnani (2009) suggests. Evidence that there is significant resistance to women 
competing outside of gender-reserved seats was provided by several female parshads: 
It’s really hard for women to get tickets without a reservation, because there is a general 
conception that women should only compete in the gender-reserved seats. If they are in a 
general seat, they are seen as taking a man’s seat.29  
The data discussed in this chapter does demonstrate that women are not competing in the 
open-gender seats against men on a broad scale; however, the causes are likely not solely with 
parties resistant to nominating women. As an electoral institution, gender quotas cannot force 
parties to nominate more than the minimum number of women, and thus do not automatically 
create a foundation that women politicians can build on, particularly if parties continue to view 
women as a nomination “risk”, as discussed in the previous chapter. However, parties may also 
be facing a lack of strong women candidates. Gender reserved elections are just as competitive as 
open gender races, but still may not be adequately preparing woman candidates to win elections 
without a reservation, especially given the advantage men have in political experience. 
The potential shortage of competitive female candidates is likely a result of significant 
discrepancies between men and women in the development of political experience and support 
prior to entering the JMC and is compounded by low female incumbency rates. Several factors 
appear to be driving low incumbency rates for both men and women in the JMC: low re-
nomination rates by parties, the displacement of candidates by the random assignment of a group 
                                                          
 




and/or gender reservation to their ward which blocks them from running again, and the mandated 
removal of gender reservations after one term. 
Stay in Your Lane: Lack of Competition Outside of Reserved Seats 
Using electoral data from the Rajasthan Electoral Commission, this analysis examines all 
candidates across the 91 wards of the 2014 election. Overall, I find very low numbers of women 
challenging men in non-gender-reserved seats, in particular women from disadvantaged 
communities. While we see several reserved-group men competing with General-caste men in 
open seats, very few reserved-group women challenge reserved-group men in their respective 
reserved seats. Furthermore, parties are not nominating many women candidates to compete in 
races outside of the gender reservation. I will review candidate demographics from 2014 and 
then discuss the party nomination of women and the lack of women competing against men. 
Table 3.1: 2014 JMC Election Demographics 
Gender Candidates Group Category  Candidates 
M 377 (71%) General 222 (41%) 
F 153 (29%) GEN(W) 95 (18%) 
Total 530 OBC 95 (18%) 
  OBC(W) 25 (5%) 
  SC 43 (8%) 
  SC(W) 27 (5%) 
  ST 17 (3%) 
  ST(W) 6 (1%) 
 
As Table 3.1 illustrates, men made up the majority of candidates in 2014 at 71-percent. 
Notably, women composed 29-percent of total candidates, roughly equal to the proportion of 
gender-reserved seats (33-percent). Furthermore, across group categories, the proportion of each 





Table 3.2: Party Nomination by Gender 
Party Women Nominated M/F Ratio 
BJP 31 (35%) 1.87 
INC 35 (40%) 1.51 
BSP 2 (11%) 8 
CPI(M) 0 (0%) 0 
NCP 1 (33%) 2 
Independent 84 (25%) 2.95 
 
Of the two parties with successful candidates in the 2014 elections, the BJP and Congress (INC), 
Congress had a slightly better ratio of male to female candidates with around 50% more male 
candidates, while the BJP approached nearly twice as many male candidates. Those competing 
outside of a party banner in the independent ranks were primarily men, by a nearly 3:1 ratio. 
Both Tables 3.1 and 3.2 demonstrate low numbers of female candidates overall, and suggest that 
few women are competing outside of the gender reserved seats, as the percentage of women 
competing is not much higher than the percentage of reserved seats. 
Table 3.3: Women Competing Against Men 
Seat Reservation Women Candidates Reserved-Group Women 
General Seats 10 (3.4%) 1 (0.03%) 
OBC Seats  0 (0%) 0 (0%) 
SC Seats 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 
ST Seats 1 (14%) 1 (14%) 
   
Indeed, as Table 3.3 above shows, 11 women competed in open-gender elections, which 
was only 7.2% of all women candidates. Nine of these women were General-caste competing in 
General Seats, one was a Scheduled Caste woman competing in a General Seat, and one 
Scheduled Tribes woman competed in a reserved-group/open-gender seat. These women all 




reservation in general, and specifically the lack of women from reserved groups competing 
outside of their reservation. Only two reserved-group women did so, one competed against 
General-caste men in a General Seat and lost, and one competed against ST men in an open-
gender ST seat and won. Even though reserved-group women can compete in both the reserved-
group/open-gender seats of their respective community and the General Seats, very few do so, 
likely because they would have to challenge men in these seats. Furthermore, while 25% of the 
total seats in the JMC are reserved-group/open-gender (OBC/SC/ST), meaning that only men or 
women from the respective reserved community can compete in these seats, only one out of the 
99 candidates competing in these seats was a woman. No woman from an OBC community 
challenged OBC men in the 13 OBC-reserved/open-gender seats, no woman from a SC caste 
challenged SC men in the eight SC seats, and, as mentioned, only one woman from a ST 
community challenged an ST man in the two ST seats. Overall, women rarely challenge men in 
open-gender seats, particularly not women from reserved-groups. Comparatively, 57 men from 
reserved groups, 37-percent of male candidates from reserved groups, challenged outside of their 
group-reservation for a General Seat. While reserved-group men regularly venture outside of 
seats reserved specifically for them, women in general rarely do, especially women from 
reserved-groups. 
Certainly, low numbers of women competing in open-gender wards is problematic for a 
gender reservation system that has been in place for five election cycles over two decades. As 
discussed, the ultimate goal of gender reservations is to establish a foundation of political 
representation that will make women candidates more competitive against men over time. 
However, this would entail women competing against men in open elections. As this data shows, 




importantly for quota effectiveness in the long-term, this means women are not gaining 
experience competing against men and not demonstrating that women can beat men in open 
elections on a broad scale. Notably, Bhavnani’s (2009) analysis of Mumbai Municipal 
Corporation elections found that in open-gender wards, seats without a gender reservation, 
higher numbers of female candidates increased the odds that a woman would win. Therefore, the 
shortage of female candidates in open-gender elections is likely the primary reason why over the 
past three Jaipur Municipal Corporation elections, only one woman in 2004, one in 2009, and 
three in 2014 have won a seat without a gender reservation, competing against men.30 Finally, 
the fact that gender exclusion appears to be even stronger from women from reserved-groups is 
concerning. While women overall are not competing against men across the board, the highest 
levels of exclusion appear to be happening to the most disadvantaged women – those from 
reserved communities. 
Party Restrictions 
The primary mover in restricting or encouraging women to run outside the gender 
reservation would be the political parties. Party nomination is key to winning elections in Jaipur. 
Out of 91 winners in 2014, only eight candidates won as an independent without a party 
nomination.  
 
                                                          
 
30 It should be noted that there were only 70 seats in the 2004 JMC elections, 77 in 2009, and 91 in 2014. 
Furthermore, while in 2004 and 2014 only 33-percent of seats were gender-reserved, in 2009 gender reservations 
were temporarily boosted to 50-percent, which likely reduced the number of women candidates competing 




Table 3.4: Female Candidates Nominated in Open-Gender Wards 
Party Female Candidates  % of Total Nominations 
BJP 1 1.1% 
INC 5 5.7% 
BSP 0 0% 
CPI(M) 0 0% 
NCP 0 0% 
IND 5 1.5% 
Total Candidates 11 8.3% 
 
Table 3.4 demonstrates that few women were nominated by any party to compete against men in 
open-gender wards. The vast majority of women are nominated only to compete in gender-
reserved wards. In fact, of the few women competing against men in open elections, little more 
than half were nominated by a party. Furthermore, only the two national parties nominated 
women to compete outside of a gender reservation, but both nominated less than six percent. 
Notably, the BJP nominated only one female candidate in an open-gender seat, which 
corresponds with the overall unwillingness of the BJP to nominate women that Jensenius (2016: 
16) observed prior to the 1990s. However, Congress is not much better at only six percent. These 
numbers indicate a probable gender bias within the party hierarchy that controls the candidate 
selection process. One female parshad, who received a nomination to compete in an open-gender 
seat and won, said that she encountered resistance within the BJP to nominating candidates such 
as her: 
I ran in the next election, in 2014, when the seat was… not gender reserved. There were 
objections within the party to me running in this seat, as women should only run in the 
gender reserved seats.31 
                                                          
 





Still, the source of this bias is likely much more nuanced, and several additional factors must be 
considered. 
The first is that a small number of key party members, usually men, control the 
nomination process for local level positions with the national parties.32 Therefore, the 
perceptions of a small number of people can exert disproportionate influence over the entire 
process. These men grant nominations on candidate electability, which is generally focused on 
ethnicity, caste, funding, and “muscle power” or workers on the ground who can contribute to 
the campaign (M.P. Singh, 2003). If a candidate lacks significantly in any one of these 
categories, they are likely to be discounted. On these terms, any perception by key members 
within the party that female candidates are electorally weaker than male candidates would lead to 
lower numbers of nominated women. While women can qualify just as easily as their male 
counterparts in terms of ethnic and caste-based qualifications, they are generally much weaker in 
terms of funding and “muscle power”. Women candidates are usually very reliant on their 
families and male benefactors for both funding and supporters on the ground (Guha, 1974; 
Jensenius, 2018).  
A second consideration is supply-side. Parties may not have enough candidates willing to 
run outside of the gender-reservation to nominate. Table 3.5 below provides a side-by-side 
comparison for each community group between the men and women from that group. The total 
number of candidates by gender are provided in the third column, along with the number of 
                                                          
 




candidates by gender who are competing outside of their group and/or gender-reservation in the 
fourth column. This could be either men from a reserved-group (OBC/SC/ST) competing in a 
General Seat, women from a reserved-group competing in an open-group/gender-reserved 
General Woman Seat, or any woman competing against men in any reserved-group/open-gender 
seat. Note that no General-caste men can compete outside of a reservation, because they have no 
reservation. Each of these candidates are competing in a much more unrestricted field, and thus 
face more competition than they would if they only competed for the reserved seats they 
qualified for. 
Table 3.5: Candidates Competing Outside of Reservation by Group 
Candidate Group Candidate Gender Total Candidates Outside Reservation 
General M  222 0 (0%) 
Gen(W) F 95 9 (9%) 
OBC M 95 34 (36%) 
OBC(W) F 25 2 (8%) 
SC M 43 12 (28%) 
SC(W) F 27 2 (7%) 
ST M 17 11 (65%) 
ST(W) F 6 1 (17%) 
  530 71 (13%) 
 
As Table 3.5 illustrates, across all groupings, significantly more men are willing or able 
to compete outside of a “protected” seat reserved for them (again except for General men who 
have no reserved seats). Within each group, there are significantly less women than men 
competing outside of their reservation. Again, participation is even lower for women from 
reserved-groups. While percentage-wise there are not considerably less women from reserve-
groups than General-caste women competing in open-gender seats, it is notable that reserved-
group women qualify for more open-gender seats than General-caste women. While General 




Backward Classes qualify for 51 open-gender seats, given the large size of the OBC reservation 
and their ability to run in both OBC and General Seats. However, again only two OBC women 
challenged these seats. Scheduled Caste women and Scheduled Tribes women qualify for the 
second and third most potential seats at 46 and 40 respectively, but only two SC and one ST 
challenged these seats. While women from these communities have the widest access within the 
reservation system, very few take advantage of it.  
Overall, this indicates that factors outside of the reservation itself are restricting the 
incentive or ability for these women to compete for seats outside of a reservation. While Table 
3.4 demonstrated that parties are nominating very few women to run against men, there appears 
to be a lack of competitive candidates as well. First, parties do not appear to be ignoring 
competitive female candidates. Of the 11 women competing against men across all elections, six 
were nominated by a party. Three of these women won and three came in as runner up. Of the 
five remaining women who did not receive a nomination, none achieved more than one-percent 
of the vote total. Therefore, parties may be willing to nominate strong women candidates to 
compete against men, but are not going to take a risk on weaker women candidates. The bigger 
problem may be a lack of strong women candidates for parties to nominate. Additionally, in 
Mumbai, Bhavnani (2009) found that women received only seven-percent of party nominations 
in open-gender wards in the 1997 and 2002 Mumbai elections, which is comparable to the 2014 
elections in Jaipur, where, out of 136 total nominations handed out by parties for open-gender 
wards, only four-percent were given to women.  
While part of the explanation for low nomination numbers is likely a lack of strong 
female candidates for parties to nominate, it is also important to note that parties themselves are 




encourage both party leaders and voters to learn about the ability of women candidates to win 
elections and make both groups more comfortable nominating and voting for women, even when 
they are competing against men (Bhavnani, 2009). Promisingly, Bhavnani found that parties in 
Mumbai were more willing to grant women tickets in open-gender wards when that ward had 
previously reserved for a woman. In Jaipur, the effect appears to be similar. Out of the six 
women nominated by a party to compete against men in an open-gender ward in 2014, five were 
nominated to ward areas that were at least partially gender-reserved in 2009.33 Furthermore, the 
one exception was a woman nominated to a ward area that was previously an open-group/open-
gender General Seat, but was won by an OBC woman in 2009. Therefore, every woman 
nominated by a party to compete against men in an open-gender ward in 2014 did so in a ward 
area at least partially represented by a woman in 2009.34 Moreover, three women challenged men 
and won in an open-gender ward in 2014, but all did so in a ward area that was at least partially 
gender-reserved in 2009. These results indicate that parties are primarily willing to “risk” 
nominating a woman in an open-gender wards only if that ward has had recent previous 
experience with a female representative. While these results suggest that the gender reservation 
system has been partially successful in persuading parties and voters that women can compete 
with men in specific cases, it is important to remember that this learning period began over two 
decades ago. Moreover, proportionally, the number of women nominated for open seats in Jaipur 
in 2014 is still worse than it was in Mumbai in 2002. Shifting gender biases within conservative 
party structures is a very gradual process.  
                                                          
 
33 Ward lines between 2009 and 2014 do not line up perfectly due to the redrawing of lines after the 2010 census. 
34 Across the five women competing independent of a party, three did so in a ward area previously reserved for a 




Additional evidence is provided by a broad analysis across Rajasthan. Essentially, the 
national parties appear to be only nominating the minimum required number of women to 
compete in nearly every gender-reserved seat, but are rarely going beyond that into open-gender 
seats.  
Table 3.6: 2014-15 Percentage of Female Candidates by Party Across Rajasthan 
Party Urban Municipalities (2014) Panchayats (2015) 
BJP 37% 52% 
Congress 37% 52% 
BSP 28% 36% 
CPI 0% 33% 
CPI(M) 20% 41% 
NCP 26% 0% 
Independents 31% 40% 
State-wide Average 33% 49% 
 
In 2014, the average percentage of female candidates across all urban municipalities in 
Rajasthan was 33-percent, which is equal to the percentage of gender-reserved seats. Only the 
national parties pushed above the minimum number of female candidates, and only slightly. 
Across rural panchayati raj elections of the following year, 2015, where Rajasthan voluntarily 
kept the gender reservation at 50-percent, 49-percent of candidates were women.35 Therefore, the 
proportion of female candidates is practically equal to reservation percentages in rural elections 
as well. However, a distinguishing point is that the gender reservation has mandated proportional 
                                                          
 
35 Rajasthan initially expanded the gender reservation to 50-percent for all elections, but was forced to roll this 
back to 33-percent after the Rajasthan High Court ruled that 50-percent was too high. It is not clear why PRI 





gender equality across panchayats at 50-percent, and therefore fewer female candidates are 
available to compete outside the reserved seats. 
These observations create additional concerns regarding the effectiveness of the gender 
reservation as a foundation for female candidate growth. If female candidates are unable to 
consistently use the reservation to become competitive for party nominations in parshad 
elections without a gender reservation, then it is difficult to foresee how they could progress into 
state and national-level elections where no gender reservation exists. The causality dilemma 
inherent in these conclusions is present in the political gender equality discussions across 
political systems. Parties will not nominate women if they are seen as weaker than their male 
counterparts; however, candidates competing in political environments where the party is strong 
need party support to become competitive candidates. Therefore, without parties taking political 
risks on female candidates, it is difficult for women to become politically strong enough to 
receive a nomination. Gender quota systems essentially force parties to take political risks on 
female candidates by requiring them to nominate women. However, in the Indian quota 
reservation system, they are only forced to nominate women in gender-reserved seats, and are 
never required to nominate women to compete against men. Proposed solutions to this dilemma 
in other political systems have been candidate quotas, which require parties to nominate a 
percentage of women across all seats. This system encourages parties to develop strong female 
candidates who can win against both male and female candidates, as they could potentially face 
both. However, this system does not create a minimum level of women in parliament, as possibly 
every woman nominated could lose to a man, particularly if the party protects its male candidates 





Competitiveness and Continuity 
As discussed, part of the reason parties nominate so few women in open-gender elections 
is likely a lack of competitive female candidates. As gender reservations significantly restrict the 
pool of qualified candidates per seat, a possible negative side effect is decreased 
competitiveness. A strong female candidate in a gender-reserved seat may not be as competitive 
in an open-gender seat if the quality of her previous competition was considerably lower. 
Table 3.7: Level of Competition in 2014 JMC Elections 
Seat Reservation # of Seats Candidates Margin of Victory  Competitive* Share 
Gen 38 7.6 17% 17 (45%) 47% 
Gen(W) 19 4.7 19% 6 (32%) 52% 
OBC 13 4.7 30% 2 (15%) 57% 
OBC(W) 6 3.7 15% 3 (50%) 50% 
SC 8 3.9 13% 3 (38%) 48% 
SC(W) 4 6.3 17% 1 (25%) 44% 
ST 2 3.5 12% 1 (50%) 45% 
ST(W) 1 5.0 12% 0 (0%) 49% 
Gen-Reserved  30 4.7 18% 10 (33%) 50% 
All 91 5.8 19% 33 (36%) 50% 
*All values are weighted averages, and a competitive seat is defined as having a MOV < 10% 
The analysis of competitiveness across JMC seats in 2014 in Table 3.7 illustrates, 
unsurprisingly, that General elections had by far the highest number of candidates competing in 
2014, as anyone can compete for these seats. Interestingly, these were followed by SC Woman 
seats, which are much more restrictive, as only women from an SC caste can compete. It is also 
notable that while OBC open-gender races had more candidates than OBC Woman gender-
reserved, both SC(W) and ST(W) gender-reserved races had more candidates than the SC and ST 
open-gender races. This observation is notable given the previously discussed lack of SC and ST 
women competing against men in open-gender seats. While few female candidates from the 




gender-reserved seats. Overall, gender-reserved seats do not have considerably fewer candidates 
on average than seats overall, particularly when considering how restrictive they are.  
There is also little difference in the average margin-of-victory (MOV) or in the number of 
competitive seats when comparing gender-reserved seats to seats overall. What does stand out 
are OBC-reserved/open-gender seats, which have a much higher than average MOV and a much 
lower number of competitive seats. Notably, this is not driven by an outlier, as eight out of the 13 
Other Backward Class seats had a higher than average MOV. The lack of competitiveness in 
OBC open-gender seats could raise the barrier-to-entry for OBC women candidates looking to 
make the jump from gender-reserved to open-gender seats. The presence of dominant male 
candidates in these races both makes competing for a party nomination more difficult and 
disincentivizes female candidates from investing time and resources. This could partially explain 
the previously discussed complete lack of OBC women competing against OBC men in open-
gender OBC seats.  
This analysis demonstrates that gender-reserved elections are nearly as competitive as the 
open-gender elections. However, despite considerable numbers of women candidates in the 
gender-reserved seats, few female candidates from the reserved-groups competed in the open-
gender races. In the case of OBC women, the greater competitiveness of open-gender OBC 
elections may be a deterrent. An additional deterrent may be drastically different electoral 
environments when shifting from a gender-reserved to an open-gender election. When gender 
reservations are instituted within a political and social system that discourage widespread 
political engagement by women, the reservation allows women to enter politics at a higher level 
of competitiveness than men. Despite their relative lack of political experience when compared 




only a woman can be nominated for gender-reserved seats. Despite their lack of experience, 
these same women are competitive because their challengers in these reserved seats are women 
who are often just as inexperienced. In contrast, across castes and communities, men on average 
have much more political experience and generally must compete against similarly experienced 
challengers. The high level of competition requires most men to work their way up from lower-
level party positions to gain enough favor and public support for a nomination and electoral win. 
This creates separate environments of competition that are perpetuated by the lack of 
competition between men and women, as women rarely enter the open-gender contests. The 
result could be a system that does not select for the politically experienced women who would be 
more competitive against men. Further research is needed, but as discussed further in Chapter 
Eight, men have significantly more political experience than women parshads. Therefore, two 
separate “leagues” may be forming, with divergent requirements to be competitive – one in the 
open-gender seats with primarily male contestants, the other in the gender-reserved seats with 
only women. Both leagues are intra-competitive, but there is no arrangement within the gender-
reserved league that encourages the development of women who can compete in the open-gender 
league.  
The key factor to the male advantage in political experience is time. Most male parshads 
have engaged extensively in some form of politics for several years, often decades, prior to 
entering the JMC, whereas for most women, competing for parshad was one of their first 
political experiences. By allowing women to enter without significant political experience, the 
gender reservation provides a leg-up to these women. However, to truly level out the playing 
field, these novice women need to spend considerable time catching up to their male counterparts 




women who won in open-gender wards were incumbents brought into politics through a past 
gender reservation, possibly demonstrating that the reservation can help ameliorate to a degree 
the initial gender discrepancy in political experience through incumbency. Comparably, in 
Jaipur, across all 91 parshad seats in the JMC, out of the 31 women who won in 2014, five were 
incumbents from either 2004 or 2009. All of these female incumbents started their parshad 
careers in gender-reserved seats. In turn, of the three women who contested and won open-
gender seats, two were incumbents from gender-reserved seats. For the women contesting open-
gender seats, incumbency certainly appears to help. Still, returning to the previous section, the 
levels of both women challenging open-gender seats and female incumbency are still alarmingly 
low in both Jaipur and Mumbai. While gender reservations do bring in women who make politics 
a career, it is not many. 
Five structural factors likely discourage first-time female parshads from pursuing a 
political career: institutional disincentives, incumbency disadvantages, re-nomination 
restrictions, reservation displacement, and mandated gender discontinuity. First, several male and 
female parshads I spoke with claimed that they were not running again in the 2019 elections, 
citing low pay, too much work, and frustration with intransigent bureaucracy. Parshads reported 
only receiving an expense allowance of around 3000 rupees a month, which is far below a 
middle-class salary. Reports of corruption opportunities posit that this allowance can be padded, 
but first-time parshads, particularly inexperienced women, likely face difficulties gaining access 
to these revenue streams. For many parshads, neither source of income compensates for the long 
hours, as parshads must respond to constituent issues day and night.  
Incumbency may pose a disadvantage to re-election as well. Most parshads do not serve 




incumbents from either 2009 or 2004, five men and five women, and 17-percent of the 2009 
JMC had served in 2004, eight men and five women. A primary reason for this low rate is a lack 
of returning candidates, as parshads usually decide not to run for a second term. From the 2009 
cohort, only approximately 23-percent returned as a candidate for the 2014 election,36 which 
could indicate that re-election is extremely competitive and further disincentivize parshads from 
attempting to return. Across the country, previous research has found that incumbency can 
confer a disadvantage on candidates in India.37 Bhavnani (2009) found an incumbency 
disadvantage for both men and women in Mumbai Municipal Corporation elections, and larger 
cross-state studies have found similar disadvantages across national and state elections (Linden, 
2004; Uppal, 2009).  
An additional deciding factor is the party nomination. Recognizing the low success rates 
of independent candidates, few parshads attempt to run again as an independent if they are not 
renominated. Out of the 72 parshads who won in 2009 under a party banner, only approximately 
14 were re-nominated by their party in 2014, and only seven of these parshads from 2009 who 
did not receive a nomination ran as independents. Either most parshads did not seek a re-
nomination or parties recognize an incumbency disadvantage and generally choose new 
candidates. Interestingly, two parshads I spoke with suggested that key members in the party, 
especially the BJP, often discouraged renomination as they feared supporting a future challenger. 
                                                          
 
36 Comparing candidate names across elections is hampered by names changes and a tendency for only the first 
names of women parshads to be recorded in 2004 and 2009. Several women from 2009 share first names with 
2014 candidates, but were not counted as I was unable to certify they were the same person. 
37 Chhibber (2001) attributes low rates of incumbency and greater political competition in India to the lack of 
secondary associations to assist in mobilizing voters. Such associations in the United States boost incumbency by 




The nomination process is often controlled by local MLAs, who reportedly are afraid of 
parshads gaining enough support to pose a future electoral challenge to themselves: 
Sometimes the party will not give you a ticket if you’ve served two to three terms 
because you will become a potential challenger for the MLA seat. They will say we need 
fresh faces… and they won’t give you a ticket (nomination). So that’s why you see so 
few people reelected from the same area. When you become a parshad for two to three 
times from a single area, you cover it very well, you do some work, your name becomes 
well known and this becomes a problem for the higher-ups.38 
It is very difficult to get a ticket the next time. Usually just two times (two consecutive 
nominations max).39 
But when asked if both national parties do this: 
No, not in Congress, it is a BJP policy. In Congress we have Gulab Nabi ji, he is a 
parshad for the seventh time.40  
Detailed data on JMC elections prior to 2014 is not currently available to determine if parties are 
re-nominating strong candidates, which would demonstrate whether party leaders are more 
interested in warding off future challengers than in fielding competitive candidates, but this area 
would benefit from future research as more data becomes available, or from a larger analysis 
across other municipal corporations. 
Perhaps the most important consideration for any parshad considering running again in 
the next election is the reservation lottery. Of the 77 parshads who won in 2009, approximately 
61 (79-percent) faced a reservation change in their area for the 2014 elections.41 Notably, 
                                                          
 
38 Interview with male parshad on 3/21/2017 in Jaipur.  
39 Interview with female parshad on 4/20/2017 in Jaipur. 
40Interview with female parshad on 4/20/2017 in Jaipur. 
41 Ward lines were redrawn following the 2010 census, so 2014 ward lines were compared to 2009 ward lines to 




approximately 26 (34-percent) faced a ward change that essentially blocked them from running 
again in that ward.  
Table 3.8: 2009 Parshad Displaced by Reservation 
Candidate Caste # Displaced  
General 11 (44%) 
Gen(W) 8 (33%) 
OBC 2 (25%) 
OBC(W) 0 (0%) 
SC 2 (33%) 
SC(W) 1 (20%) 
ST 2 (100%) 




Unsurprisingly, as Table 3.8 shows, the majority of these were male, as they face the possibility 
of either a group and/or a gender reservation blocking them from running again. However, it is 
important to note that the group reservation lines are rigid, regardless of gender reservation, just 
as men cannot compete across community or caste lines, neither can women. In 2014, 
reservation changes also blocked ten women who had won in 2009 from the possibility of 
running again in their ward. All were women who did not fit the group criteria for the new 2014 
ward reservation because they were either General-caste women who could not run in a reserved-
group ward, or OBC, SC or ST women whose wards had been reserved for a grouping other than 
their own. This is a notable downside to gender-reservations cross-cutting caste-reservations, as 
33-percent of General women, 20-percent of Scheduled Caste women, and 50-percent of 
Scheduled Tribe women were unable to run again in their ward due to reservation blocks. JMC 
electoral rules do allow candidates to run in wards they do not reside in, so even with a 




them. However, this does not appear to be common, as only three parshads interviewed reported 
doing so in 2014.  
Delving deeper into the various reservation possibilities, the probability of being blocked 
by a reservation differs significantly across community groupings. At current ratios (until they 
are adjusted with the next census in 2020), Table 3.9 below demonstrates in Rajasthan how many 
seats are available and how many seats are blocked for each category of candidate in any given 
election at the local level. If a candidate’s ward is reserved for any of the reservations off-limits 
to them, they cannot compete in that ward. Given the fact that 58-percent of all seats are reserved 
for somebody, several community groupings are blocked from competing in a majority of seats. 
Table 3.9: Blocked by Reservation 
Caste  Open Blocked Can Compete In Cannot Compete In 
General 42% 58% GEN Any Reserved Seat 
Gen(W) 63% 37% GEN, GEN(W) 
OBC, OBC(W), SC, SC(W), ST, 
ST(W) 
OBC 56% 44% GEN, OBC 
GEN(W), OBC(W), SC, SC(W), 
ST, ST(W) 
OBC(W) 84% 16% 
GEN, GEN(W), OBC, 
OBC(W)  SC, SC(W), ST, ST(W) 
SC 51% 49% GEN, SC 
GEN(W), OBC, OBC(W), SC(W), 
ST, ST(W) 
SC(W) 76% 24% 
GEN, GEN(W), SC, 
SC(W) OBC, OBC(W), ST, ST(W) 
ST 44% 56% GEN, ST 
GEN(W), OBC, OBC(W), SC, 
SC(W), ST(W) 
ST(W) 66% 34% 
GEN, GEN(W), ST, 
ST(W) OBC, OBC(W), SC, SC(W) 
 
As expected, General-caste men face the highest number of blocked seats at 58-percent, 
but it is notable that ST men, a disadvantaged class specifically for whom reservations were 




Furthermore, as discussed previously, the candidate with the most options by far are OBC 
women. OBC candidates overall have the largest reserved block of seats at 21-percent, of which 
a third are reserved for OBC women. On top of that, OBC women can compete in both the 
General Woman and General elections. Due to a smaller number of seats reserved for both SC 
and ST candidates, SC and ST women both can compete in a supermajority of seats, but not as 
many as OBC women. A problematic side effect of caste-exclusive reservations established in 
proportion to the population is that the least populous groups (Scheduled Tribes) are blocked 
from the large number of seats reserved for the more populous groups (Other Backward Classes 
and Scheduled Castes). While General-caste men face the greatest chance of being blocked, the 
reservation system is still likely to block the disadvantaged groups it is designed to support. SC 
and ST communities tend to be significantly more economically and socially disadvantaged 
compared to OBC communities, but under this system have fewer electoral options. As discussed 
at the beginning of this chapter, this again demonstrates that while reservations create a 
foundation of representation, to a degree they also can create an artificial ceiling that actually 
favors the more populous, more advantaged communities and constrains the smaller. This is 
particularly problematic given the likelihood smaller minorities are already more likely to be 
excluded from key decision-making and resource-allocation processes, especially if they are 
poorer as well. 
For female parshads specifically, the reservation system institutes an additional 
consideration. Reservation rules mandate that a ward cannot be gender-reserved in consecutive 
elections. As designed, it could be argued that this rule encourages women to develop the 
expertise and political support to compete without the gender reservation. However, this 




seat. Gender-reserved seats must be open-gender the following election and, as discussed, few 
women compete in open-gender elections. The only exception is following a census and 
subsequent ward redistricting, which resets the lottery and allows any ward to be reserved for a 
woman. This exception benefited several female parshads from 2009 who were re-elected in 
2014, as this election followed the 2010 census, allowing 17 gender-reserved wards to maintain 
their reservation. Moreover, this exception allows us to compare outcomes for parshads who lost 
their gender reservation to those who maintained theirs.   






Reservation Lost  
Gender Reservation 
Maintained  
General 7 0 0 
Gen(W) 0 13 10 
OBC 1 0 0 
OBC(W) 0 3 5 
SC 1 0 0 
SC(W) 0 3 2 
ST 1 0 0 
ST(W) 0 0 1 
    
Male Parshad Affected 10 0 0 
Female Parshad Affected 0 19 18 
 
While the assignment of gender reservations was completely random for the 2014 
elections, Table 3.10 shows that this transition was accompanied by an overall loss of nine 
gender-reserved seats after the Rajasthan High Court mandated the reduction in gender 
reservations from 50-percent in 2009 to 33-percent in 2014 for municipal corporations.42 Of the 
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the number of wards, the number of gender reservations lost should be equal to the number assigned. From 2009 





remaining 30 gender-reservations, ten were assigned to ward areas which were previously 
represented by male parshads in 2009 and thus blocked them from running for the same ward in 
2014. One of these men was nominated by Congress to run in another ward in 2014 and won. 
The rest were apparently unable or uninterested in shifting wards. 19 female parshads, or 50-
percent, who represented a 2009 ward with a gender reservation lost their reservation. Of these 
women, only two were nominated to run again in 2014, one in an open-gender ward, and one in a 
gender-reserved. One more ran as an independent. Only the woman nominated for the open-
gender ward went on to win again in 2014.  
Table 3.11: Results of Gender Reservation Changes for Occupying Parshad, 2009 to 2014  
Type of Change  Total Ran Again Won Again 
Assigned Reservation 10 (26%) 1 (10%) 1 (10%) 
Lost Reservation 19 (50%) 5 (26%) 1 (5%) 
Maintained Reservation 18 (47%) 7 (39%) 3 (17%) 
 
In comparison, the women whose wards maintained their gender reservation fared much 
better. Table 3.11 describes outcomes for all the candidates in 2009 who faced a change in 
gender reservation for their ward. Of the 18 women in gender-reserved wards from 2009 that 
maintained their gender reservation into 2014, six were nominated to run again in 2014 and one 
ran as an independent. Six did so in the same ward area they served previously, while one moved 
to another gender-reserved ward. Notably, three out of the five went on to win again. When 
compared to only one woman who won again after losing a gender reservation, this demonstrates 
that when gender reservations are maintained over subsequent election cycles, it is much more 
                                                          
 
in 2009, following the voluntary expansion of the suggested 50% quota to Rajasthan. However, this was reduced to 
33% in 2014 after the Rajasthan HC struck down the expansion. Therefore, we see a shift from 39 out of 77 seats 




likely that female parshads will both be renominated by their parties and go on to win a second 
election, which is critical to developing individual political expertise. These results also 
demonstrate how comparatively less likely that women will be either re-nominated or return for a 
second term when their gender reservation is removed after only one term. While arguably the 
gender reservation should only serve as a temporary foundation for women to start their political 
careers, removing it too soon appears to minimize the positive effect. Considering the previous 
findings that two out of the three women who contested and won open-gender seats against men 
were incumbents from gender-reserved seats, bringing women back for a second term is a key 
way to make women more competitive. Limiting a gender-reservation to only one term is likely 
too short a period for a woman to gain enough political experience and support to compete on an 
equal footing with men. 
These findings should be considered alongside Bhavnani’s (2009) determination that 
women are more likely to win in open-gender wards that were previously reserved for a woman. 
While a single term of gender reservation may influence party leaders and voters enough in an 
individual ward that a woman can be successful there in the future, this chapter has demonstrated 
that a single term does not appear to be enough to ensure an incumbent female parshad will 
return for a second term. How we judge this distinction depends on what the core goal of the 
gender-reservation system is. If the primary goal is to acclimate voters and parties to female 
candidates competing alongside men, then Bhavnani’s results and my own findings that all 
women who received a nomination were nominated in previously gender-reserved wards indicate 
that this goal is being achieved, albeit very slowly and in small numbers. However, if the goal of 
the reservation is to develop a cohort of women who can gain significant political expertise and 




then the very low numbers of incumbent women overall, and particularly the low number of 
women returning to compete against men, indicate that this goal is not being achieved. 
Furthermore, one reason this goal is not being achieved is inherent in the gender-reservation 
rules. The mandated removal of gender-reservations from a ward after one term, as will happen 
to the women currently in office in the upcoming 2019 elections, reduces the number of women 
who will return.43 
Conclusions 
Gender quotas as an institution work both as a set of rules that structure who voters can 
and cannot select as their representative, and as an incentive mechanism that encourages the 
participation of women, who are otherwise disinclined by constraining social norms and lack of 
experience to involve themselves politically, by providing a route into office that excludes male 
competition. However, this analysis has demonstrated that as an electoral institution, gender 
quotas cannot force parties to nominate more than the minimum number of women, and thus do 
not automatically create a foundation that women politicians can build on. If parties continue to 
view women as a nomination “risk” or are otherwise uninterested in nominating women to 
compete outside of gender reservations, then the quota can become both a floor and a ceiling. 
                                                          
 
43 Gender-reservation changes always happen alongside caste-reservation changes, which add additional obstacles 
to incumbency. Six women (16-percent of all women) from 2009 both lost the gender reservation in their ward and 
were blocked by a caste reservation that they did not qualify for. One was nominated by the BJP to compete in a 
different, open-gender ward and won, and another competed as an independent in another gender-reserved ward 
but lost. The rest were apparently unable or uninterested in shifting wards. Comparably, four women (11-percent) 
from 2009 whose ward maintained its gender reservation were blocked by a caste reservation. One was 





Parties nominate the minimum number of women but favor men in the remainder of the open-
gender seats.  
This analysis of the Jaipur Municipal Corporation 2014 elections demonstrates that 
women do not appear able or ready to compete in the open-gender seats against men on a broad 
scale, particularly women from the reserved-groups. A key factor to this shortage is party 
nominations, which are crucial to winning elections in Jaipur. Parties are not nominating many 
candidates to compete in races outside of a gender reservation. Furthermore, corresponding with 
the literature, despite over two decades of experience with gender reservations, parties are 
primarily willing to nominate a woman to compete in an open-gender ward, to compete against 
men, only if that ward has had recent previous experience with a female representative. Either 
the party considers women less competitive in wards that have not experienced a woman 
representative recently, and/or constituent polls indicate something similar. This indicates that 
shifting gender biases within conservative party structures and/or society itself via electoral 
quotas is a very gradual process. Parties may be facing a lack of strong women candidates; 
however, this analysis also indicated that gender-reserved elections are just as competitive as 
open gender races. Still, the possibility remains that two separate “leagues” are forming, one in 
the open-gender seats with primarily male contestants, the other in the gender-reserved seats with 
only women. Competition within gender-reserved seats may not be preparing female candidates 
to compete against men in open-gender seats, with their advantage in political experience. 
Underlying any shortage of competitive female candidates is a significant discrepancy in 
lifetime political experience and support development prior to entering the JMC. By giving 
women a leg-up, the gender reservation may partially rectify this discrepancy; however, low 




women pursuing politics as a career, it is difficult to foresee how they bridge the experience gap 
with men.  
Five structural factors likely discourage first-time female parshads from pursuing a 
political career: institutional disincentives, incumbency disadvantages, re-nomination 
restrictions, reservation displacement, and mandated gender discontinuity. Parshad positions are 
low-paid and often require long hours. Parties also rarely re-nominate parshads for a second 
term, possibly due to an inherent incumbency disadvantage that has been observed across Indian 
elections. Furthermore, many parshads every electoral cycle are displaced by the random 
assignment of a group and/or gender reservation to their ward which blocks them from running 
again. Notably, through this process, the reservation system can block the disadvantaged groups 
it was designed to support. While reservations create a foundation of representation, to a degree 
they also can create an artificial ceiling that significantly restricts where a candidate can 
compete, even for women and reserved-castes. Finally, the mandated removal of gender 
reservations after one term may be doing more harm than good. While there is a theoretical 
argument for encouraging women to become competitive outside of gender-reserved wards by 
removing reservations early, the analysis of JMC results of subsequent elections after a gender 
reservation is removed show that women are much less likely to return for a second term if 
gender reservations are removed rather than maintained. This indicates that one term is generally 
not enough time for women to establish themselves politically enough to be competitive with 
men in open-gender elections. Returning to the discussion of gender-reservation goals, if the 
objective is to develop an experienced cohort of women who can compete with men at higher 




of such a cohort is further demonstrated by the lack of female representatives in higher levels of 
government. Across the 18 Jaipur-area MLA seats alone, there is only one woman. 
These obstacles are added to an already strained rational calculation for women 
considering entering politics. As the narratives in the rest of this dissertation will describe, there 
are considerable costs for a woman considering entering politics: societal censure, family 
censure, family responsibilities, electoral disadvantages, long hours and low pay. The gender 
reservation adds additional disincentives – reservation blocks and disappearing gender 
reservations. When compared to the minimal benefits a parshad position provides – reduced 
political competition in gender-reserved wards, hyperlocal political power, some individual 
independence, and minimal opportunities for personal gain, it is not surprising that few women 
decide to pursue a political career. Furthermore, problematically for democratic accountability, 
low parshad incumbency can disincentivize parshad commitment for both men and women. If 
there is little likelihood or desire to return for a second term, then there is little need to please the 
voters. Multiple parshads admitted that the JMC had a poor reputation in terms of parshad 
dedication and achievement. Constituent surveys would be needed to determine how accurate 
that is; however, as the parshad below discusses, the reservation system can discourage 
motivation: 
Initially I fought from ward…, but now that ward is an OBC seat. I had to move, and that 
is the major reason that these parshads don't work, because they know that after 5 years 
they have to move. They know whether they work or don't work, we are not going to 
fight again from this locality. That's a major problem for why these parshads don't 
work.44  
                                                          
 




Given the number of obstacles discussed to winning a second term, most parshads must expect 
to only serve one term and thus have little to gain electorally to motivate service to their 
constituents. 
Still, these conclusions are based on a limited analysis of only one municipal corporation. 
Developing a comprehensive understanding of the effect reservation institutional design has on 
electoral outcomes for women requires an analysis of multiple electoral years from several 
municipal corporations across India. Given the importance of party nomination to electoral 
success, future research should also look deeper into the nomination process. A qualitative 
investigation of nomination practices and the role of gatekeepers such as regional MLAs could 
provide insight into why parties nominate so few women to compete in open-gender seats. 
Finally, a broad data collection effort that tracks the career pathways of successful women in 
state and national politics to determine how many started in a gender-reserved parshad ward is 
needed to determine if the gender reservation system is serving its intended function as a pipeline 
to develop female political talent to serve at the highest levels. Finally, following the concerns 
outlined in this chapter and described in the forthcoming narratives, the possibility remains that 
the gender reservation was instituted and is maintained primarily as a release valve to discourage 
future demands for expanded quotas, possibly at higher levels, particularly as it does not threaten 
the most powerful male politicians at the state and national levels. If the parshad position is 
essentially a dead-end, with very few women progressing to higher levels of government, then it 
is not serving its purpose. 
This chapter has described how women enter and leave the JMC via the gender 
reservation; however, we know very little about what goes on in-between, during her term. The 




themselves. Chapter Four begins the methodological discussion by reviewing the challenges 
encountered and changes made during the data collection process, before moving into Chapter 
Five which reviews the theoretical link between descriptive and substantive representation that 
forms the core of this research and describes the coding process used to apply this theory to the 
JMC case. Following these two chapters of methodology, the analysis of the narratives 





Chapter 4: An Evolving Methodology 
Scholars often lament that “researchers rarely share their beginning tales; there are no 
false starts, no confusion, quandary, infatuation, or terror, only a coherent, well-planned research 
strategy, or at least that’s the story we tell about our research” (Charmaz and Mitchell, 1997, 
cited in Shope, 2006). As Maxwell (2005) points out, the ideal sequential research model that 
progresses in a straight line from research question to data gathering to analysis is “not a good fit 
for qualitative research”. Many components must be reassessed or adapted throughout a project 
due to unforeseen developments. In this chapter, I will discuss the challenges encountered and 
changes made through an ongoing reflexive process. This transparency is important to 
maintaining replicability and encouraging criticism, supports the interpretation of the narratives I 
present, and aids in the judgement of my findings. First, I discuss the evolution of this project 
from investigating how a woman was representing her constituents, to was she representing them 
independently or simply as a placeholder for someone else. I then describe the research design 
and data collection process, with a focus on the limits of using a single case study. Finally, I go 
through the various methodological and ethical challenges I faced throughout the data gathering 
and analysis.  
This research project initially proposed to examine how variation across gender 
demographics can influence substantive representation for women. Specifically, I expected to 
find significant variation in legislative priorities depending on the caste of female representatives 
in gender-reserved seats, based on a hypothesis that women from higher castes would have 
significantly different priorities than women from lower castes based on different life 
experiences. I planned a series of interviews with both female and male parshads within the 




determined policy categories. Likely unsurprising to other qualitative researchers, the formal 
rigidness of my quantitative measures did not survive first contact. 
Upon arrival in Jaipur, the process officially began with a discussion with a hotel clerk at 
the front desk, who in response to my question about his parshad, informed me in English that 
“they are all worthless people” who only want to make money. After I described my proposed 
project to him, my research assistant Varun, someone who had spent his whole life in Rajasthan 
and would prove crucial in providing local context, pointed out that the JMC is primarily tasked 
with municipal civic duties. Therefore, parshads are unlikely to prioritize legislative issues in the 
way I envisioned. Furthermore, women’s issues in general are unlikely to be prioritized, as laws 
and enforcement for these issues operate primarily at the state level. Furthermore, he was 
skeptical of the value in interviewing many of the women parshads and warned me many would 
only speak with us in the presence of men from their family. He also claimed many of these 
women have simply replaced their husbands as parshad after his seat was reserved for a woman, 
and are holding it until the reservation is removed and their husbands can run again. The 
following day he reported a conversation with a local chaiwalla (tea vendor), who described his 
parshad as “some lady”, he knew her name but “it was not important” because “her husband 
does all the work”.  
These discussions introduced a critical challenge to my system of measurement and my 
conception of representation. It became obvious early on that policy priorities were likely useless 
as a dependent variable, as everyone essentially prioritized the same issues. Furthermore, if 
women parshads did provide their priorities, using them was problematic if some were simply 
serving as a proxy for their husbands. Additionally, accessing women parshads in a manner that 




in this chapter, these challenges shifted the target of the research project from policy priorities to 
the women themselves and their ability to substantively represent their constituents. 
Theoretically, in the causal chain that links descriptive to substantive representation, this project 
moved from investigating how a woman was representing her constituents, to was she 
representing them independently or simply as a placeholder for someone else. 
Defining Concepts 
I was no longer attempting to objectively track policy priorities, but I still wanted to 
gauge the ability of parshads to address local women’s issues. However, from the first interview, 
how to define “women’s issues” within this project became an obvious sticking point. In 
response to a question on the ability of parshads to address women’s issues and rights, our 
interviewee emphasized that the JMC does not deal with women’s issues, only the state 
legislature has the power to do so. In subsequent interviews, questions containing the phrase 
“women’s issues” were often met with confusion.45 Confused himself, after the first interview 
Varun asked me what I meant by women’s issues. I listed issues from the literature such as 
access to drinking water, accessible toilets, and protections from sexual violence. He pointed out 
that “Jaipur does not live in the 15th century anymore” and that access to water and toilets are not 
big issues in the city. This point forced me to grapple with how to define women’s issues within 
the Indian context. In the Western context, women’s issues are centered on women’s rights (anti-
discrimination, anti-violence, reproductive rights) and women’s traditional societal roles 
(children, education, healthcare) (Wolbrecht, 2010; Osborn, 2014). These are generally 
considered applicable across societies. However, within the Indian context, it is important to 
                                                          
 




consider the issues unique to a developing society, and to incorporate the enormous gulf between 
developed and less-developed spheres. Most of the literature on India examines the rural 
panchayati raj institutions, and hence rural concerns for women dominate the idea of women’s 
issues in India, such as accessible drinking water, household toilets, access to equal education 
and nourishment for daughters, equal property rights, preventing rape and violence against 
women, and marriage equality and protections. However, while these issues do not disappear in 
the urban municipal sphere, they are less problematic, particularly in the more developed and 
affluent areas. Access to drinking water is an issue more limited to the kacchi bastis 
(undeveloped housing areas), household toilets are much more common (the bigger issue is 
public infrastructure such as sewers), and girls have better access to education and nourishment. 
The rest of the social and legal issues appear to be just as prominent in the cities as in the 
villages, but they fall under the purview of the state government, not the municipal. Still, gender 
reservations had been instituted to improve the representation of women in the municipal 
corporation, but I struggled to determine how to measure their impact on women in the city.  
I decided to push forward with the interviews and see what turned up. During the first 
few interviews, I began to see the promise of the more qualitative aspects of our questionnaire, 
particularly regarding parshad background, political journey, campaign, aspirations, perceptions 
of women’s role in politics, and ethnographic observations taken from the interviews themselves. 
To leverage these strengths, I began to shift the project away from the quantitative measure of 
policy priorities and towards a more qualitative measure of the ability of women parshads to 
successfully represent their constituents. I moved from imposing external categories on what is 
and isn’t a women’s issue, and instead shifted my focus to the generative processes that brought 




office, the struggle for women to assert independence throughout this process, and determine the 
many obstacles hindering this journey. Following substantive representation theory, if women 
enter politics with the shared experiences of their constituents, then they will organically 
understand the interests of their women constituents. I was more concerned with locating and 
measuring the constraints and obstacles that prevent them from fully supporting these interests, 
especially the ability of women parshads to act independently of the men around them. 
However, the shift to a more qualitative approach required me to adjust my research design to 
accommodate new constraints and maintain rigor.  
Research Design and Data Collection 
The use of a single case study, and the selection of Jaipur as the case to investigate this 
question pathway created opportunities and constraints. I gathered comprehensive information 
on a large portion of the entire unit (41 of the 91 total parshads), which creates extensive within-
case variation along gender, community/caste, education, and class lines. This variation 
strengthens the ability of the case to follow the primary purpose of a case study – to understand a 
larger class of similar units (Gerring, 2004). In my case, these findings outline the capacity of a 
reservation quota system to assist women in overcoming the societal and political restrictions of 
patriarchal societies that hinder their ability to participate. Furthermore, this case helps us begin 
to answer two core questions put forth by the literature: do reserved seats enable women to win 
unreserved seats (Yoon, 2016)? Can reserved seats become a floor to increase representation for 
women, rather than a ceiling (Paxton & Hughes, 2016)?  
I chose to study the Indian municipal corporation for several reasons: it offers a directly 
observable and quantifiable improvement in the representation (at least descriptively) of women 




passed since institutional change was enacted to allow for the intended effect, 24 years and 5 
electoral cycles; and parshads are politically relevant enough to be identifiable and thus 
accessible, but not high enough on the political ladder to make access impossible without 
connections. Geographically, I chose Jaipur’s municipal corporation because I was familiar with 
the city and had prior contacts from previous study, it offered the opportunity to study change in 
a state (Rajasthan) that is one of the more conservative, traditional, and patriarchal within the 
country. Finally, Jaipur, as with most Indian cities, has become incredibly diverse in terms of 
ethnicity, community/caste, class, and urban/rural origins due to massive migration over the past 
two decades from the rural to the urban, and across regions from the poorer to the wealthier. 
These factors affect the ability of institutions to deliver change, and Jaipur provided the 
opportunity to observe many of them in action. 
The study of local government also provides the best opportunity to study the interaction 
of elected representatives with their constituents. As with bureaucracy (Gupta, 2012), the higher 
one goes in the political hierarchy, the less contact representatives have with the average person, 
and the more focused communication becomes with elites. A connection between representatives 
and their constituents has been labeled a key aspect of substantive representation theory. For 
representation to qualify as substantive, the elected must fully understand and remain responsive 
to the group they are purported to represent (Mansbridge, 1999; Weldon, 2002; Urbinati and 
Warren, 2008). In the personalized politics of India, in-person interaction and communication are 
key to getting officials to take notice of your concerns (Gupta, 2012), and for most urban 
Indians, the parshad is the only personal connection they will make with an elected official. 
Therefore, while my focus on the local level prevents me from establishing findings easily 




the role of institutions in the development of substantive representation at political levels where 
it should be the most apparent. 
The JMC resides within a relatively conservative region of India that serves as a difficult 
case to institutionally establish substantive representation. This reality varies across the state, 
between communities, between the city and the village, and between classes; however, in 
general, patriarchal norms still dominate Rajasthani and Jaipuri society and most women who 
live and act within it. Therefore, the challenges that restrict substantive representation in Jaipur 
should not be taken as universally applicable across India, as patriarchal norms vary significantly 
across the country. Future research will hopefully provide a comparison with less patriarchal 
environments where women may have more opportunities to gain, maintain, and exert political 
power. 
As a case study, the primary intent of this research is descriptive. I discuss the possible 
causes of what I have observed, but these are always presented as heuristic rather than 
conclusive. The main goal is to thoroughly describe and develop the correlations I observed 
across narratives. Providing an authoritative answer as to why requires a broader systematic 
comparison. In the tradeoff between breadth and depth, I have focused on going deeper through 
extensive interviewing within a single case. Following Gerring (2004), depth allows me to 
investigate and determine several of the causal mechanisms that restrict women from developing 
political power, even with institutional supports provided by reserved seats. Ideally, breadth can 
be added to this work by future examination of additional cases to allow us to begin to determine 
actual causal effects. 
Data collection began with a purposeful sample, drawing on a specific panel of women 




alongside to provide a control. This purposeful sample slowly evolved by necessity into a 
convenience sample by the end as the pool of accessible subjects diminished. As my research 
assistant Varun and I approached 20 completed interviews of the 33 total women parshads, 
getting access to the remaining 13 became very difficult. We had picked the low hanging fruit 
and the rest continued to not answer their phones or were unable to set up meetings. Landing 
successful interviews with men was generally much easier, as there was a larger sample and they 
are more accessible. Ultimately, my interview count was limited to 23 women and 18 men. 
The shift to convenience sampling by the end of my project makes the risk of selection 
bias higher. It may limit the amount of variation within the dependent variable, which can result 
in the over-estimation of the explanations (Collier and Mahoney, 1996) by over-relying on 
informants whose views may be atypical (Maxwell, 2012). However, as the figures below 
demonstrate, we developed a diverse sample largely proportional to the JMC as a whole along 
community, caste and partisan lines. Women are over-represented across all group reservation 
categories (OBC(W), SC(W) and ST(W)), but suited the focus of my project on women parshads 
specifically, and control is provided with a nearly equal representation of men. 





Figure 4.2: Proportional Group Reservation Category of Full JMC and Interviewed 
  
Figure 4.3: Party Association of Full JMC and Interviewed 
  
To further diminish the impact of sample bias, I triangulate across methods: participant-
observations, ethnographic interviews, and quantitative analysis are all incorporated into this 
project (Berg, 1998; Creswell and Miller, 2000; Hesse-Biber, 2012). Moreover, by focusing on 
one unit with relatively homogenous causal patterns within it, as all parshads are acting within 
the same institution of the JMC with patriarchal norms influential throughout, I restrict the broad 
generalizability of this study, but strengthen support for the reliability of my explanations within 
the JMC itself (Collier and Mahoney, 1996).  
Methodological and Ethical Challenges 
The core challenge of this project was the double-bind of gaining access to the narratives 




the following passage from my fieldnotes attest, seeking a balance is extremely important for 
researchers, and very difficult to do.  
 
It was quite difficult to land this interview, my research assistant called multiple times, 
and no one answered. Finally, the parshad’s husband answered and told us to come the 
following Tuesday in the morning. However, when we arrived no one answered the 
phone, and when we rang the doorbell the parshad herself answered the door, but did not 
appear to have any knowledge of the interview. Furthermore, she was obviously 
uncomfortable with two men at her doorstep and her husband out of the house. She told 
us to come back the next morning when her husband would be there. We returned the 
following day and again no one answered the phone. This time her father-in-law 
answered the door, brought us in for water and ghewar, then called his son who said he 
would call us back in an hour, but never did so we left. We decided to wait a couple 
weeks to try again. This time she answered and told us to come the next morning. We 
arrived, no one answered the door or the phone, but we waited several minutes and 
eventually she came out and invited us in for the interview. She appeared totally 
exhausted, as her 7-month old son had been running a fever and she had no household 
help. We carried out the interview with her holding him while he slept. She seemed quite 
nervous and uncomfortable, although she did smile when talking about how much work 
the campaign was. She had agreed to the interview, but didn’t appear eager and didn’t 
allow us to record. My assistant attributes this to her husband being out of the house. Her 
answers were short and the interview quick, around 20 minutes.46    
 
The core of this research project centers on the ability of women parshads to assert their 
independence as representatives. However, as the above quote illustrates, we were outsiders 
entering their homes, often for interviews set up solely through their husbands who regulated 
household comings-and-goings. Varun and I became agents for a period in the power dynamics 
that restrict that independence. I was continually troubled by the trade-off I felt we had to make 
between abiding by existing norms to complete the interview, versus challenging these norms as 
part of an empowering feminist research agenda (Fonow and Cook, 2005; Harding and Norberg, 
                                                          
 




2005). Traditionally, as visitors we should address the husband first and step lightly when trying 
to focus the interview on his wife or daughter to avoid any implication that their opinion was 
valued over his. When both the parshad and her husband were present, we tended to address 
questions to him first to show respect, before turning to get her opinion. Ideally, they would both 
respond; however, even when a question was initially directed to her, the husband would often 
step in and answer for her. We generally did not press her for an answer to avoid rudeness. 
Furthermore, particularly for the more dependent women, they often did not know the answer, or 
would only give a short yes/no, and their husband would complete the answer for her. These 
interviews often shifted to a relatively isolated conversation between us and her husband. We 
would try to get her more involved, but walked a fine line between trying to include her and 
avoiding public humiliation by revealing her lack of knowledge.  
Several ethical and empirical issues also arise out of the experience narrated above. First, 
in the pursuit of data, I put this woman in an uncomfortable and potentially socially 
compromising position. In a traditional Indian household, it is generally inappropriate for a 
woman, particularly a young woman, married or unmarried, to spend time alone with men who 
are not family members. Our persistence eventually persuaded her to allow us to interview her, 
but that did not prevent possible social ramifications and censure in the future from neighbors, 
friends and family. Additionally, we reinforced the inherent power hierarchies these women have 
been struggling with their whole lives (Wolf, 1996). As two privileged, persistent males, we 
essentially invaded her private space both physically and socially. Although she gave us 
permission, we gained access because I was white and my research assistant could persuade her, 
because we were educated, and because her husband had granted us access. I realize now that she 




opportunity to interview her when her husband was present. Still, given the difficulties of landing 
this interview, there was always a tradeoff between gaining access and these ethical issues. 
Overall, if I had not been persistent in trying to land interviews with women parshads, my 
sample would be largely composed of men. We did not request to interview her alone and had 
expected her husband to be there, but this experience led us to accept that it would be preferable 
to interview women in the presence of male family members or acquaintances.  
Contacting and physically finding the parshads proved the most challenging aspect of the 
data-gathering process. Through trial and error, Varun and I settled on cold-calling from a public 
JMC contact list, introducing ourselves as Ph.D. students, one from America and one from 
Rajasthan University, and asking for an interview to contribute to my research on local political 
experiences in Jaipur. As we discovered throughout the process, emphasizing “Ph.D.” 
“American”, and “Rajasthan University” quickly established a rapport, given the societal levels 
of respect held for higher institutions of learning (particularly foreign), and the alumni networks 
that my research assistant could tap into via his association with Rajasthan University. For 
example, Varun was aware that our first interviewee had also attended Rajasthan University, so 
he brought up this shared connection during our cold-call to convince him to take our interview 
request seriously. Nearly every parshad who answered our calls was receptive to an interview 
and would either give us a place and time to come or would tell us to call back. However, 
patience and persistence became critical as at least half of our appointments were cancelled the 
day of the scheduled interview, particularly with women parshads, and we had to start the 
process over.  
Although this strenuous process ultimately limited the number of interviews I could 




involvement. Who answered the official phone number and set up the interview indicated how 
involved husbands were in the official duties of their parshad wives. The difficulties in 
completing interviews with women also revealed the societal expectations, responsibilities, and 
restrictions that limited their ability to spend time representing their constituents. For example, 
during holidays and the wedding season, an interview with a woman parshad became nearly 
impossible, as women are primarily responsible for preparing and providing hospitality to 
visiting family during holidays. Only male parshads were accessible during these times. 
Furthermore, domestic issues such as a sick child, spouse or in-law often forced the female head-
of-household to stay home or travel to care for the sick individual, particularly if it was a father-
in-law or husband. Finally, deaths and funerals require the attendance of the women in a family 
to support the grieving, prepare the body, and perform the last rites. While men do have 
responsibilities in these areas as well, they are fewer and much easier to ignore. As Pinsky 
(2013) argues, valuable qualitative data exists in the interactions between interviewer and 
interviewee, even outside of the interview itself. 
Our first interview exemplifies several of the challenges we faced during the interview 
process. First, is a lack of privacy. Nearly all of the parshads asked us to come to their home for 
the interview. Some had private side offices, but many did not. Therefore, there was almost 
always someone else present, whether party workers, assistants, fellow parshads, family, 
spouses, children, elders, in-laws, or constituents: 
We called the parshad the day before. He agreed to an interview and said to come to his 
house. We arrived a quarter after eight to a large house with a privacy wall and a gate. 
Varun says it is one of the nicer neighborhoods in the city. We were greeted by his wife, 
and even though we were already 20 minutes late, as we were unable to find his house, 
she told us to return in an hour as he was sleeping. We went down the street to drink chai, 
read the newspaper, and then we return. He is now awake and waves us in to a large 
sitting room in a very open house. I give him my business card, which he glances at and 




is around the room at various points in their breakfast routine. We sit down on the couch, 
his wife is lounging nearby, and it feels like a strange beginning. Varun takes the lead and 
begins to discuss with him the signed consent form, which he views with skepticism. He 
is not comfortable with us recording him, as he is a politician he says, and is not 
comfortable with how it might be used. To encourage him to feel more at ease, Varun 
hands over the interview questions to show we’re not trying to trap him. During this 
discussion, an assistant comes in with paperwork needing his signature regarding widow 
benefits. He then returns to our question list and still declines the recording, so we begin. 
We start with the first question, but as we move on the parshad glances down at the 
question list in his hand and moves immediately to the next, rattling answers off like test 
questions. We frantically write down what we can. The interview takes about half-an-
hour, and he seems to warm to us by the end. We ask him if there is anything else he’d 
like to tell us about the JMC and how it works. He tells me to come back in three years 
after he is out of office and he will tell me so many things.47 
 
The lack of privacy illustrated in this narrative was common across nearly every interview. This 
consideration is particularly relevant for the interviews with women. Women across much of 
South Asia are expected to be deferential in the presence of male family members, particularly 
elders, regardless of political or social standing. This created a problem as I attempted to 
determine how independent these women parshads were of the men around them, as they were 
less likely to assert themselves when these men were present. However, other research has 
characterized the home as a safe, non-threatening space where women interviewees have more 
control (Sanderson et al, 2013). This is likely even more the case with many of the women we 
interviewed, who were mainly housewives prior to entering politics, and would have rarely 
interacted unaccompanied with strangers outside of the house. I ultimately concluded that while 
the presence of men likely circumscribed the interviewee, these women had to act within these 
environments daily, and would rarely conduct their office in the absence of men, who dominate 
all aspects of the government, the party system, and public life itself. The interview environment 
                                                          
 




likely reflected the parshad’s reality better than an artificially private environment that excluded 
men. 
This first interview also demonstrated the importance of language and establishing trust. 
We translated both the questions and signed consent form into Hindi, and always presented the 
Hindi instead of the English versions. This insured both that the parshads understood what they 
were signing, and avoided the embarrassing situation of forcing them to admit they couldn’t read 
or understand English.48 During the interview itself, Varun would lead the questioning along my 
protocol, and I would follow the conversation and ask clarifying questions. While allowing the 
interpreter to lead the interview requires giving up a significant amount of control on behalf of 
the researcher, it also allows the interview to become a more free-flowing conversation and less 
formal (Sanderson et al, 2013). My research assistant’s native Hindi and knowledge of local 
dialects put parshads more at ease and improved understanding, and allowed me to think about 
what questions needed to be asked and gave additional time for fieldnote jottings. I would 
improvise questions in Hindi myself, particularly to clarify points or pursue a new line of 
questioning, but could always turn to Varun to explain any confusion in translation.  
Many parshads were initially skeptical of our intent. One parshad acknowledged that 
they were hesitant to set up an interview with us because they had dealt with people before who 
were “only looking for juicy stories and then take things out of context or change the story 
completely.” We attempted to build the trust needed for a candid recorded conversation 
throughout our introduction. Through the signed consent and verbally we emphasized that we 
were Ph.D. students, the interviews would only be used for my dissertation, their names would 
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never be mentioned, and the recordings would be stored in a safe place and never shared. 
Furthermore, when asking to record we would share the question protocol to reassure them that 
there were no “gotcha” questions (after the experience of the first interview, we would take the 
protocol back before starting the interview to allow us to create a more conversational 
exchange).49 This approach worked for the most part, as out of the final 41 interviewees, all but 
three allowed us to record. Still, some of the best conversations came after the recorder was 
turned off and conversation became freer.   
There are always inherent power imbalances between the interviewer and interviewee 
that vary across research settings (Kvale, 2006; Tanggaard, 2007; Vähäsantanen and Saarinen, 
2013). From the beginning, I knew that managing both gendered power imbalances and racial 
hierarchies within the interview process would be critical to this project. As a white male, I was 
not the ideal principal investigator from a demographic perspective. Women interviewees are 
generally more open with women interviewers (Oakley, 2016). Furthermore, gender imbalances 
and racial privilege could create a deep gulf between myself and the interviewees that would 
significantly limit the narrative. Following Oakley, I sought to lessen the power imbalance to a 
degree by relying on a local assistant to both “reduce social distance” during the interview (198) 
and provide more accurate translations. My assistant was still male, but provided knowledge of 
local cultural norms and understanding to both help bridge the gap with the interviewee, and 
ensure that these norms were respected during the project (Higginbottom and Serrant-Green, 
2005; Sanderson et al, 2013).3 For example, my research assistant could enter a parshad’s 
                                                          
 
49 We made it a point to visibly turn off the recorder during phone calls or other official business (I also avoided 
writing at these times as well to avoid suspicion). Additionally, it became apparent that some liked having their 




household and quickly identify the head of the family, to whom we would then pay our respects 
before proceeding to the interview, avoiding any unintended affront, particularly if we were 
interviewing a woman of the family.  
Reviewing my fieldnotes, I am struck by how quickly we gained access to so many 
parshads with just one phone call. We were given license to enter their private homes and 
interact with their families. This demonstrated the value of being a white American male 
involved in Ph.D. research, all of which provided immediate respect and to some degree, trust. 
The opportunity for these parshads to be associated with a white person was valuable, it is a sign 
of foreign connections and worldliness that demands social respect and generates the prestige 
that is critical to remaining relevant within Indian politics. Multiple times we were photographed 
with the parshad by their assistants, and even videotaped on occasion. Following Warren’s 
(1988) experiences – through race, class and Western culture (and in my case, gender) I 
“acquired authority and privilege” (cited in Wolf, 1996: 8). Varun agreed that an Indian, a 
foreigner with darker skin, or a woman engaging in the same research project would face 
considerably greater obstacles due to the additional normative expectations and suspicions 
placed on individuals with these demographic characteristics, which white foreigners generally 
are exempt from.  
In one of our early interviews set up with a woman parshad, her husband answered the 
phone, arranged the interview, met us at their house and ended up giving the interview. We never 
saw or interacted with her, she stayed inside while we spoke with her husband out on the patio 
with other male family members present.50 This happened several more times to varying degrees. 
                                                          
 




Often, we would arrive at the house and sit down with the husband. His wife, the parshad, would 
come in and serve us chai, water, and snacks, then either retire and check on us periodically 
throughout the interview, or sit quietly to the side and answer few if any questions. At other 
times, we would know she was in the house, but we would never see her – she would make us 
chai but a male assistant would serve it, or we would ask for her signature on the signed consent 
and an assistant would go back into the house, get it, and return with the form. One time, all we 
ever saw of the parshad was her arm as she handed her business card for us to her husband 
through a partially closed door.  
These situations were problematic, both ethically and methodologically. Was she truly 
giving consent for us to use her story, but as told by her husband? Were we simply reifying the 
patriarchal hierarchy by not demanding to talk to her? Did I abdicate my duty as a feminist 
researcher to uncover “subjugated knowledge” (Hesse-Biber, 2012)? Ultimately, I decided that 
as men not of her family, we had no other means of obtaining consent. We were reinforcing the 
status quo and not digging for knowledge that only she could give, but I considered this justified 
considering the likely consequences. If we were to persistently request to talk to her, we would 
have risked insulting the husband (and her by proxy), putting her in an awkward position with 
possible future ramifications, and likely gained little data useful for my research question. I 
needed to know who was the primary agent, and these arrangements suggested that her husband 
handled all parshad interactions with men outside of her family at the least.  
In a society where men conduct much of public business, this raised serious questions 
about autonomy. Often husbands made the dependence of their spouses unabashedly clear: 




because this ward was reserved for a woman.51 If he ran the campaign, made the decisions, and 
dealt with constituents, then I needed that narrative for this research project based on its 
objectives. To address these inherent shortcomings, I incorporated several methods of inquiry to 
determine the multiple ways women can engage in the political process – primary interviews 
with the parshads themselves, participant observations of JMC meetings, interviews with outside 
journalists and activists, and interviews with student politicians – using triangulation to create a 
more complete picture (Hesse-Biber, 2012). The narratives from the interviews as provided by 
the parshads or their spouses and my observations of their actions and behavior during JMC 
meetings provided insight into their independence or dependence as they carried out their office. 
The primary interviews with parshads generally provided individual insight into the personal 
constraints and supports that influenced the development of independence or dependence, while 
the interviews with journalists and activists provided a more systemic perspective on the 
structural influences. While not from the parshads themselves, the interviews with student 
politicians give a unique perspective into the politically formative years of the average politician 
in India. 
Despite these considerations, given the shortcomings I find in the gender reservation 
system, I also fear actors with political agendas may use these findings to push the rollback of 
the current system or to further discourage a future expansion of the system to the state and 
national levels. Conservative Indian politicians in recent years have voiced a desire to re-assess 
the gender reservation system to ensure that “women who are active in politics and public life … 
                                                          
 





may not lose their importance and role as mothers, daughters and sisters”. Instead, “women 
power does not require freedom, but protection and channelization”.52 Similar to Khan (2001, 
2005) and the concerns she expressed on her own work, I also wonder how these findings will be 
“read” in the West. Criticism of cultures in the developing world often serves to “further 
demonize and stereotype”, and reinforce the common view that the West is the benchmark of 
political progress (Khan, 2001: 268). Given these considerations, while the exploitation of the 
reservation system by men is the core finding, I also emphasize the presence of supremely 
qualified and capable women parshads who were also brought up through reserved seats. 
Furthermore, the most important lesson we may take from these findings is the inability of 
detached institutional fixes designed by Western academics and pushed by Western policy-
makers, such as gender quotas, to reliably serve as a universal fix for female under-
representation across cultural contexts without taking the strength and resiliency of contextual 
cultural norms into account. 
Conclusions 
Before setting out on fieldwork abroad, particularly when relying on interviews, 
researchers must take into consideration the unique social dynamics and norms that will govern 
the interaction between the interviewer and interviewee. At its best, interviewing is a 
conversation, and local norms will influence that conversation, and thus the findings, 
considerably. Challenges to gaining access to interviewees while maintaining their rights as 
individuals will be significant. For this reason, I continually emphasize the importance of finding 
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a local, trusted facilitator to help and to advise in this delicate process, both to improve fieldwork 
outcomes, and more importantly, to protect the interviewees from the negative repercussions that 
can last long after the researcher has left. Furthermore, scholars will have to conduct interviews 
in less than ideal social environments and will be forced to alter their methodology to 
accommodate the eventual narrative. Recognizing this beforehand and designing a project that is 
flexible, remaining adaptable in the field, and being honest afterwards with the resultant 
shortcomings is crucial. 
With a goal of maintaining transparency, supporting the interpretation of the forthcoming 
narratives, and to aid in the judgement of my findings, this chapter discussed the challenges 
encountered and changes made during the data collection phase of this project. I discussed the 
evolution of this project from investigating how a woman was representing her constituents, to 
was she representing them independently or simply as a placeholder for someone else. I then 
described the research design and data collection process, with a focus on the limits of using a 
single case study. Finally, I reviewed the various methodological and ethical challenges I faced 
throughout the data gathering and analysis. The following chapter will review the theoretical link 
between descriptive and substantive representation that forms the core of this research and then 
move into the coding process used to apply this theory to the JMC case. After these two chapters 






Chapter 5: Delivering Substantive Representation through Quotas 
All quotas are intended to accelerate the growth of women in political power; however, 
variation in design and implementation has led to significant discrepancies in efficacy and the 
delivery of substantive representation.53 This chapter discusses the crucial theoretical link 
between improving descriptive representation via quotas and achieving substantive 
representation – women wielding true political power. For quotas to be considered effective, the 
literature argues that women must be elected who are qualified, who successfully push the 
interests of women, who fundamentally alter the masculine political environment, and who 
consistently serve their constituents as their representative. I then use these standards to develop 
the measures used in my own analysis of gender quota reservations within the Jaipur Municipal 
Corporation. However, while scholars have conducted research globally, their analyses generally 
do not go below the national level, and are primarily focused on the developed world.54 As I 
discuss in this chapter, the literature has developed standards that are not always readily 
applicable to local level politics in the developing world.  
This chapter begins with a methodological distinction between the two primary ways of 
measuring substantive representation: process and outcomes. As this chapter will discuss, the 
JMC is not an effective case to measure substantive representation as an outcome, as there is 
little measurable legislative output. However, the JMC is an effective case to measure process, 
given the semi-legislative parshad responsibilities. Then the chapter identifies the dependent 
variable for this analysis – individual parshad independence. As the rest of this dissertation will 
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demonstrate, parshads do not enter the JMC with intrinsic autonomy, many are quite dependent 
on others to carry out office responsibilities, which creates a disconnect between descriptive and 
substantive representation. I define the three categories of independence relied upon for the 
analysis: independent, moderately-dependent, or highly-dependent, and discuss the 
categorization process. Finally, I shift to the five independent variables: campaigns and 
elections, access to political networks, constituent activity, institutional environment, and 
qualifications, which explain the causal processes that lead to independence and dependence. I 
define each and discuss their use in the coding of the parshad narratives. 
Process versus Outcomes 
First a conceptual distinction should be made. As Franceschet & Piscopo (2008: 393) 
argue, the concept of substantive representation must be disaggregated into two distinct 
concepts: “substantive representation as process, where women change the legislative agenda, 
and substantive representation as outcome, where female legislators succeed in passing women’s 
rights laws.” Substantive representation consists of changing both legislative outcomes and the 
process of legislating itself. Examples of outcomes are straightforward – bills are passed that 
support women’s rights or public goods needed by women constituents are delivered. Examples 
of process include introducing or sponsoring bills that support women’s issues, providing 
previously excluded perspectives and legislative approaches within debates, and connecting 
women in power to women in society. As this chapter will discuss, the JMC is not an effective 
case to measure substantive representation as an outcome, given the lack of measurable 
legislative output. However, the JMC is an effective case to measure process, given the extensive 




Scholarship measuring substantive representation as an outcome relies predominantly on 
the number of women’s interest bills that pass and become policy.55 Additional work tracks the 
delivery of public goods by women leaders that specifically support women constituents.56 
However, as discussed in the first chapter, the JMC is not primarily a legislature that debates and 
passes social policy bills. It is a municipal corporation tasked with running the city of Jaipur, and 
thus the only real debate and votes are to pass an annual budget and select an executive. 
Furthermore, there is little variation in official budgetary allocations across parshads, as they are 
each allocated an equal amount. The real amount does vary significantly based on the parshad’s 
ability to solicit additional funds from the JMC executive and from members of the state 
legislature (MLA), but this process and amounts are opaque, and data is not available for a 
systematic comparison. Therefore, the standard measures of substantive representation as an 
outcome – passing bills and delivering public goods – are not readily adaptable to the JMC case.  
In comparison, the concept of process is much broader. Analyzing process involves both 
individual actors and the environment they act within, which are readily applicable to any level 
of politics. Recognizing this advantage, in this chapter, I orient the standards of measure for this 
analysis around representation as a process. As the narratives of the next chapter will illustrate, 
the ability of women parshads to represent their constituents can be restricted by a lack of 
autonomy. This dynamic is the primary analytical core of this research, and I will discuss how 
independence and dependence is measured. Following my focus on process, I then discuss the 
independent variables that help explain the ability, or inability, of a parshad to assert their 
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independence: campaigns, representative access, constituent activity, political environment, and 
qualifications. I review the existing literature on each and how I applied them to the JMC case. I 
provide examples from the interview narratives throughout to demonstrate how these measures 
were applied. 
Dependent Variable: Individual Independence 
The core of this research centers on the ability of women parshads to assert their 
independence as representatives. The quality of women brought in through gender quotas, and 
particularly the perception of their quality, is critical to instigating the broader social and 
normative changes successful quota systems will ideally bring about. Exposure to effective 
women representatives should diminish restrictive gender stereotypes and motivate a larger 
cohort of future women leaders. Extensive research across Indian villages has found that 
exposure to female leadership through quotas alters male perceptions of female leadership 
ability, and weakens public and domestic stereotypes about female roles (Beaman et al, 2009).57 
In turn, this has been shown to encourage the participation of women, and improves their ability 
to win in the absence of quotas in both Mumbai (Bhavnani, 2009) and West Bengal (Beaman et 
al, 2009). Indian women are more likely to participate in panchayat meetings and to file an 
official request or complaint when the panchayat leader position is reserved for a woman (Ban 
and Rao, 2008; Chattopadhyay & Duflo, 2004; Beaman et al, 2010). Indian girls and their 
parents also have higher educational and career aspirations for their daughters under a woman 
sarpanch (Beaman et al, 2012). However, Beaman et al (2010) found that women sarpanchs are 
more likely than their male counterparts to say that their spouses pressured them into running 
                                                          
 




and helps them in their political responsibilities. Women sarpanchs in reserved seats were also 
reported to speak less or often not at all, and were more likely to allow the vice-sarpanch or other 
official to replace her as chair in panchayat meetings.58 
These discrepancies demonstrate that quotas can, but do not necessarily lead to role 
models. There are several accounts of women representatives brought in through reservations 
who serve primarily as stand-ins for male relatives in India (Nanivadekar, 2006), with similar 
arguments that women in politics often serve as surrogates for fathers, husbands or sons in 
Pakistan (Shaheed, 1986). Media reports often mention parshad-patis and sarpanch-patis as 
joking “official” titles for the husbands of the elected representatives, given their involvement in 
the official duties of the parshad and sarpanch wives, despite being unelected. Increasing 
numbers of elected women are certainly positive, but we must also consider the possibility that 
when women are brought in by the reservation who are unprepared and dependent on their 
husbands or fathers, they may not demonstrate the ability of women to serve as effective 
politicians.  As one husband claimed: 
When people see her face (the I) they think of her as just a face, they know her father is 
the main decisionmaker (said right in front of the parshad).59 
 
In contrast, however, I also found multiple examples of women who were considered highly 
effective by the men around them, and women parshads who viewed themselves as valuable role 
models: 
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 Now you see a good number of female parshads in the JMC, some are even heads of 
committees. They serve as role models for other women in our area, who now they think 
that they can also work outside of the house.60 
 
Most scholarship assumes a priori that the elected representative enters the legislature 
with a degree of individual agency. However, in highly patriarchal societies, these accounts 
illustrate that this independence should not be taken for granted. The alarming challenge such a 
phenomenon poses to our standard conception of democracy makes individual independence the 
core dependent variable of this dissertation. To determine individual levels of independence or 
dependence, selections from each parshad’s narrative and field observations were coded as 
measuring individual independence if they addressed the following questions: 
• Who answered the phone and set up the interview, the parshad or their spouse, or both?  
 
• Does the parshad provide all the interview answers, do they just sit to the side while their 
spouse answers, are they present?  
 
• Who conducts the official work of the post? How involved is the parshad’s family in 
their official work? How about their spouse, do they get involved or not at all?  
 
• Does the parshad demonstrate an in-depth understanding of the JMC? 
 
Independence codes were organized by narrative, and each narrative was then analyzed and 
categorized as either independent, moderately-dependent, or highly-dependent. Conceptually, I 
define independent as able to run the office without the regular participation of another. While 
these parshads rely on communal support, they are the prime decision-maker and are able carry 
out basic duties of the office on their own. I define highly-dependent as unable to run the office 
without the regular participation of another. Without the contribution of their spouse or parent, a 
                                                          
 




highly-dependent parshad would be incapable of carrying out the basic duties of the office. This 
is conceptually different from ineffective parshads who are simply poor at their job. Several 
parshads gave indications that they lacked interest in serving their constituents or were not very 
active. Still, they understood their position and could carry out the basic functions. Highly-
dependent parshads enter the post with very little political experience, demonstrate little interest 
in participating fully in the post or are blocked by the participating family member, show very 
little knowledge of the JMC and its processes, and have significant familial responsibilities that 
leave them little time to gain the knowledge and experience they need to be an effective parshad. 
Finally, I classify moderately-dependent in between independent and highly-dependent. These 
parshads do not fit either extreme, and instead they fall into a grey area of “tandem” 
arrangements. These parshads are neither completely independent nor dependent, but have 
formed joint working relationships with spouses or male advisors to spread the office load of 
parshad responsibilities. Parshads in these arrangements have some autonomous decision-
making power for some office responsibilities, while their spouse or family member has taken 
over in others. Using these definitions, the following table lays out the number of parshads by 
gender and their classification. 
Table 5.1: Independent and Dependent Parshads by Gender 
 Independent Moderately-Dependent Highly-Dependent Totals 
Women 
Parshads 
5 8 10 23 
Men Parshads 13 5 0 18 
 
Given the unique interviewing circumstances discussed in Chapter Four, practicing 
reflexivity during the analysis of the interview narratives was critical. A key contribution of the 




2004), and recognizing that a researcher is never objectively absent from the narrative (Pinsky, 
2013; Hyden, 2014). Therefore, researchers must make the process “by which they came to 
know” explicit, and remain conscious of the personal demographic and ideological influences on 
their work (Frosh and Emerson, 2005, cited in Grant, 2014: 2).  
Recognizing the restrictions on the ability of women parshads to be completely open 
during the interview due to the power imbalance and societal barriers imposed both by the 
presence of myself and male research assistant, and the frequent presence of male family 
members, I built my analysis of parshad independence on explicit, manifest indicators. Latent 
indicators of perceived independence/dependence that relied on my own interpretation of the 
situation would be inherently biased and likely invalid. Therefore, to determine which parshads 
were highly dependent, I relied on both minimally subjective observations from the interviews 
themselves – the parshad never engaged with us over the phone or during the interview, we 
spoke only with the husband or father; or on statements made by the interviewees which 
explicitly made it clear that the parshad was minimally involved in running the office. These 
statements included: family members made the decision that the parshad would run for the seat 
and managed the campaign; family members conduct most of important parshad business; the 
parshad rarely leaves the house independently to engage in official duties; and the parshad 
expressed little knowledge of important JMC processes during the interview. To further improve 
validity, I classified a parshad as highly dependent only if all of these statements were present in 
a narrative. 
It became clear early in the project that dependence and the manipulation of the parshad 
seat by male family members was not socially controversial. As discussed in Chapter Three, as 




arrangement from voters. The narratives from the interviews with dependent parshads (or their 
husbands) are generally overt. Men speak openly of conducting official business in place of their 
parshad wives or daughters. Husbands and fathers were also often brutally straightforward with 
their opinion on their wife or daughter’s unsuitability for the seat, even in their presence. This 
honesty creates additional concerns regarding the reification of existing power imbalances within 
the family and society. However, it also removed the need for me to attempt to inductively 
determine how independent many of these women were, as it was generally blatantly clear. Such 
a methodology would likely have been extremely difficult, if not impossible, if the interviewees 
had been encouraged to dissemble due to probable societal backlash. 
Independent Variables 
To determine the causal processes that lead to independence and dependence within the 
JMC, the rest of the analysis focuses on the five common themes that emerged across the 
narratives that appear to act as independent variables: campaigns and elections, access to 
political networks, constituent activity, institutional environment and qualifications. The rest of 
this chapter discusses each of these themes, how codes were developed to measure each, and 
provides examples to illustrate their application. 
a. Campaigns and Elections. The process of representation begins with the campaign and 
winning elections. Overall, the literature has extensively examined the ability of women to win 
national elections, but less work has looked at local elections. Bhavnani (2009) did find that 
within the rotating system of gender reserved seats in Mumbai municipal corporation elections, 
electoral wards with prior experience with a gender reservation were more likely to elect women 
in future open-gender elections. However, the literature has rarely examined the campaigns of 




the candidate’s commitment to their ward, willingness to engage with constituents, and more 
importantly, their political connections (as demonstrated by who and how many support their 
campaign). Candidates must run an effective campaign, which requires campaign funds for 
advertising, volunteers to canvas, and a candidate and team willing to go door-to-door to ask for 
constituent votes. Five years later they then must have enough political desire and ambition to 
complete the process again. Integral to this process is support from the party, the candidate’s 
family and close associates, and, as discussed in Chapter Three, luck in the reservation lottery 
that determines which wards are reserved for whom.  
During election season, getting party tickets, running a campaign, and getting re-elected 
dominate the parshad’s schedule for several weeks, and thus the narratives surrounding elections 
are very detailed and forthcoming, as this husband of a parshad described:  
For the campaign we went street to street, meeting with people, we convinced them. They 
told us about their problems. We had two separate teams, one of men, one of women, I 
led the men and my wife (the parshad) led the women. She had a team of 15-20 women. 
The women’s team went door to door. In Muslim communities, women usually do not 
come out of the house, so the women’s team could go inside the house.61 
 
Campaigns also illustrate the complex relationships between the representative and the 
constituent created by the restrictive traditional gender norms on interpersonal interaction. 
Women generally rely quite heavily on male family members to guide and support their 
campaign, both to benefit from their experience and to accommodate normative expectations that 
a woman always be accompanied by a man in public. To determine how these dynamics 
influence the ability of parshads to assert autonomy, selections from each parshad’s narrative 
                                                          
 




and field observations were coded under the campaign and elections theme if they addressed the 
following questions: 
• Did the parshad decide on their own to run? Did their spouse encourage it? 
 
• How did the parshad get a candidate ticket? Did they have connections in the party? Who 
managed and participated in the campaign?    
 
• Did the parshad go door-to-door with everyone, or did they stay at home? Was the 
parshad comfortable interacting with voters?  
 
b. Access to Political Networks. Once elected, the literature prioritizes the measure of 
representative preferences to determine substantive representation. Women are expected to 
prioritize issues of concern to their women constituents that have historically been under-
prioritized by men. Scholars generally find that women generally “care more about, know more 
about, and do more about women’s issues” (Reingold, 2008: 6). Women are more likely than 
men to express concern and interest in women’s issues and push through more legislation 
addressing women’s issues. However, as discussed in Chapter Four, when the level of analysis 
moves from the national and state level to the local level, and into the developing world, 
distinctions on gendered issues start to blur. Women’s issues, communal issues, everything tends 
to blend together into a shared focus on improving infrastructure, access to benefits, and day-to-
day life. The core issues faced by parshads across India for example – maintaining a clean 
environment, functional sewage lines, working streetlights, roads with less potholes, and 
supporting constituents in need – do not divide along liberal/conservative or gender lines, they 
are demanded by everyone. In these cases, what’s more important is the ability of the parshad to 
access public resources to fulfill these demands. This access is generally controlled by 
gatekeepers such as their regional MLA or MP, and the JMC executive, who can provide 




Based on this reality, I focus on access to political networks. To determine how this access 
influences the ability of parshads to assert autonomy, selections from each parshad’s narrative 
and field observations were coded under the access to political networks theme if they addressed 
the following questions:  
• Does the parshad have independent political connections, or do they rely on family 
connections and experience?  
 
• Have they been able to get support and funds from the mayor, MLA or MP, or are they 
frustrated with the lack of?  
 
For example, parshad access to MLAs and MPs significantly. This is illustrated by separate 
accounts from parshads in the majority party (BJP): 
I talk with my MLA continuously to get help. Recently he gave 60-70 lakh rupees for 
small diesel trucks to go in the small passages and collect garbage. I got some of these 
trucks as we needed some in our area. I’m also in talks with my MP about what he can 
help me with.62 
 
And from the opposition (Congress): 
From the MLA and MP funds I haven’t received any help. There is a discrimination 
against us as the opposition. Recently the MLA has gave diesel trucks to nearby wards, 
but he didn’t give us any. If he didn’t give us anything that’s ok, but he gave two trucks 
to the nearby BJP ward. If I sit down and cry about the lack of resources, it won’t help 
my people. We have to clean as we did earlier, whether we have the diesel trucks or not. 
It’s me who has to face the public, not the MLA, so if I cry about it people aren’t going to 
believe me.63 
 
These opposing quotes illustrate the significant discrepancy I observed in parshad access to 
benefactors. Whereas some parshads received ready support and extra funds from their MLAs 
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and MPs, others complained of receiving nearly nothing, and often blamed partisan differences 
for their neglect. 
c. Constituent Activity. As asserted within the literature, the core link between descriptive and 
substantive representation rests on the connection between the representative and the constituent. 
Representatives enter office with a life experience that informs their decision-making, but 
equally important is the ability of constituents to keep their representative updated on their 
evolving needs. Women are often found to bring unique approaches and skillsets to elected 
office that their male colleagues lack. For example, women at the county level in the US are 
found to be more approachable for constituents, more trusted, and more responsive to their 
concerns than their male counterparts (Flammang, 1985). Female panchayat leaders in India are 
found to reflect the preferences of both their male and female constituents better than male 
leaders (Lindgren et al, 2009). Furthermore, more female US state legislators emphasized 
constituency service as a priority than men (Richardson and Freeman, 1995), dedicated more 
time to staying in contact with their constituents, and in turn received more constituent requests 
(Carey, Niemi, and Powell 1998; Epstein, Niemi, and Powell 2005).  
Constituent interaction dominates the parshad’s official duties in the JMC. Much of their 
day is spent in their ward – meeting with constituents, monitoring projects, and looking for 
problems. Whether at the office or home, people walk in off the street or call in regularly to 
discuss problems and complaints. However, a potential barrier for female constituents is 
traditional norms on gender relations, which are still strong in Indian society. These barriers 
often make it difficult for women constituents to access their representative unless they bring 




Men and women come in equal numbers to me, but since I am a woman, other women 
feel safe around me to talk, they are not hesitant to speak their minds. And since I am a 
woman I can naturally better understand their problems. They also feel free to come at 
any time, they don’t need to be accompanied by their husbands, because I’m a woman. 
For example, the problem of water will only be encountered by woman. As her husband 
is at work, she has to find a way to acquire water for the household if they aren’t 
connected to public water. Sometimes women tell me that if their parshad had not been a 
woman then they would not be able to come directly to me without their husbands.64 
 
Constituent service also includes serving constituent needs through the legislative 
process. Methods measuring women’s effectiveness as legislators generally track the 
introduction or sponsorship of legislation, self-reported efficacy, and reported time spent 
developing legislation. However, in the JMC, given the lack of a regular legislative process, most 
of these measures are not directly applicable, but its quasi-legislative environment does allow 
inquiry into general activity and approaches. Parshads conduct their official duties on the floor 
in general board meetings and committees (giving speeches, speaking with colleagues), engaging 
with the bureaucracy (pushing through work orders), and outside of the JMC (touring their 
wards, addressing problems). Furthermore, communication with constituents (recording 
problems, facilitating paperwork) is an essential part of their official duties, as they are the only 
personal connection most constituents in the city have to the state.65  
These two general activities, constituent interaction and service, encompass the 
constituent activity theme. To determine how this activity influences the ability of parshads to 
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assert autonomy, selections from each parshad’s narrative and field observations were coded 
under the constituent activity theme if they addressed the following questions: 
• Are they comfortable going outside the house alone or only with a family escort? Is the 
parshad comfortable and able to engage with constituents alone?  
 
• Do constituents come to them with issues? Do women constituents come, do they come 
on their own or only in groups?  
 
• Do they visit their ward regularly on their own? Do they hold regular office hours or does 
their spouse?  
 
• Could the parshad achieve most of the goals they had or only some?  
 
• Do they struggle with the bureaucracy? Are they reliant on another’s experience? Do they 
understand the bureaucratic process or does their spouse take care of it? 
 
Following the literature, I pay special attention to the interaction with women 
constituents, activities that support women’s interests, and connections to outside women’s 
groups. The narratives from the JMC also demonstrated that for many parshads constituent 
service goes beyond connections to local groups and into personal relationships with individual 
constituents, as the following two women parshads describe: 
Sometimes children come to me with problems they don’t want to take to their parents. 
For them I set aside a special time. These children come with problems such as 
unaffordable education, or they need a better job, but they don’t want to go to their 
parents about these problems. Some of them don’t want to study, they want to work, so I 
enroll them in nursing, sewing, knitting, computer, and beautician courses.66 
Sometimes parshads are asked to help in problems outside of the JMC ambit: police 
issues, JDA issues, women’s issues, domestic problems, financial help, RSB, and loan 
related problems, financial problems. People do come to me for these problems, or 
sometimes domestic feuds, and they call us to mediate or talk some sense into them.67 
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These quotes illustrate the broad range of personal services constituents look to their parshads 
for, from educational support to financial issues. Parshads have the general responsibility of 
acting as a facilitator for many services, not just those connected with the state. 
d. Institutional Environment. More women in politics should not only improve the representation 
of women’s interests, but should also change how political outcomes overall are realized. When 
women make it into a legislative body, they tend to shift the way business is conducted. Women 
in US state legislatures take a more communal, inclusive, and collaborative approach to 
legislation, and are more likely to seek consensus than their male colleagues. However, as the 
number of women increases in state legislatures, threatened male counterparts often become 
more aggressive and dominant, and less collaborative and accommodating (Kathlene, 1994; 
Rosenthal, 1998). Furthermore, these findings are primarily developed from legislators observed 
operating in the highly regimented deliberative environment of US state legislatures. From my 
own experience observing the less disciplined JMC environment, with different norms of 
behavior, we need to not only consider hostility towards women members, but complete 
exclusion as well. As this excerpt from my participant observation of a JMC board meeting 
describes, women face significant barriers to fundamental participation: 
Several men are shouting over each other. The parshad Sama stands up and tries to object 
to what was being said. I can’t hear her as she is drowned out and then sits down. The 
men speaking just keeping going unperturbed. She raises her hand, apparently asking the 
mayor to recognize her, but no one does, and this is the only time I see anyone raise their 
hand the whole night. She tries to get in her objection again, and is again unsuccessful, 
her voice is not loud enough to be heard as the men continue to shout at each other. She 
gives up, visibly frustrated.68 
 
                                                          
 




This observation demonstrates the need to consider the environment women representatives 
enter. Changes in individual preferences and styles brought about by increasing the number of 
women elected will have little impact on the overall deliberative body if these women are 
suppressed. The literature has generally measured the ability of women to influence the process 
by counting the amount of legislation addressing women’s issues that is proposed, the 
appointment of women to leadership positions, and the observed ability of women to voice and 
successfully push their interests within male-dominated environments. As illustrated by the 
observation above, the ability of women to voice and push their interests within institutional and 
social environments that favors men’s preferences and legislative styles is particularly applicable 
to the JMC. Women parshads must act within multiple formal and informal environments – JMC 
board meetings, JMC bureaucracy, other city and state agencies, and an array of social 
environments outside the JMC. All of which are dominated by traditional patriarchal norms. 
These factors are combined into the institutional environment theme. To determine how the 
environment influences the ability of parshads to assert autonomy, selections from each 
parshad’s narrative and field observations were coded under this theme if they addressed the 
following questions:  
• Is the JMC difficult to operate within?  
 
• Did normative obstacles emerge during the election campaign? Does the party support 
their work?  
 
• How do male parshads feel about women brought in through the reservation system?  
 
• Do women speak in the general board meetings? Do women engage in a similar manner 
to men?  
 
• Does their family support their political activity? How difficult is the work/life balance 
for her? Is she still a housewife saddled with domestic responsibilities? How have 





e. Qualifications. A common opposition to the establishment of quotas is the concern that 
women will push better qualified men out of office (Dahlerup & Freidenvall, 2010). These 
concerns appear to unfounded in many cases, as scholars have found that quotas can raise the 
overall level of qualifications among politicians (Weeks & Baldez, 2015). Research in Sweden 
even found that party quotas both brought in equally qualified women and, by forcing men to 
compete for a smaller number of seats, raised the qualification levels of male candidates as well 
(O’Brien & Rickne, 2016; Besley et al, 2017). However, other scholars have found that women 
brought in through quotas often have less experience, which can reinforce negative societal 
stereotypes on the capacities of women in politics (Franceschet & Piscopo, 2012). I also 
encountered a variety of education and experience levels in my interviews with JMC parshads, 
from those with only the minimum tenth grade education, to those with master’s degrees, and 
housewives who rarely ventured outside the house independently, to women who ran their own 
businesses. 
Within the discussion on measuring qualification, there is a substantive representation 
question. Despite the call for greater racial and ethnic diversity among women representatives to 
reflect the diversity of their constituents, less attention has been paid to diversity in socio-
economic and education backgrounds. Following substantive representation theory, we would 
expect women from disadvantaged backgrounds, and thus generally lower education attainment, 
to better represent women from similar backgrounds based on their shared experiences. Indeed, 
research from Germany argues that a benefit of quota institution there has been greater 
participation by women from the working class without university degrees (Geissel & Hust, 




However, the general assumption within the existing literature is that more education is always 
better.  
What is less debatable is an individual’s ability to serve as an effective representative. 
Notably, given the previously discussed concerns about parshad dependence, I encountered 
parshads who did not appear ready to take on the full responsibilities of the office, and were 
leaving the running of the office up to husbands or fathers. As one father of a parshad 
commented: 
She doesn’t know anything about how the JMC works because she has never been to the 
working area of it, never managed the tender process, never met with any officer or 
contractor. I manage all of this.69 
 
To gauge the qualifications of JMC parshads I follow existing research on individual 
qualifications, which primarily relies on reported education levels and prior political experience 
(Nugent and Krook, 2015), as well as self-reported political interests prior to entering office to 
gauge political ambition (Thomas, 1994). The relative accessibility of parshads and their 
willingness to discuss past experiences and future ambitions makes the JMC particularly well 
suited to measuring qualifications in terms of education, prior political experience, political 
interests and ambition, and perceived efficacy, all of which form the qualifications theme. To 
determine how experience and ambition influences the ability of parshads to assert autonomy, 
selections from each parshad’s narrative and field observations were coded under the 
qualifications theme if they addressed the following questions: 
• Did the parshad have political experience prior to the election?  
 
                                                          
 




• Did the parshad have experience outside of the house? How educated are they? Did they 
have experience interacting with the public, such as doing social work, or community 
organizing?  
 
• Was the parshad interested in politics before being elected, or was interest all spousal?  
 
• How motivated is the parshad to continue in politics? Will their spouse take their place in 
the next election if the seat is open-gender? 
 
These codes then guide the analysis of independent and dependent parshad development 
that are presented over the next three chapters. As Maxwell (2012) points out, in qualitative 
research “the goal of coding is not to count things”, but to instead separate the data and arrange it 
into manageable categories that enable within-category comparison (96). To begin the coding 
process, I took the five primary measures of substantive representation as a process developed in 
this chapter – campaigns and elections, access to networks, constituent activity, institutional 
environment, and qualifications – and use them as my overarching categories to examine how 
and why some parshads take office independently while others are highly-dependent. With these 
categories as a guide for the information I wanted to pull from the narratives, I continued to open 
coding, with no pre-established code list. Codes were then developed within the narratives 
themselves with these categories in mind. These codes are primarily based on the manifest 
content – the actual phrases of the authors (Berg, 2004) as translated by my assistant – I do not 
attempt to subjectively interpret their words. I also code manifest ethnographic observations 
from my assistant and fieldnotes (e.g. who set up the interview, who did most of the speaking, 
interaction between parshad and spouse). I do not code or incorporate latent content – the 
interpreted meaning of statements – into my systematic analysis. Comments on interpreted latent 
meanings from my assistant and fieldnotes are only included anecdotally to provide illustration, 





Ultimately, the goal of quotas is not just to bring qualified and effective women in, but to 
also bring about the expected changes in preferences, policy output, legislative style, and 
constituent service that links descriptive to substantive representation. Scholarship has found that 
quotas can lead to more debate and discussion on women’s issues (Devlin & Elgie, 2008, 
Xydias, 2007), and more supportive public policy (Beaman et al. 2009, Chattopadhyay & Duflo, 
2004, Franceschet & Piscopo, 2008). Women representatives brought through quotas also feel 
more obligated to their women constituents than non-quota women (Xydias 2014). However, in 
other cases, quotas appear to have a mixed or no effect.70 These discrepancies demonstrate the 
inability of quotas to bring about real change if women are unable to alter policy and process 
after election. To understand this, we need to consider the causal processes that ultimately links 
descriptive and substantive representation – the guiding forces that influence a female 
representative’s ability to wield power (Reingold, 2008).  
As the narratives that are presented in the next chapter will demonstrate, electoral and 
legislative institutions act in tandem with, competition with, and are often overcome by the 
larger, and often much more powerful social institutions that influence the political process at 
every juncture. Winning an election does not free a woman from the social constraints that 
restricted her agency prior to the election. Even relatively inconsequential societal norms can 
significantly constrain the latitude of women parshads to carry out their responsibilities, 
                                                          
 
70 The institution of quotas does not appear to have changed policy outcomes in Rwanda (Devlin & Elgie, 2008), 
while in Argentina the number of bills introduced on women’s issues improved, but not legislative success 
(Franceschet & Piscopo, 2008). Other research in Mexico found little change in the sponsorship and passage of bills, 
attaining of leadership positions, and committee representation after the introduction of quotas (Kerevel & Atkeson, 




particularly when their position demands time in public. The rest of this dissertation explores this 
competition between progress and constraint, using the narratives from the women who live this 
experience, to illustrate the stubborn resistance of social norms to change, and even the ability of 
these norms to infiltrate the institutions that were designed to suppress them.  
To address concerns with selection bias (Collier and Mahoney, 1996), I have defined 
each coding category and provided examples to clarify the determination of independence and 
dependence and the application of the independent variables to the analysis. This chapter 
described the focus on measuring substantive representation as a process, which frames the 
following analysis. Then the chapter identified the dependent variable for this analysis – 
individual parshad independence, and defined the three categories of independence relied upon 
for the analysis: independent, moderately-dependent, or highly-dependent, and discussed the 
categorization process. Finally, I described the five independent variables and the coding process 
used to apply them to the narratives for: campaigns and elections, access to political networks, 
constituent activity, institutional environment, and qualifications, which are used to explain the 
causal processes that lead to independence and dependence. 
In Chapter Six, I use the narratives of the most dependent parshads to demonstrate the 
parshad-pati phenomenon and investigate the process that leads to significant dependence. In 
Chapter Seven, I use the contrasting narratives of independent women parshads to demonstrate 
the ability of women to assert themselves and engage as competently as their male JMC 
colleagues, with the caveat that even these women continue to rely on male benefactors to 
cultivate this independence. Then, in Chapter Eight, using both the narratives and outside 
literature, I describe the broad base of restrictions and obstacles in Indian society that drive 




reservation. Finally, in Chapter Nine I conclude with a discussion of the institutional weaknesses 
of the gender reservation system when faced with powerful patriarchal norms, and a call to 





Chapter 6: Women as Proxy Representatives 
This chapter begins the core analysis of this dissertation – the 41 narratives gathered 
through semi-structured interviews with JMC parshads from 2016-17. Using the 
independence/dependence categorization discussed in the previous chapter, this chapter solely 
examines the narratives from the parshads categorized as highly-dependent. Chapter Seven will 
then provide contrast with the narratives from the parshads categorized as moderately-dependent 
and independent. Finally, using comparison across these narratives, Chapter Eight concludes the 
examination with a discussion on the role societal norms play in the establishment of 
dependence.  
The analysis and discussion of the narratives in this chapter begins with a brief review of 
the literature and the criteria used to categorize dependence. Then it progresses into the 
narratives themselves, which are organized by common themes. Each parshad’s story is 
presented as it was told. It should be kept in mind that several of these stories came strictly from 
the husband or father, as the parshad was never present. I clarify in the footnotes who 
participated in the interview. After the presentation of each narrative in the thematic group, I 
discuss which commonalities they highlight. Most of the commonalities discussed are shared by 
nearly all the highly-dependent narratives, but are highlighted best by the narratives they follow. 
The first two narratives illustrate near total dependence, these parshads appear to have very little 
agency and only engage in the minimum required for the office. The next three narratives 
demonstrate the motivations and interests of husbands interested in gaining access to power via 
the gender reservation. The next two illustrate how women are pressured into running for the 
parshad office, but are unable to fulfill the responsibilities independently. Finally, the last three 




engaging in the office, due to a need to “protect” them from the political realm. While these 
narratives are presented thematically, they are not intended to progress along a spectrum of 
dependence. Rather, they illustrate different forms of dependence that vary in terms of parshad 
agency and engagement, parshad political interest, spousal/parental motivations, and external 
constraints. 
Institutional Challenge: Proxy Representatives 
Most of the women parshads in the JMC, 30 out of 33, came in through the gender 
reservation system. As discussed in Chapter Two, the reservation system is intended to 
accelerate the development of core democratic virtues, such as fair representation and constituent 
accountability, in societies where such tenants are constrained by societal norms and weak 
institutions (Bhavnani, 2009). However, while past research has demonstrated that such 
reservations have significantly improved female representation at the local level in India 
relatively quickly, the literature has also found that social and institutional traditions are 
persistent. For example, female candidates often require the assent of male family elders before 
deciding to run (Bhavnani, 2009).  
As the narratives from this chapter illustrate, social traditions persist within the gender 
reservation system to a much greater extent than simply requiring assent. A startling cohort of 
women parshads brought in by gender reservations in 2014 elections appear to be nearly totally 
dependent on male family members to conduct the duties of the office. In most cases, an 
ambitious male family member sees an opportunity to gain a political benefit through her 
candidature, and pressures her to run. In none of these cases does the woman herself 
independently profess the initial interest in running for the seat, she is always prodded, 




and often competes against the proxies of other actors. On their own, these women would have 
considerable difficulties campaigning as they have very little political experience. Therefore, 
these competitions are generally managed by the same men who pushed them to run for office, 
who have the political experience and connections needed. After entering office, the lack of 
public experience generally forces her to rely heavily on her husband or father to carry out most 
of the duties of the office and even to interact with constituents, which is primarily because 
society perceives such activities as inappropriate for women. Still, several of these women still 
attest that this new, public experience has kindled an interest in political life that encouraged 
them to become more involved. 
The narratives selected for this chapter were chosen based on the level of dependence I 
observed relative to the narratives as a whole. Based on the criteria discussed in Chapter Five, I 
have categorized these parshads as highly-dependent. Conceptually, I define highly-dependent 
as the inability to run the office without the regular participation of another. Without the 
contribution of their spouse or parent, a highly dependent parshad would be incapable of 
carrying out the basic duties of the office. This is conceptually different from ineffective 
parshads who are simply poor at their job. Several parshads gave indications that they lacked 
interest in serving their constituents or were not very active. Still, they understood their position 
and could carry out the basic functions. Highly-dependent parshads enter the post with very little 
political experience, demonstrate little interest in participating fully in the post or are blocked by 
a family member, show very little knowledge of the JMC and its processes, and have significant 
familial responsibilities that leave them little time to gain the knowledge and experience they 




As discussed previously in Chapter Five, to determine which parshads were highly-
dependent, I relied both on minimally subjective observations from the interviews themselves – 
the parshad never engaged with us over the phone or during the interview, we spoke only with 
the husband or father; or on statements made during the interview which explicitly made it clear 
that the parshad was minimally involved in running the office. These statements included: 
family members made the decision that the parshad would run for the seat and managed the 
campaign; family members conduct most of the important parshad business; the parshad rarely 
leaves the house independently to engage in official duties; and the parshad expressed little 
knowledge of important JMC processes during the interview. To further improve validity, I 
categorized a parshad as highly dependent only if all of these statements were present in a 
narrative. 
Out of the 41 parshads I interviewed, I found ten who demonstrated that they were highly 
dependent on those around them to conduct the office effectively. Nine of these were women 
dependent on their husbands, and one on her father. Notably, no men demonstrated that they 
were highly dependent on their family members.71 These narratives come from interviews held 
either with the parshad and husband or father, or with just her husband in many cases, as she was 
either uninterested or unable to meet with us. Again, the following narratives are presented 
                                                          
 
71 Of the 18 men I interviewed, none appeared highly dependent on anyone around them. However, when 
discussing the parshad-pati phenomenon with one of the independent women parshads, she commented that, “It 
is common for husbands to take care of the female’s office, as there are only two to three cases of men vacating a 
seat and having their wife run when a seat is assigned a General reservation (open-group/open-gender) in the 
lottery.” This is an interesting exception that does not appear to illustrate the dependence of a husband on their 
spouse, but rather that their wife was more politically competitive than they were (Interview with female parshad 




thematically, and are not intended to progress along a spectrum of dependence. Rather, they 
demonstrate different forms of dependence. 
Complete Proxies: Parshads with No Agency 
These first narratives are two of the more extreme examples of women parshads I 
interviewed who were highly dependent on male family members. These women had no initial 
interest in participating in politics, the decision to run for office came entirely from male 
members in their families. These men had personal political ambitions that were either blocked 
by the assignment of gender reservation to their ward, or saw opportunity in the reservation. As 
the one with more political experience and a public image, these men take the lead in the 
campaign, and the woman herself at most engages on the side with women constituents. After 
winning, the newly-elected parshad returns into the home to resume domestic duties, while her 
husband or father takes over the official duties of the seat. On occasion, she will attend public 
functions and mandatory JMC meetings, and this experience may kindle a political interest that 
could motivate her to engage further, but only if her family allows it. 
Mr. Darzi, father of parshad Haleema  
After the ward-lines were redrawn, I was unable to run for parshad as the seat was now 
reserved for a woman candidate. My situation was helpless, as only my daughter could 
run, her mother was less-educated. I knew education would be an important part of this 
election, as it was time for the next generation to step up, so I proposed that my daughter 
run as an independent. People seemed to like her, there was a craze about her, and then 
she won the election.72 
                                                          
 
72 Interview with father of parshad on 11/29/2016 in Jaipur. Parshad’s father arranged and set up the interview. 
After we asked to meet with the parshad he called for her, and she eventually joined us partway through the 





Mr. Darzi73 had been involved in politics since the tensions in 1992 following the 
demolition of the Babri Masjid in Ayodha, a seminal event for Muslims confronted with the 
rising political presence of Hindu fundamentalism. He was ambitious and persistent, first running 
for the sarpanch position of his village and losing, then eventually winning the deputy sarpanch 
seat. After moving to Jaipur, he ran for the parshad seat of his ward and lost, and even competed 
in state legislative assembly elections, losing there as well. Approaching the 2014 elections, he 
wanted to try for the parshad seat once more, but he faced a challenge following the reservation 
lottery for the upcoming elections. His ward had randomly drawn a gender reservation. His 
community was not listed on either the central or state lists of communities who qualify for 
reservations as a Scheduled Caste (SC), Scheduled Tribe (ST), or Other Backward Classes 
(OBC),74 but luckily, the only restriction was on gender, no group reservations were attached, so 
he could still push his wife or daughter to run. However, his wife had received little education, so 
he worried about her ability to compete. That left his daughter Haleema, a quiet girl who had 
rarely stepped outside the house without family in accompaniment, but had completed more 
schooling than her mother. Party electoral tickets were already secured for other candidates 
running under the BJP and Congress symbols, but Mr. Darzi saw an opportunity and entered her 
as an independent.  
Haleema was suddenly thrust out into the campaign trail. For two weeks leading up to the 
election, she followed her father and brother from house to house throughout their ward. Her 
father introduced his previously anonymous daughter to local voters, and promised to address 
local issues with water and sewage if they elected her parshad. He was well known in this ward 
                                                          
 
73 All names are pseudonyms. I have also changed some individual details to protect anonymity. 




already from his previous work on a ward development committee, so they did not have to meet 
everyone. Voters did ask – why bring her out of the house to deal with all these people? Leave 
her at home, they only needed to hear from him. Voters understood the system, they knew he 
would be the acting parshad, she was only there to fill the reservation. The campaign was 
successful, and despite heavy spending by the other candidates they won a comfortable victory, 
with the BJP candidate unable to get her bail returned in the predominantly Muslim ward.75 The 
family celebrated and Mr. Darzi prepared his plans for the next five years, while Haleema 
retreated back into the house. Over the next two years, she would rarely engage in parshad 
duties, attending JMC meetings only four to five times. She attended several weddings and 
public events, but people did not recognize her, they only knew her father. 
Mr. Darzi enjoys politics and is already planning for the next elections in 2019. If the 
lottery leaves the ward unreserved, he will be able to try his luck again himself, now practically 
as an incumbent. However, if it is reserved for a woman once more, he plans to stand his 
daughter again, unless she marries and thus leaves the household. In preparation for that 
possibility, he is currently trying to find an educated girl for his son to marry, someone who will 
qualify for recently enacted minimum education requirements and thus able take Haleema’s 
place.76 
                                                          
 
75 Electoral candidates must pay a bail to compete in elections, which is only returned if they receive over 10% of 
the vote total. It is not a large amount of money, usually less than 50 USD, but it is considered embarrassing to lose 
it. 
76 Minimum education requirements for parshads were established in Rajasthan in 2015, after the 2014 elections. 
In future elections, candidates must have completed at least 10th standard (equivalent to 10th grade) to stand for 
elections. Some estimate that as many as half of current parshads across the state will be barred from participating 





Mr. Salvi, husband of parshad Mrs. Salvi 
Fighting an election never occurred to me before, but through my friend’s circle and my 
family’s support, I was encouraged to run… I said that if we get a ticket then we will 
fight the election. 
With the grace of God we got the ticket, then I convinced my wife to fight the election, 
she was ok with it and we decided to fight and luckily we won.77 
 
Mr. Salvi had been active with the BJP for the past 15 years, but had not seriously 
considered competing in elections. However, the same lottery that had reserved Mr. Darzi’s ward 
for a woman reserved his as well, alongside an OBC group reservation. His community was 
listed as an OBC, so many members of his close friends and family encouraged him to compete. 
His father remained skeptical, given the lack of familial electoral experience, but their family had 
lived in this area for multiple generations and were well-known. Several locals continued to push 
Mr. Salvi to request a ticket from the BJP on behalf of his wife, who still had no knowledge of 
the proposal. Eventually he did. They were competing with ten others for the ticket and started 
low in internal party rankings initially, as the party was looking for a good candidate to compete 
against a popular incumbent Congress candidate (who had found a woman from his family to run 
as well). However, after local polling showed strong support for Mr. Salvi and his wife, when 
combined with his years of party service in the area, he rose to the top of the list and they were 
given the ticket. He returned home and informed his wife that she would be competing in the 
upcoming parshad elections. Following her surprise, he convinced her to run and they started the 
campaign.  
                                                          
 
77 Interview with husband of female parshad on 3/22/2017 in Jaipur. Parshad’s husband arranged and set up the 
interview. Parshad was never present during the interview, the entire narrative came from him. The consent form 




Given the short amount of time before the election, Mr. Salvi aimed for efficiency. Over 
the past two years, thousands of new families had moved into their ward, and he needed to reach 
out to the new voters who were unfamiliar with him and his family. With BJP volunteers, he 
canvassed new housing developments every morning and helped the new residents fill out voter 
registration forms, which he would then submit. As a real estate broker, he knew the area well. 
He had bought and sold several of these newly built lots and developments. He reminded voters 
of the work he had done with the BJP in their neighborhood and encouraged them to vote for him 
and his wife. He often brought his wife along. She would go door-to-door with him, trying to 
reach every person in their ward. It was a big ward, they would start early in the morning at six, 
eating their breakfast and lunch on the road. He would then often continue campaigning late into 
the night. His family helped. His five brothers and father joined the campaign alongside other 
relatives and even close neighbors. Each reached out to local contacts and acquaintances to ask 
for support at the ballot box. Ultimately, their work paid off, as Mr. Salvi and his wife rode the 
2014 BJP wave to join the supermajority in the JMC. 
Mrs. Salvi became pregnant soon after the election, and now they have a young daughter. 
Due to her domestic responsibilities, she is rarely able to go out to meet with voters or address 
issues in their ward, so Mr. Salvi takes care of those aspects. He thinks that it is better regardless, 
as a woman should not be subject to the foul language constituents often direct at their parshad. 
She does have family nearby to watch her daughter, so she is able to attend JMC meetings and 
go out into her ward occasionally. This experience has triggered a new interest in politics for her, 
and now that her daughter is older she takes her to party meetings and public programs. She has 
become more outgoing, and is more comfortable calling JMC officers and pushing them to 




Their ward has a large population from communities who qualify for the OBC 
reservation, making it more likely the lottery will reserve this ward for them again in the future. 
This was the second time in a row it had been reserved for their group, previously it was for a 
man. Mr. Salvi plans to run again in the next election if reserved again for an OBC, either his 
wife or he himself will stand depending on if there is an accompanying gender reservation.  
- 
Neither Haleema nor Mrs. Salvi had any initial interest in participating in politics. The 
decision to run for office came entirely from male members in their families (father in Haleema’s 
case and husband in Mrs. Salvi’s) who had political ambitions that were either blocked by a 
gender reservation within their district, or who saw an opportunity to gain access to power 
through their wife or daughter.  
These two cases share features that were common across the interviews of highly-
dependent parshads. Six of the ten narratives from highly-dependent parshads came strictly 
from the husband, as the parshad herself was never present throughout the interview. Of the 
remaining four, in two the parshad was present but only provided a few short answers, the 
narrative was dominated by the husband or father, and in only two did the parshad herself 
provide a fair amount of information. Therefore, these narratives generally begin with the 
husband or father describing their personal political ambitions, which usually stem from several 
years, if not decades, of local political activity, and their desire to compete for a parshad seat. 
These ambitions were often checked many months before the actual election when the 
reservation lottery was held and their local ward was made off-limits to them personally by a 
gender and/or group reservation. Depending on their personal political reach and luck granted by 




known and have connections to local power-brokers who can deliver critical vote-banks. There is 
no residency requirement for candidacy, but the parties generally only hand out nominations to 
candidates who can demonstrate they will be competitive in the ward, so crossing ward-lines is 
difficult. 
If they do not see opportunity for themselves outside of their ward, the ambitious man 
then looks for alternate means to access political power. He must find a candidate who fits the 
various requirements to be both a candidate (gender, community, and education) and receive a 
party nomination (voter and party appeal), combined with the willingness to step aside and allow 
him to act as de-facto parshad. These requirements generally limit him to women in his family 
who feel a deep obligation to him – a wife or daughter. Then he must convince her to enter 
political life, which is an incredibly intimidating prospect for a woman who often has spent most 
of her life sheltered – first by her family as a daughter and then by her husband as a housewife. 
Upon convincing, he must then make her a competitive candidate for the party’s nomination. A 
history on his part of loyal party service and personal connections within the party go a long way 
towards pushing her name to the top of the list, often competing with up to ten or 11 others. As 
Mrs. Salvi’s case demonstrates, husbands may even put off informing her of his intent to propose 
her candidature until after securing the nomination. If they are unable to land a nomination, there 
is still the option of competing as an independent, but they are generally electorally unsuccessful 
against candidates with national party backing. 
Typically, nominations are handed out only a week or two prior to the election itself, so 
upon being nominated, the candidate must immediately begin campaigning. As the one with 
political experience and a public image, the parshad’s husband or father takes the lead in the 




family on the campaign trail, knocking on the doors of as many potential voters as possible. He 
is generally already recognized, but his wife or daughter is likely a newcomer. Marriage 
traditions play a key part in this dynamic. Due to massive migration from the villages to the 
cities over the past few decades, particularly by men looking for work, there is often a scarcity of 
eligible brides from one’s own community/caste who live nearby. Therefore, a suitor frequently 
returns to his village to marry, then brings her back with him to the city where he now lives and 
works. She leaves both her family and social circles behind to join those of her husband. Thus, 
many aspiring women parshads, dependent or not, must rely on the social contacts of their 
husband and his family. 
The politically aspiring husband or father introduces this new face to each household as 
their future parshad, with their blessings, and she often goes to the side to speak with the women 
of the household, while her husband or father discusses his plans for the ward with the men. It is 
generally clear to everyone in the household that the candidate herself will not be the main 
decision-maker. They understand that she is foremost a face that checks the necessary boxes. It is 
publicly acknowledged that official, and unofficial, requests will go through her husband or 
father. As the voters at one house told Haleema’s father during their campaign, “she doesn’t need 
to come, as we only know her as your daughter, we just know you… Don’t trouble taking her 
around with you,” in other words, just leave her at home.78  
The campaign grinds through an arduous week or two of 12- to 18-hour days until the 
election, ideally culminating with a win. If not, they may try again next time if it was close and 
the reservations line up correctly. If they do win, then they set down to the business of being 
                                                          
 




parshad. However, in respect of experience, tradition and gendered responsibilities, the highly-
dependent parshads return to the home to maintain the household, raise the children, and care for 
their husband and in-laws. Mrs. Salvi herself became pregnant soon after their electoral win, and 
spent much of her first two years in office raising their new daughter. Women parshads from 
wealthier families can discharge a portion of these responsibilities onto hired help, but none 
escape them entirely.  
Still, these women are the face of the seat, and so they will attend public functions and 
weddings to meet constituents, and they must attend regular JMC committee and general board 
meetings. Annually, every parshad must give an account of their ward in the general board 
meetings, and many of the highly-dependent women will read out loud to the body from a sheet 
prepared by her husband. Her signature and stamp are also required on all official paperwork, 
which comes in daily via constituent requests for government benefits and contractor tenders that 
allocate money to infrastructure projects in her ward. However, she leaves the decision-making 
and field work for the most part to her husband or father. Constituents call day and night to make 
requests or file complaints – sewer lines break or clog, electricity fails, and roads fall apart under 
monsoon rains. Many of these problems require the individual attention of the parshad, either to 
address the problem personally or to ensure the contractor addresses it expediently and correctly. 
However, most of these interactions will be with men, and it is generally normatively 
inappropriate for women from these traditional households to engage independently with men 
not of her family, so many feel that these responsibilities are best left to her husband. 
Despite a lack of engagement, for many of these women, this experience kindles a 
political interest. They appreciate the respect they now receive in public, they like engaging with 




As they gain more experience, they may engage more in areas where they are comfortable, 
whether speaking more in the board meetings or meeting on their own with women constituents 
who come with requests. Many enjoy the position so much they plan to run again in the next 
election if given the opportunity. This suits the motivations of their husbands or fathers as well, 
whose only assurance of remaining competitive in the next election is having a woman in their 
family willing to compete, in case the reservation returns. As Haleema’s father said, he will run 
if the seat is open0gender. However, if it is reserved and his daughter is married and thus left his 
family by then, he needs to find an educated girl for his son to marry and take her spot. 
Sensing Opportunity: Exploiting the Gender Reservation 
Many of these parshad-patis resent both the gender and group reservation system that 
can make large numbers of seats off-limits to them. However, they also see opportunity in the 
gender reservation of their respective wards. Some would have run themselves if the ward had 
lacked a gender reservation, while others had run themselves in the past but lost. Now, using 
their years of campaign experience and local contacts, they can gain power through their wives. 
Generally, their parshad wives do not have significant public experience and are not comfortable 
interacting with voters and constituents. While they may do some of the JMC paperwork, they 
are very dependent on their husbands to conduct most of the parshad duties, particularly those 
that involve leaving the office to go out into the ward. However, these women can interact with 
women constituents in the more traditional households, where their husbands cannot. Despite 
their attempts to engage in some of the parshad duties, they are frustratingly hindered by a lack 
of experience. As housewives previously, the public interaction, documents, government 
officials, and the general bureaucracy is intimidating and difficult to understand. 




She was not very interested in politics originally, going through elections and being a 
politician, but this ward was reserved for a woman candidate. If it had been unreserved 
than I would have run, and if it is in the future I will, but it was reserved so I encouraged 
my wife to run instead.79 
 
Mr. Joshi and his father-in-law had been involved in local politics for some time. They 
had contacts within the BJP, and Mr. Joshi himself had served in several lower-level political 
posts within the party. He had once led the committee that distributed candidate nominations 
prior to elections. He had planned on running for parshad in the 2014 elections, but when it was 
reserved for a woman he had to reconsider. The reservation system irritated him. As a Brahmin, 
his community did not receive any reservations, and it essentially blocked him and those like him 
from competing in a majority of the seats. For this reason, he felt that candidates with reserved 
status should stick to the reserved seats, and leave the open seats to the communities who do not 
benefit from reservations to give men like him an opportunity. Luckily, their ward had been 
reserved for a General Woman, so despite their community’s lack of a group reservation, his 
wife could still run. The whole family, even neighbors, supported and encouraged her to run. 
They lived in a large joint household, so there were several other women within the family who 
could take up her domestic responsibilities when she needed help. She had been to BJP party 
meetings before with her husband and was vice president of the local BJP women’s wing 
(mahila morcha), so despite being a housewife for most of her adult life, she had some public 
experience. She felt comfortable meeting with her women constituents when they came to her 
                                                          
 
79 Interview with husband of female parshad on 11/10/2016 in Jaipur. Parshad’s husband arranged and set up the 
interview. She was never present during the interview, the entire narrative came from him. The consent form was 




house with issues. Still, her husband takes on most of the responsibility of public JMC duties, 
which helps given his political experience in the ward. 
Mr. Koria, speaking on behalf of parshad Mrs. Koria 
In the previous election, 2009, my mother ran for parshad of this ward with Congress but 
lost… My mother ran in the previous election because my wife was pregnant, otherwise 
she would have run.80 
 
Mr. Koria’s wife was far from her family, she had followed her husband across several 
states with his job after marriage before coming to Jaipur. Now that they were relatively settled, 
she was attending university and hoped to teach in the future. She had no previous interest or 
experience in politics, but her husband had been politically involved since his days in university 
politics before their marriage, when he had become college president. When they arrived in 
Jaipur, he became actively involved in local politics, even running and losing as an independent 
for parshad of a nearby ward. He also worked with an old friend from university in a local NGO 
that provides poorer students in Jaipur with clothes, bags, and winter clothes. Mrs. Koria, on the 
other hand, had always been housewife, and rarely engaged in any public activities until now. 
Through his contacts with the party, her husband landed her a nomination for the upcoming 
parshad elections and she won.  
Mr. Koria was quite proud of the campaign that they had run. He had significant 
campaign experience, albeit often unsuccessful. After his failed bid for parshad, their ward was 
reserved for a woman. His mother received a party nomination and he managed her campaign. 
                                                          
 
80 Interview with the husband of female parshad on 01/11/2017. Parshad’s husband arranged and set up the 
interview. Parshad was never present during the interview, the entire narrative came from him. The consent form 




He tried to adapt his campaign experience from his days in student politics by focusing on 
persuasive speeches and intimidating the opposition. However, these tactics did not work in the 
parshad elections, and his mother lost. However, for the next elections, the reservation lottery 
landed another OBC Woman reservation for his ward, and this time he vowed to apply the 
lessons he learned from this failed campaign to beat the incumbent and get his wife elected 
instead. This time he focused on building contacts with key local groups. He had been politically 
active at the ground level for the previous five years, and he reached out to the heads of the large 
joint families in the area, who each could deliver 50-100 votes. His mother also spread the word 
through her successful dairy business to all the elderly women who came for their morning milk.  
He put his wife on the campaign trail going door-to-door to get her face out there. She 
was nervous at first, but he told her to just remain polite, no matter what was said to her. Due to 
local familiarity with her husband, she was generally welcomed and faced few problems. She 
only complained of having to drink so much hospitality tea. The voters really warmed to her. 
Thinking back, he attributes her success to his change in campaign tactics, and her youth and 
education, which he credits with bringing in the support from the younger generations that his 
mother had lacked. Now he runs the parshad office out of their home. He is looking forward to 
moving into the official JMC office, which is under construction at present. However, currently 
in his home office, if constituents come in with paperwork that need the parshad’s signature, his 
wife is at hand to sign it. In the future, he will have to run home from the new office every time 
her signature is required.81 
                                                          
 
81 We witnessed this firsthand during the interview when we presented the signed consent form. He went back 





Mr. Nawaz, speaking on behalf of parshad Mrs. Nawaz 
She signs all the forms, she goes to JMC meetings. Whenever a letter has to be written, 
she signs it and personally takes it to the JMC officer. After that, if we have to deal with 
the public, or regular communication is required with the officer, this work is done by 
me.82 
 
Neither Mrs. Nawaz nor her husband had had much in the way of political affiliations 
early in their marriage, until Mr. Nawaz was persuaded to get involved by a combination of 
politically active friends and a speech given by then Congress vice-president Rahul Gandhi at a 
huge rally in Jaipur. He joined the youth wing of Congress, then was noticed by local Congress 
politicians, who encouraged him to run in local elections and promised their support. When his 
ward was reserved for a woman, he decided to ask for their support in getting his wife a 
nomination from the party. She too was a member of the youth wing, and had been to a few 
social gathering and programs, so she received a nomination. However, older local leaders 
angrily objected to their seniority being ignored and such a new member being nominated. One 
decided to run as an independent and stood his daughter-in-law in as a candidate.  
During the campaign, Mr. Darzi countered this challenge by contacting and convincing 
several ex-parshads from the area to give their support. Despite that fact that his wife would 
normally not go out in public, he asked her to go door-to-door to meet their voters and ask for 
their support. She was also able to go into some of the more traditional households and speak 
with the women, something her husband would not have been able to do as a man. These tactics 
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paid off, and they beat the “rebel” candidate. Mr. Nawaz credits having the Congress symbol as 
his biggest asset in tipping the election. 
Now that his wife is parshad, Mr. Nawaz has brought on a colleague to help with his 
dental practice during the day while he helps her, but he is still able to practice in the evenings. 
He sits at his home office in the mornings and meets with constituents, before heading out into to 
check on the ward in the afternoons. If anyone comes while he is out, he has an office girl who 
can fill out necessary paperwork for Mrs. Nawaz’s signature. Despite their lack of experience, 
they feel comfortable with the JMC process now and understand it. Still, he wishes that there 
were more training resources available for new women candidates to help them adjust to public 
life. He does credit his wife with encouraging more women from their predominantly Muslim 
ward to come to them with their problems. Mrs. Nawaz enjoys helping people address their 
issues, and the respect their family now receives, but neither are comfortable with her going out 
into the ward to deal with the public on a regular basis. It seems like even if they consistently 
provide for constituents, if one issue goes unresolved people will get angry and disrespect you, 
even if their parshad is a woman. It seems better if she avoided these kinds of people. Even so, 
they want to run again in the next elections, if they are given the nomination. 
- 
Resentment and curbed ambition were not restricted to gender reservations for Mrs. 
Joshi’s husband, as he felt that the entire reservation system blocks out men like him. As 
discussed in Chapter Three, forward-caste communities do not receive any group reservations, 
and as a man, he will never benefit officially from any gender reservations. As he stated, he felt 
that the reservation system prevented him from competing in most of the seats. Indeed, in the 




which left only 38 seats that men like Mr. Joshi were eligible to compete in. However, in contrast 
to Mr. Joshi, both Mrs. Koria’s and Mrs. Nawaz’s husbands saw opportunity in the gender 
reservation of their respective wards. While both likely would have run themselves if the ward 
had lacked a gender reservation, Mr. Koria had been trying unsuccessfully for years to get access 
to a parshad seat, first by he himself running as an independent, then through his mother with a 
Congress nomination, but failed until his wife finally ran and won. All three husbands also 
managed their wives’ campaigns, as was the case with all highly-dependent parshads. Mr. Koria 
brought years of campaign experience and local contacts, and critically, the support of local 
power brokers. The patriarchs of large local families have several generations living nearby, and 
thus can deliver a large number of votes. These “vote-banks” can be critical in elections often 
decided by under a thousand votes. Mr. Nawaz faced the stiff challenge of a renegade Congress 
candidate angered at being skipped over for the nomination, essentially creating a proxy contest 
with Mr. Nawaz pushing his wife and the Congress-man pushing his daughter-in-law. Mr. 
Nawaz, with his party resources, ultimately prevailed. 
Perhaps due to being raised in a more advantaged, forward-caste community, Mrs. Joshi 
had more public experience and felt more comfortable interacting with voters and constituents 
than either Mrs. Koria or Mrs. Nawaz, both of whom came from reserved communities. While 
Mrs. Joshi did more public engagement than the other two, all three women were very dependent 
on their husbands to conduct most of the parshad duties, particularly those that involved dealing 
with the public or with contractors. Mr. Joshi and Mr. Koria both stated that their wives 
primarily limited themselves to signing paperwork and attending JMC meetings, both of which 
they themselves could not do as non-parshads, and occasionally meeting with officials and 




that when he was out of the house someone could assist constituents in filling out paper work 
and getting it signed by his wife. He did mention that he relied on his wife to engage with 
women constituents in the more traditional Muslim households, as these women would rarely be 
permitted to interact with him, as a man outside their family. He also argued that the JMC should 
provide more resources and training for new women parshads, particularly for those who were 
previously housewives, and thus had trouble with public interactions, documents, government 
officials, and the general bureaucracy that is incredibly convoluted and intimidating for those 
without prior experience.   
Outside Pressure: The Communal Push to Run for Office 
In contrast to the rest of the highly-dependent parshads, these two women were not 
pushed to run by their husbands. After their ward was reserved for a woman, they were either 
pushed by friends and family to run or by party members looking for a viable candidate. As their 
husbands were not personally seeking office, they were also initially reluctant to take on the 
extra work-load that they expected to fall on them if their wives won. Although still unable to 
run the office on their own, these women appear to be better able to share the workload than 
other highly-dependent parshads. Experience outside of the home appears to help build the 
knowledge and confidence that allows a woman to assert herself to a greater degree than others. 
Mr. Deshpande, on behalf of parshad Mrs. Deshpande 
I accompany her wherever she goes, to all of the departments. Whenever I am not here or 
busy, then the driver will take her to the JMC or JDA, otherwise I will go with her.83 
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Mrs. Deshpande had gained public experience while working with the women’s wing of 
the BJP, but still had not really been interested in politics prior to 2014. However, when their 
ward was reserved for a woman, many women she had met during her work with the women’s 
wing came to her and told her to run. She was initially skeptical, but they were persistent, so she 
decided to go to her husband. He had worked for several decades with the Rashtriya 
Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), the Hindu nationalist parent organization of the BJP, and had the 
political connections within the party that she would need for the nomination. One day she told 
him, “If you promise to say yes, then I will tell you what I am thinking”, and he responded, “has 
there ever been a case where I have denied you?”84 She told him of the elections and he initially 
protested, as they were already involved in community service through the RSS and BJP, but she 
persisted and asked him to get her the BJP nomination. He conceded and began discussing the 
idea with colleagues and party workers. Fortunately, they were in search of a suitable candidate 
and quickly agreed. They campaigned and won the election, and now Mr. Deshpande credits the 
reservation with giving women like his wife the opportunity to gain political experience. She has 
gone from being a housewife to talking with JMC officials and bringing up important issues in 
the general board meetings. Still, he complains of the enormous number of phone calls he gets 
every day, some of them very late at night, from constituents with issues or complaints. Each 
phone call often requires him to make several subsequent calls to rectify the problem.  
Mrs. Pande 
                                                          
 





Originally it was very difficult in the JMC. I didn’t know how to speak, what to say, how 
the apparatus inside the JMC works, how to deal with officers. I used to call my husband 
now and then and he would help me with things. He asked me to bring the files home, 
then he would guide me on the necessary steps to be taken.85 
 
Although still very dependent on her husband, Mrs. Pande was more comfortable and 
confident in public than some of her female colleagues, likely due to her previous experience as 
a teacher. While her husband dominated our interview, she engaged more than any other highly-
dependent parshad. Neither Mrs. Pande nor her husband had been interested in the 2014 
elections when the local MLA called her husband, an old friend, after their ward was reserved for 
a woman. He convinced her husband to accept the party nomination on behalf of his wife for the 
upcoming elections. Due to the exception granted by the redrawing of ward lines for the 2014 
election, this ward had been consecutively gender-reserved, so their competitor from Congress 
had experience as an incumbent, but still they won by over a thousand votes. She enjoyed the 
campaign. Her husband and son ran the operation, and she welcomed meeting new people and 
accepted the newfound respect they offered. She did have to retire from her job in the 
government school, given the ban on serving in public office while holding a government post, 
but she has gotten to know her ward and its inhabitants well. She gets up at four every morning 
to tour her ward and look for problems. Still, it’s been an uphill climb. She relied heavily on her 
husband for guidance and assistance at the beginning, and still she does not fully understand the 
JMC, but she enjoys being able to help her constituents and plans to run again in the next 
election. 
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In contrast to the previous narratives in this chapter, Mrs. Deshpande and Mrs. Pande 
were not motivated to run by their husbands. Mr. Deshpande described how the women his wife 
volunteered with as part of the BJP women’s wing encouraged her to ask for his support in 
gaining a party nomination. Mr. Pande said that he and his wife were convinced to accept the 
parshad nomination by an old family friend, the local BJP MLA who had been tasked with 
finding competitive BJP candidates for upcoming elections in the wards of his constituency. 
Both husbands were initially reluctant, citing the expected workload that would fall on them. It 
appears that Mrs. Pande is better able to share the workload with her husband, as she mentioned 
that she was initially very dependent on him, but now two years in, she feels more capable and 
independent. This may be due to her experience as a government school teacher, a position 
which would require public interaction and familiarity with governmental bureaucratic 
procedures. 
Protectors 
These final narratives illustrate the significant disadvantage in terms of education and 
public experience that women generally have when entering politics. Furthermore, they are often 
entering an alien social environment that is dominated by loud and aggressive men, where they 
do not feel comfortable or able to speak up. Their husbands and families recognize this and do 
not think it appropriate that women should have to face angry and frustrated constituents who 
may use language they feel is inappropriate for women to hear. By taking their wife’s place, 
these men also see an opportunity to demonstrate their ability to deliver public goods and resolve 





Mr. Wazir, speaking on behalf of parshad Mrs. Wazir 
In 2014, this seat was reserved for a woman, that’s why my wife ran for the office, 
otherwise I would have been the candidate. 
Its only because of me that she ran for the office, as previously she was a housewife.86 
 
Mr. Wazir had been active in politics for nearly 20 years, primarily helping local 
politicians and assisting neighbors and associates with problems. As a lifelong resident of the 
kacchi basti (undeveloped housing area) in the ward and a former bus conductor, he was 
intimately familiar with the area and its constituents. He had tried to move into politics officially 
in 2004, running as an independent in the parshad elections, but lost. He planned to run again in 
2014, but their ward was reserved for a woman. Still, the reservation presented an opportunity if 
he could get his wife a nomination. Fortunately, minimum education requirements were not 
established in Rajasthan until after the 2014 elections, so even though she had no formal 
education he was able to get her a nomination from Congress and win the election. He managed 
the campaign, spending 12 hours a day in the field talking to voters, many of whom already 
knew him well, while his wife met with their mothers, wives and daughters. 
Despite her lack of education and political experience, Mrs. Wazir has been able to help 
her husband with parshad duties. She attends JMC meetings, occasionally meets with 
constituents, and takes care of the required paperwork. Dealing with the public has been difficult 
for her however, as she had always been a housewife. Therefore, her husband does most of the 
parshad work in the ward, meeting with JMC officials, fixing problems, and arranging 
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contractors. He was already familiar with the workings of the JMC from his previous work in the 
ward. He thinks this arrangement is better anyways, given the language frustrated people use 
nowadays – abusive language that a woman should not hear. Anymore, entering local politics is 
like being pushed onto the battlefield (maidaan utarate), you never know what someone might 
say to you or about you. He feels that it is better if she restricts herself to maintaining the 
household and JMC duties that involve less public dealings, such as signing paperwork, 
attending meetings, and possibly meeting with female constituents, and leaves the rest up to him. 
The arrangement seems to be working well, and he is optimistic that he will get the party 
nomination in the next elections, if reservations allow. 
Mr Mehar, speaking on behalf of parshad Mrs. Mehar 
She was a housewife before. If the seat had been unreserved then I would have run. 
During the first campaign, since I had worked here since 1990, I knew it very well. 
Through our education program for local people, everyone knew me.87 
 
Mr. and Mrs. Mehar were getting old, this was her second term as parshad, but they 
hoped someone younger would come along for the next election to take their place. Their ward 
had been reserved for a woman for a second election in a row, allowing Mrs. Mehar to stay on as 
incumbent. They had been in the area for 25 years and were well known, so they did not have to 
engage in the exhausting standard door-to-door campaign. Mrs. Mehar had been born in a nearby 
village, in a time when rural women rarely received much of an education, but she was literate. 
She had been a housewife most of her life, and found it difficult to speak at the general board 
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meetings due to a few people loudly dominating the discussion. She still must sign and stamp the 
necessary paperwork, attend the mandatory JMC meetings, and may meet with constituents, but 
Mr. Mehar performs most of the parshad duties. He tours their ward in the morning, then sits in 
the office from nine to five, and his door was always open. He was proud of the new sewer line, 
improved water supply, and paved footpaths and roads that had been installed on their watch – a 
significant improvement over the mess he saw in the ward under the previous parshad. 
Mr. Gavaria, speaking on behalf of parshad Mrs. Gavaria 
My wife and I share our work together. Before, the JMC used to give 2-3 office boys to 
every parshad who would write all the letters, manage files, register complaints, but now 
JMC has stopped this practice, so the husband of a female parshad automatically comes 
into the picture. A male parshad can do his work alone, but a female parshad needs a 
man as well.88 
 
Both Mrs. Gavaria and her husband were born in their ward. They both have been 
involved in some form of social service supporting their community group for most of their lives. 
Mr. Gavaria had worked with a local organization focused on development for nearly two 
decades. He would contact government officials on the behalf of neighbors to push for more 
government projects, such as improved roads and drains, for their neighborhood. He eventually 
gained a reputation in the area as someone who could deliver government support when needed. 
Mr. Gavaria had always been a BJP member and brought his wife into the party a little over a 
year before the 2014 elections. When it was announced that their ward was reserved for a 
woman, they were fully supported by the party and received the nomination.  
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The campaign was difficult, they were competing against three other candidates, with 
even the independents drawing some support. Mrs. Gavaria had just given birth three months 
before to a daughter and was also very shy. She had a difficult time reaching out to voters, 
although she did grow comfortable meeting and talking with the women constituents. His 
strategy of campaigning on his previous service to the party and community paid off, and he was 
proud that their team did not have to distribute any liquor or money to still win by a substantial 
margin. Now in office, Mr. Gavaria takes on the bulk of the work, which feels like 20-hour days 
most of the time, but is glad he can spare his wife the brunt of criticism and foul language that he 
receives from constituents on occasion. Still, he knew the local MLA before the elections and 
has turned to him for additional funds when needed, and Mrs. Gavaria is able to help him when 
her mother-in-law can watch their young daughter and take care of the household. Mrs. Gavaria 
is gaining confidence, particularly in the general board meetings, and she feels more comfortable 
speaking up in front of her colleagues. She also reaches out to other female parshads in nearby 
wards when she needs help. She and her husband are both proud of the work they have done for 
women in their ward. During their term, they’ve opened three Anganwadi centers (publicly-
funded mother and child support centers) and one daycare center for working women, held 
functions to raise awareness on women’s issues, and even helped women in the more 
undeveloped areas apply for federal funds to install a personal toilet in their homes. 
- 
Mrs. Wazir and Mrs. Mehar entered politics at a significant disadvantage in terms of 
education and public experience. Both likely had very little if any formal education and had 
spent most of their lives as housewives. Given the passage of state law mandating a minimum of 




be able to compete in the next election. As with many women parshads, Mrs. Mehar was in a 
completely different social environment than the one she grew up in. She moved from her rural 
village to her husband’s family in Jaipur upon marriage. On the other hand, Mrs. Gavaria serves 
in the ward she grew up in and is much more familiar with her constituents. Both Mrs. Gavaria 
and Mrs. Mehar feel restricted by the loud and aggressive environment of the JMC general board 
meetings, where they do not feel comfortable or able to speak up. I saw this myself as an 
observer. The discussion is generally dominated by a few loud men who continually must be 
restrained by the mayor’s gavel. Mrs. Gavaria would like a set amount of time each meeting for 
each parshad to speak about their issues without constantly being interrupted. Furthermore, all 
three women are not comfortable going out into their ward to deal with constituents and 
contractors. Mr. Mehar agrees with Mr. Gavaria and Mr. Salvi that women parshads should not 
have to sacrifice their dignity by talking to angry and frustrated constituents who may use 
language inappropriate for women to hear. Mr. Mehar used the colorful metaphor of being 
“pushed onto the battlefield” to describe what it is like for women to enter politics for the first 
time. 
From my own interviews with parshads in the JMC, many listed “social work” or 
wanting to “serve the people” as a primary motivation. In his investigation of student politics in 
Uttar Pradesh, Jeffrey (2010) interprets the choice of these terms as intentional to both establish 
the authority of the leader as deriving from their societal contributions, as opposed to other types 
of authority common in India that stem from religious or lineal ties, and to protest their humility 
and subservience to the communal good. Following Jeffrey, both Mr. Gavaria and Mr. Wazir see 
their wife’s office as an opportunity to further demonstrate their own commitment to “social 




Gavaria built on his history of social work to win in 2014, and both men may try to build their 
reputation in the current term as a foundation for a future electoral bid, as reservations permit. 
On the other hand, Mr. Mehar and his wife are both much older and tired. They’ve been in the 
JMC for two terms now and are hoping for a newer younger candidate to take over in the next 
election. 
Conclusions 
Several themes tie these narratives together and provide a general description of the 
mechanism that brings these women into politics as parshads who are highly dependent on their 
husbands or fathers. First, a political actor sees an opportunity to gain a political benefit through 
her candidature, whether ambitious husbands blocked by the gender reservation, or those unable 
to win on their own. Outside actors as well can become involved, such as party colleagues or a 
local MLA desperate for a viable candidate in their district. These actors are looking for someone 
who fits the reservation requirements and will be competitive. In none of these cases did the 
woman herself profess the initial interest in running for the seat, she is always prodded, 
encouraged, or told she should enter politics. She then is relegated to a proxy role and often 
competes against the proxies of other actors, as the examples of Mrs. Salvi and Mrs. Nawaz 
demonstrate. 
These women have very little public experience, particularly political experience. 
Therefore, these competitions are generally managed by the same men who pushed them to run 
for office. These men have the political experience and connections, often from previous 
campaigns of their own, needed to win local elections. During these campaigns, it is clear to 




husband will conduct most of the parshad duties. Still, she generally goes door-to-door with him, 
and is often tasked with speaking with the women of the households they visit.  
After entering office, the lack of public experience becomes more pronounced, as she 
relies heavily on her husband or father to deal with the JMC, contractors and constituents. This is 
often attributed to her own personal lack of experience, but as I discuss in Chapter Eight, it is 
also a result of external societal restrictions. As Mr. Salvi, Mr. Nawaz, and Mr. Wazir stated, 
along with several other male parshads we interviewed, extensive public interaction is perceived 
by many as inappropriate for women. While the fundamental core of this norm is much more 
complex, the typical justification given is that angry constituents tend to use foul language, and 
women should not have to hear it. As I illustrate in Chapter Eight, the idea of politics as a 
masculine arena, where femininity will be tarnished and thus does not belong, is both common 
and a significant obstacle to increasing women’s substantive representation. 
Several of these women do feel comfortable engaging in the minimum required JMC 
duties, such as attending meetings, signing paperwork, and meeting with some government 
officials. Others made it clear that they were also becoming more comfortable engaging with 
constituents at public functions or at speaking up in meetings. As I discuss in the next chapter, 
this new, public experience often kindles an interest in political life that encourages some of 
these women to run again and develop the expertise and experience that enables them to assert 
their independence to a greater degree over time. In the next chapter, I use these contrasting 
narratives from independent women parshads to demonstrate the ability of women to assert 
themselves and engage as competently as their male JMC colleagues. However, as discussed in 
this chapter, these women continue to rely on male benefactors to a degree to cultivate this 
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Chapter 7: Independent Women Representatives 
This chapter moves the analysis to the narratives from the five women who were 
categorized as independent and the eight women categorized as moderately-dependent. 
Table 7.1: Independent and Dependent Parshads by Gender 
 Independent Moderately-Dependent Highly-Dependent Totals 
Women Parshads 5 8 10 23 
Men Parshads 13 5 0 18 
 
As discussed in Chapter Five, I define independence as the ability to run the parshad office 
without the regular participation of another. While independent parshads still often rely on 
communal support, they are the prime decision-maker and are able carry out the basic duties of 
the office on their own. In between the extremes of independent and dependent parshads are 
those who fit neither category. Instead, they fall into a grey area of moderate-dependence. These 
parshads are neither completely independent nor dependent, but have formed joint working 
“tandem” relationships with spouses or male advisors to spread the office load of parshad 
responsibilities. Eight female parshads and five male parshads were categorized as moderately-
dependent. Each of these parshads indicated that they could conduct most of the office 
responsibilities on their own, but were still reliant on the assistance of family members for the 
rest. I present the narratives from two of these parshads, which were representative of the rest of 
narratives that fell into this category. 
The first section describes the most independent women I interviewed. These women 
either entered political office nearly entirely independent, or arrived dependent but then asserted 
their independence over time. I review the significant challenges and dramatic responsibilities 




often having considerably less political experience than their male colleagues, these women 
embrace their role and often make a notable effort to reach out specifically to women and 
children in need. While most women lack prior political experience, most of these independent 
women have leveraged their social experience from professional or volunteer backgrounds in 
social work and education. Throughout these narratives, the importance of past professional or 
public experience, relative wealth and access to household help, and the support of their families 
is made clear. 
Promisingly, these narratives also demonstrate significant engagement with the intention 
of establishing a political career by several of these women. Most claim that they would likely 
not have been interested or able to pursue such a career without the gender reservation. 
Secondly, independent and moderately-dependent women provide societal exposure to female 
leaders that could encourage voters to revise stereotypes and prejudices regarding female 
political leaders, and influence future voting behavior. However, across these narratives, the 
inescapable constraining influence of the patriarchal environment is obvious. To differing 
degrees, all of these women still rely on male supporters and family who enable them to attain 
independence. While these narratives demonstrate the ability of women to gain autonomy, they 
also demonstrate how quickly that independence could be revoked by their husbands and 
families.  
This chapter first presents and analyzes the independent parshads, and then progresses to 
the moderately-dependent parshads. The analysis and discussion of the narratives are again 
organized by common themes. Each parshad’s story is presented as it was told. In contrast to the 
highly-dependent narratives from Chapter Six, the interviews that provided these narratives were 




family members. Those family members may have contributed to the narrative, but a significant 
portion always came from the parshad. I clarify in the footnotes who participated in the 
interview. After the presentation of each narrative in the thematic group, I discuss which 
commonalities they highlight. The first three narratives illustrate total independence comparable 
to their male colleagues. These parshads have significant agency and engage fully in the office 
responsibilities. The next two narratives demonstrate the dramatic lifestyle changes that taking 
on the parshad office as an independent woman requires, particularly for women who were 
primarily housewives previously. The final two narratives shift to the moderately-dependent 
women and illustrate how women can engage independently in certain aspects of the office, but 
due to private responsibilities and societal constraints, still rely on a family member to assist with 
the rest.  
Establishing Independence 
In contrast to the narratives from the highly-dependent women presented in Chapter Six, 
these narratives demonstrate that women can enter the JMC as fully independent parshads. They 
may either join the JMC largely independent of their husbands and maintain that independence, 
or in other cases enter office heavily reliant on men, but then assert themselves over time as they 
become more experienced. Either way, these women have reached the point where they can run 
their own campaigns and are the primary decision-maker within the office. The narratives 
suggest that significant past public experience makes it more likely that a woman enters politics 
independently. Public experience can be garnered from either outside the office in private work 
or during their parshad service, as incumbency is particularly valuable. The opportunity to learn 
their responsibilities over multiple terms makes them much more capable and confident than new 




participation of previously politically disengaged women, which over time could develop a cadre 
of experienced women politicians who can compete with their male counterparts. However, good 
fortune in the reservation lottery can be critical as well, as the assignment of supporting gender 
reservations makes incumbency more likely as discussed in Chapter Three, while the assignment 
of blocking group reservations can make competition impossible. 
Mrs. Mohania 
I would not feel right if someone treated my husband as the parshad and not me. I would 
feel dishonored, bad. I would want him to feel dishonored. Voters should say, “I will talk 
to the elected parshad only, you (husband) can go out”. I discuss issues with my husband, 
a healthy discussion, but it’s my decision. I make it a point that he is not a part of the 
office – I’m on the stage, he is down below.89 
 
Notably, this is the first narrative presented entirely by the parshad herself, with no 
family members present. Mrs. Mohania came with her father to Jaipur as he transferred jobs to a 
local bank. She sought higher education, and after completing her bachelor’s wanted to pursue an 
MBA. However, her conservative father objected to her leaving the house unmarried, so she 
stayed at home and completed her master’s in science at nearby Rajasthan University, where she 
was at the top of her graduating class. Combined with her perfect English, she was hired to teach 
classes at a premier Jaipur school that prepared students for entry tests to the incredibly 
competitive Indian Institutes of Technology. During this time, she married a successful Jaipuri 
businessman and started a family, giving birth to a son. Her husband had never aspired to 
politics, but her father-in-law had been involved in politics for a long time, and when their ward 
was reserved for a woman in 2009, he strongly encouraged her to stand for election. This was a 
                                                          
 





significant choice for her. The demands of campaigning and the office would force her to leave 
an exceptional job, and her young son was only a year old. Still, family offered to help take care 
of her son, and her father-in-law convinced her to run. Using his contacts in the BJP, he secured 
her a nomination. As she had never been politically involved, her only experience outside the 
house was at university and then professionally as a teacher, so her father-in-law managed the 
campaign. Initially, she found it difficult and awkward to go out into a strange, new arena and 
ask strangers for their vote. However, their ward leaned heavily to the BJP, and with his 
leadership and party support they won.    
Her first tenure was quite difficult. The BJP was in the opposition and she had to learn 
the complicated process required to get anything done in the JMC bureaucracy. One of her 
husband’s employees would accompany her around the JMC to help her navigate the building. It 
took six months just to find all the officers she needed to see. She would carry around a heavy 
packet of documents wherever she went in case one was required by a bureaucrat. Her father-in-
law initially managed the office and met with her constituents. Over time, she became more 
comfortable. She came to know which documents were required by which official and in what 
order. She also started to meet with constituents on her own. Her household could afford a driver 
and office assistant, which helped her considerably. Her husband also supplied workers from his 
nearby store on occasion if JMC employees were inadequate. She credits her father-in-law and 
family with both helping her gain office and giving her the freedom to assert herself, but she is 
frustrated by the lack of independent women in the JMC. If her husband attempted to interfere in 
her work now she would tell him pointedly to get out, the voters elected her, not him. 
By the end of her first term, she was confident in her abilities and wanted to continue. 




term. This time, she required little help from family. She knew her ward, and the voters knew 
her. She planned the campaign, distributing portable radios to her canvassers, and went out on 
her own to meet constituents. Redistricting had brought in new areas that were dominated by 
Brahmin families, and the party was worried they would not support her, as a candidate from 
another caste. However, she proved them wrong and won a second term. Completely on her own 
now, she has plans to implement the Prime Minister’s nationwide waste removal plan and 
improve healthcare access for residents of the only kacchi-basti in her ward. Although several 
years off, she is also planning to run in the next election, if reservations allow.  
Mrs. Chandal 
Whenever there are JMC meetings, there are so many problems that female members 
face. Like stage fright – they don’t know how to speak in front of all these people. They 
lack exposure in expressing their thoughts publicly... I believe that everyone is not a born 
orator. It is dependent on experience. These women have to work independently to 
improve.90 
 
Mrs. Chandal came from a much lower social class than Mrs. Mohania. She had grown 
up in a village outside Jaipur, where girls from her community generally only completed tenth 
grade before being married off. However, her father did not observe these traditions, and 
encouraged and provided for his daughter to pursue higher education. Her father was often 
taunted for not marrying her off young. People from their community would ask him – what did 
he want, for her to become a collector (district magistrate)? She put off marriage until after 
completing her bachelor’s, then finished her master’s soon after that. However, she was unable 
to go straight into the workforce and use her education as she wanted, because she had to stay 
                                                          
 





home to raise her two young boys. Moreover, she had to raise them largely on her own as her 
husband was working and both of her in-laws had passed. As they got older, she started doing 
social work in the nearby kacchi-basti. There, she helped children get an education and 
encouraged women to get out of the house and get engaged in their community. Despite not 
residing in the ward, when it was reserved for a woman from her community group in the next 
election, the local neighborhood she had been serving demanded she run for parshad. Once she 
agreed, the amount of local support for her in the ward convinced the BJP to give her the 
nomination. 
Mrs. Chandal had political experience from her childhood, when she had helped her 
father support local candidates in campaigning and registering voters. He was well-known and 
respected within their community. She was comfortable campaigning, as she knew the ward 
from her social work. She preferred to meet voters during the day, as the men were usually at 
work and she could engage primarily with local women. She would walk the kacchi-basti, 
meeting with large groups of voters who gathered whenever she came. By eight in the evening 
she would return home, as the men would return to the neighborhood and she began to feel 
unsafe. She won easily, as Congress did not field a viable candidate. The years of working with 
women and children in this community gave her a deep awareness of local needs, and meant she 
already knew many of her constituents. This experience enabled her to work independently from 
the start. During her first term, she focused immediately on her policy priorities – developing the 
public parks in the area that had fallen into disrepair. She too is frustrated by the number of 
women in the JMC dependent on their husbands. She counts Mrs. Mohania as one of her close 





Politics suited Mrs. Chandal, but electoral law mandated that a ward could not be 
reserved for a woman over consecutive elections. Instead the lottery assigned an open-gender 
OBC reservation to this ward in the next election. As she did not come from an OBC 
community, she did not qualify and was thus blocked from running. However, five years later, 
the lottery assigned her ward a reservation that she qualified for, and she decided to make her 
return. This campaign was significantly different. This ward was much wealthier than her 
original, and she could not count on crowds to show up and listen to her campaign. She had to go 
door-to-door and meet each individual family. Her family and local women she had worked with 
before helped her canvas the new ward and she won by a thin margin. She continues to support 
the disadvantaged in her ward, particularly women, who appreciate having a woman parshad 
they can speak to openly and honestly without their husbands present. Now that their children are 
older, her husband has offered to help more around the house, which will give her more time to 
dedicate to the JMC. If reservations allow and the party continues to support her, she plans on 
running again in 2019. 
Mrs. Parashar 
Among the eight candidates I was the only female, all others were male. This last election 
meant a lot to me, because it was very satisfying that as the only female, I beat the other 
male candidates. Since it was very close, the feel of winning was very strong. I worked 
very hard for this election.91 
 
Alongside Mrs. Chandal, Mrs. Parashar also decided to push for another term in 2014. On 
the opposite side of the aisle, with Congress, she managed to both defeat seven male competitors 
                                                          
 





and weather the BJP electoral wave, which pushed so many fellow Congress candidates out of 
office that election. As an incumbent, she was an adaptable and experienced campaigner. After 
her first electoral victory in 2004, in 2009 she was shifted by the party to a nearby ward. After 
winning there, in 2014 she had to move once more to a new ward, to campaign with new voters, 
and this time without a gender reservation. She credits her well-known honesty and blemish-free 
record with consistently garnering solid electoral support across multiple wards. Ambitiously, 
she plans to build on this broad base of support and push for an MLA nomination in the 2019 
elections, as she has already demonstrated she can win across at least half of the MLA 
constituency. 
Mrs. Parashar has never had any issue campaigning on her own door-to-door, and asking 
strangers for their vote. After shifting wards multiple times, she has chatted with thousands of 
voters, new and old. Engaging with strangers outside of the home has been her life’s work. Prior 
to running for parshad, she was raised in a village far outside of Jaipur before coming to the city 
to do both her bachelor’s and master’s at Rajasthan University. She then took over as manager of 
a local school, where she continues to teach. She also regularly worked with local women – 
organizing workshops to teach income-producing skills such as sewing, knitting and computer 
literacy. Initially, she had no interest in politics. Her father had not been involved, and her 
husband had participated in student politics, but rarely afterwards. It was not until her ward was 
reserved for a woman, and people who knew her from her school and her workshops suggested 
that she compete, that she even considered it. After her victory, her husband supported her desire 
to work independently, and did not involve himself in her JMC work. His support gave her the 
confidence to succeed on her own early on, and she continues to run the office from the grounds 




When she first went to the JMC, she was nervous, but quickly managed to figure out the 
process. As with most parshads, she has found that JMC bureaucrats rarely act on requests 
without consistent prodding: “Files do not move by themselves, you push them from table to 
table, otherwise they will be dumped and forgotten. You have to be active to get your work 
done”.92 She feels that the men she works with, both in the JMC and constituents, respect her. 
She finds a cooperative approach the most productive, and sees her key role as a mediator giving 
suggestions. She has not been able to accomplish everything she intended – drainage is still quite 
poor in her ward during the rainy season, but she hopes the budget will allow for improvements 
in the coming years. Her influence will likely increase as she joins the “high performance” 
committee focused on the overall development of Jaipur, where she will be able to question and 
push high-level bureaucrats to do more. 
- 
In contrast to Chapter Six, these narratives demonstrate the ability of women to enter the 
JMC and act as fully independent parshads. They appear to be as capable as any male parshad, 
and more so than many. As the narratives of Mrs. Chandal and Mrs. Parashar illustrate, female 
parshads can join the JMC largely independent of their husbands or any other family members. 
Comparatively, as Mrs. Mohania recounted, female parshads can still enter office heavily reliant 
on men, but then assert themselves over time as they become more comfortable in the position 
with experience. In notable contrast to the replacement role men play for highly-dependent 
parshads, Mrs. Mohania’s case demonstrates that the support and encouragement of men can 
                                                          
 




help develop a woman’s confidence and ability to the point that she no longer requires their 
assistance.  
The ability of Mrs. Chandal and Mrs. Parashar to enter politics predominantly 
independent was likely supported by significant experience both in political campaigning (Mrs. 
Chandal) and in managing a large education institution (Mrs. Parashar). Both experiences 
provided public exposure, political understanding, and exposure to government bureaucracy. In 
contrast, Mrs. Mohania had little public experience prior to running for office, and was therefore 
much more initially reliant upon men to both organize her campaign and familiarize her with the 
JMC bureaucracy.  
Regardless, all three women over multiple terms have reached the point where they run 
their own campaigns and are the primary decision-maker within the office. Out of the 23 women 
interviewed, only these three women were incumbents. As these women describe, the 
opportunity to learn their trade over multiple terms makes them more capable and confident than 
new entrants, which is critical to gaining independence. From the outside, male parshads have 
also commented that by the middle of their tenure, two to three years in, female parshads are 
generally more adept: “they are more experienced, and they can handle the pressure better”.93 
Furthermore, all three of these women entered politics because a nearby ward was reserved for a 
woman. They were then able to win re-election both with the help of a subsequent gender 
reservation (Mrs. Mohania) and without (Mrs. Chandal and Mrs. Parashar).  
                                                          
 




This process demonstrates one of the primary long-term goals of a gender quota system – 
to prompt the political participation of women who previously were not engaged, and over time 
develop a cadre of experienced women politicians who can compete on an equal footing with 
their male counterparts (Deininger et al, 2011). However, as discussed in Chapter Three, the 
electoral prohibition on gender reservations in consecutive elections for a ward likely hampers 
this goal. When two of these women made the jump to open-gender wards, it was clear that these 
campaigns were much more difficult. Certainly, it appears that their prior experience as 
incumbents made them more competitive; however, they were two of the most publicly-
experienced women I interviewed. For the average woman parshad, entering an open-gender 
race after only one term, and without significant prior experience, would be a daunting 
challenge. Moreover, Mrs. Chandal’s experience also demonstrates how the reservation system 
can both support and block the participation of individuals from disadvantaged communities 
such as hers, as she was blocked from running again in her ward for a second term due to the 
assignment of a group reservation that she did not qualify for.  
Dramatic Changes: Assuming Parshad Responsibilities 
While prior public experience is common across all highly-independent women 
parshads, the following two narratives illustrate the diverse paths these women take into office. 
To gain office, women may have to work their way up the party hierarchy much as their male 
colleagues do, or they may use the leg-up provided by the gender-reservation to enter politics 
with little to no prior experience with a party. However they get there, nearly every female 
parshad experiences a significant shift in responsibilities that could be overwhelming, but all the 
independent parshads embraced their obligation over time. Correspondingly, several mentioned 




cited by the literature as an expected benefit of improving female representation (Thomas, 1994; 
Reingold, 1992). Promisingly, a minor networking effect is observable across these women, as 
several of them serve as role models for other women in the JMC who want to emulate their 
independence. Furthermore, several of these independent women are actively pushing back 
against societal acceptance of the parshad-pati phenomenon, which in the long-term could 
contribute towards the normative rejection of dependent candidates by voters that will be 
required to change the existing order.  
Mrs. Rawal 
This is an area where men often stay out late drinking and come home drunk, sometimes 
they beat their wives. In this process, the women do not have their own means of 
livelihood, they aren’t working, so they’re totally dependent on their husbands. That’s 
why I encourage them to take training courses, so they can get their own work. I try to 
address other issues for my ward collection beyond simply garbage collecting, like family 
matters, husband and wife problems, and issues with children.94 
 
In contrast to most women parshads in the JMC, Mrs. Rawal had always been interested 
in politics, particularly after joining her husband’s family. Her husband and several of his 
brothers were politically active, and encouraged her to get involved as well. They would take her 
to community events and introduce her to local leaders. A decade ago, she joined the BJP and 
began her political career as a minister in the party’s neighborhood commission. She also worked 
with a trade union to address local issues. Several years later, she got further involved as an 
assistant to Mrs. Mohania during her first term as parshad, and gained experience in working 
with the JMC bureaucracy. Mrs. Rawal and her husband both admire how Mrs. Mohania 
                                                          
 





conducts herself, and Mrs. Rawal credits her with positively influencing her own working style. 
She had considered running for office herself in 2009, but the ward was assigned a reservation 
she did not qualify for, preventing her from running. Still, she kept the parshad who won 
apprised on neighborhood problems, despite her Congress affiliation.  
Prior to the 2014 elections, Mrs. Rawal joined the campaign of the BJP MLA competing 
in her constituency. She worked alongside his wife, going door-to-door, and gained valuable 
experience on how to run a winning campaign. MLAs will often bring along political up-and-
comers in their campaigns to boost their prospects, and, despite four others competing for the 
nomination for upcoming parshad elections, the party recognized Mrs. Rawal’s previous 
contribution by nominating her. She was strongly supported locally, came from a family with 
demonstrated service to the party, and fit the reservation – the ward had been reserved for a 
woman from her community. She immediately put her prior experience into campaigning across 
her ward. She was less familiar with the kacchi-bastis and had difficulty organizing an effective 
effort there, as there were no set streets or addresses. However, in the rest of the ward she had a 
strong rapport with local voters, both from her social and party work, and from three generations 
of familial residency in the ward through her husband. This paid off handsomely in a blowout 
victory, reportedly the largest winning margin in this ward in recent memory. She is confident 
she can have a career in politics and plans to run again in the next election if the reservation 
lottery allows and she is granted the nomination.  
If Mrs. Rawal is unable to run again, she still wants to continue working on her core 
passion of improving the quality of life for women and children in her ward. She is an imposing 
woman with a serious countenance. Business-like and straightforward, she sees herself as more 




well. She passionately discusses issues local women have with alcoholic husbands and domestic 
abuse. Many of these women are stuck in daily-wage jobs, such as sweepers, bidi (cigarette) 
rollers, or garment makers. Children in her area also have difficulty affording an education. She 
has tried to help both groups gain some independence by enrolling them in courses for better-
paying industries such as nursing, sewing, knitting, computer work, or as beauticians. For her 
ward in general, she is not hesitant to track down her MLA or MP if she needs additional funds 
or an extra lever of pressure on the bureaucracy to get development projects approved and 
funded. She has always worked independently, but credits the support her joint family provides 
in relieving her of domestic responsibilities, which she acknowledges forces many other women 
parshads to spend more time at home and less time at the JMC. 
Mrs. Goswami 
Management ability is not something new to women, it is a natural quality they have. A 
woman can do anything, and can manage anything, if chance and exposure is given to 
her. Take my example. For two and a half years I didn’t know about these things, my 
only duty was being a housewife and mother. The whole time, I was only focused on 
waking my son up at 6 and sending him to school. What was happening in the 
neighborhood was completely unknown to me. I understood that I did not know about 
these things, because they were not my area, not my work, so why would I think about 
them. But now, I know I have the responsibility of almost 1 lakh (100,000) households, 
so now I definitely think about them and try to understand them.95 
 
Mrs. Goswami points to her mother, a professor at Rajasthan University, as a key 
independent woman role model for her growing up. Well-educated herself, Mrs. Goswami 
completed both a bachelor’s and master’s before marrying. Through her husband, she joined a 
very politically active family. Her husband himself was parshad of their ward the previous term. 
                                                          
 





Prior to marriage, as with the rest of her family she had little interest or involvement in politics. 
She considered herself a housewife, but regularly engaged in social work and was very active at 
the nearby Hindu temple. Her beautiful singing was often requested there on weekends. 
However, this changed in 2014 when her husband’s ward was reserved for a woman, and the 
regional MLA, familiar with her husband, urged her to accept the party nomination and run in his 
stead. She resisted at first, as she found the typical campaign work of “holding hands and 
touching feet all the time” not appealing. Nonetheless, appeals and support coming from family 
and elders soon swayed her and she dove in. 
The campaign was a family affair. Mrs. Goswami wanted to cover the entire ward, from 
the houses of the wealthy IAS officers to the make-shift dwellings of the kacchi-bastis, and she 
relied on many in-laws who took the train all the way from Delhi to walk with her through the 
blistering streets of summer for 15 days. Everyone worried for Mrs. Goswami, who was prone to 
fainting in such heat. Still, she connected with the voters, especially the women, who were 
impressed to see her face on campaign posters across the ward. They were also able to build on 
the strong image her husband had established in this ward over the past five years. He had 
avoided the populist rhetoric of the conventional “kurta-pyjama” politician. His preference for 
the standard collared-shirt and pants to their emblematic starched white kurtas appealed to the 
educated, upper middle-class constituents of the ward. This broad base of support translated into 
massive margin-of-victory, nearly eight times the size of her husband’s in his 2009 win.  
Mrs. Goswami entered the office fully intending to work entirely on her own. However, 
she soon realized that she needed her husband and other family members more experienced in 
politics to help her get started. They helped her find her way through the bureaucratic maze of 




with the bureaucracy effectively. Over nearly three years of holding office, she listened carefully 
and learned quickly. Now, she has the experience and confidence to find and engage whomever 
she needs to on her own. She works with officers to redesign work-flow to improve efficiency, 
and regularly consults outside experts on municipal law to improve her understanding. She has 
black-listed a corrupt public contractor who cut his cement with too much sand to improve 
profits, which resulted in a seven-year road built in their ward washing out in only one. In 
hindsight, she appreciates both the support her husband provided early on and his willingness to 
not interfere in her work now that she is independent. She has much more she wants to 
accomplish this term and has not seriously thought about the next elections. Her primary concern 
is that she be remembered to have been as good of a parshad as her husband, if not better. 
Now Mrs. Goswami is something of a local celebrity. She is very open to the media, and 
has aired in several news interviews and regularly puts out bulletins on the radio. TV hosts have 
told her that she is a natural in front of the camera. Local women in particular are impressed by 
her. She was particularly touched by several young girls who approached her in the kacchi-basti 
and told her they wanted to be like her in the future. Her family also appreciates all the 
compliments they receive on her behalf, which is a real source of pride for her in-laws. As with 
her good friend Mrs. Mohania, Mrs. Goswami hopes she can be a role model for the women in 
her ward as well. She hopes that her example will encourage college girls to think of politics as a 
potential profession rather than a waste of time. She also thinks that her success has given local 
women the courage to come to their parshad on their own. Compared to her husband’s term, it 
seems like more wives come to the office now, when before it was mainly their husbands. 
Mrs. Goswami does not think that as a woman she is unique in her ability to succeed 




mother, whose biggest concern was getting her son up and off to school in the morning. Now she 
is responsible for almost 10,000 homes. She feels that all women are natural communicators and 
organizers well suited to politics, given their experience managing a household. Compared to 
many other parshads, who spend most of their time shouting at the bureaucracy before giving 
up, she has found more success in listening carefully to the officers and their explanations on the 
process. Critically, she knows that JMC officers know best how to bend the rules to get her 
requests through the red tape.  
On the parshad-pati phenomenon, she objects to the public acceptance of husbands who 
get their wife nominated and elected, and then tell her to stay home while men do the work. Just 
because the men in the family may have more political experience then her, it still does not give 
them the right to treat her as a dummy candidate and serve their own interests. She believes that 
these women must make it clear that she will fight in the election and will run the office. Not 
simply read in the meetings from a piece of paper written by her husband or father-in-law. If they 
do not agree, then she should refuse to run. She acknowledges that most women parshads, 
whether educated or not, have a difficult time asserting their independence from the beginning, 
unless they have a political background. However, the bigger problem is the men in their 
families who shut these women out and run the office themselves. Mrs. Goswami worries that if 
the husbands and father-in-laws of these women do the rounds of the ward instead of her, they 
will discourage local women from coming forward with their problems. Particularly in lower-
income, lower-educated areas, where women are already intimidated by authority figures, having 
to address a male authority is incredibly daunting. She regularly counsels her fellow female 
parshads, who often ask her to speak with them, and advises them to take and use the guidance, 




She challenges them to think about where they will be after the five years of their term is up and 
are wondering if they gave their best and accomplished what they wanted to. 
- 
The narratives of Mrs. Rawal and Mrs. Goswami display the range of paths female 
parshads take to winning office. Mrs. Goswami essentially succeeded her husband as parshad in 
a partially revised ward following redistricting after it was reserved for a woman, while Mrs. 
Rawal worked her way up from the neighborhood commission a decade prior. Mrs. Rawal’s path 
mirrors that of most of her male colleagues that I interviewed. No male parshad mentioned 
succeeding a spouse or relative, and most had been working in lower level party positions before 
finally being nominated as a parshad candidate, whereas the majority of female parshads 
interviewed had rarely engaged in politics prior to becoming parshad. Furthermore, as discussed 
in Chapter Three, the reservation may allow women to bypass Mrs. Rawal’s substantive journey 
and enter politics as a novice at a higher position than most men.  
Upon joining the JMC, nearly every female parshad, and many male parshads as well, 
commented on the dramatic change in their responsibilities. As Mrs. Goswami succinctly 
described, she went from being primarily responsible for her son to thousands of families in her 
ward overnight. All five of the independent women discussed embraced this burden. Notably, 
many mentioned the responsibility they felt to support local women and children in their wards. 
Mrs. Rawal specifically detailed her focus on improving the quality of life for disadvantaged 
women and children. Mrs. Mohania and Mrs. Goswami both feel that they serve as role models 
for women and girls in their ward, as they demonstrate that women can be both independent of 
their husbands and families, and in positions of power, which has been cited as key to improving 




both encourage eligible women to run in the short-term and inspire younger women to become 
more politically involved in the long-term. Ideally, more female role models will establish larger 
future cohorts of women leaders who are better able to independently compete and serve in 
office. 
A key enabler for most of these women is likely wealth and class. I met with four out of 
the five independent women in locations that illustrated relative wealth. Mrs. Mohania, Mrs. 
Chandal, and Mrs. Goswami asked me to come to their homes, all of which were quite large, in 
nice neighborhoods, and were staffed with at least one naukar (house servant).96 Mrs. Parashar, 
as the manager of a local school, was also likely upper middle-class. I met Mrs. Rawal at her 
home, which was of modest size and plain, an average middle-class house that likely indicated 
she was not as wealthy as the rest of the independent women. As will be discussed in Chapter 
Eight, wealth and class can make the path to independence for women politicians significantly 
easier. Naukars can be hired to take over household and familial responsibilities to free up time 
for political work. Women from the upper-classes also receive more education and come from 
more educated parents, which often translates into a less constraining youth that allows for more 
public and political experience for young women.97 However, several highly-dependent women 
appeared to come from relative wealth as well, so the correlation is not absolute. Wealth may 
make independence more likely, but it does not guarantee it. 
These women did express considerable frustration over the number of female parshads in 
the JMC who are dependent on their husbands and families. Anecdotes from Mrs. Mohania and 
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Mrs. Chandal claim the total number of independent women in the JMC is quite low. Still, 
optimism can be found in the assertions by Mrs. Mohania and Mrs. Goswami that it is 
normatively inappropriate for women to cede their seat to their husbands. Essentially, they argue 
that this subverts the will of the voters, who selected her not him. While this norm certainly does 
not seem to be widespread, given the success of parshad-patis in the polls, the reputation of 
these women and their willingness to engage publicly could encourage a wider transmission of 
this norm throughout the electorate going forward. Referring to the discussion on voter 
accountability in Chapter Three, the only realistic institutional method of effectively 
discouraging parshad-patis is through the ballot box. As long as such candidates are electorally 
successful they will continue to run.  
Finally, there may also be a minor networking effect that has encouraged female 
independence. Both Mrs. Mohania and Mrs. Goswami appear to be role models and mentors for 
several of their female colleagues. Mrs. Mohania was cited by several women as someone they 
sought to emulate. Mrs. Goswami recounted several fellow women who asked her for advice and 
direction. Recognizing the reality for many of these women, she often pushed them to use their 
assets – take a more cooperative approach with the bureaucracy, and build on the guidance and 
support they received from their husbands and family to assert themselves over time. While 
gradual, this may be the most pragmatic method of encouraging independence in the short-term. 
Moderately-Dependent Parshads: Working in Tandem 
Finally, the remainder of narratives from women parshads form a middle ground 
between the highly-dependent women discussed in Chapter Six and the independent women 
covered above. I recount two of the most representative narratives, which cover many of the 




husbands or male advisors, in which they have varying degrees of independence from the men 
around them, but none are completely independent. Instead they have formed joint working 
relationships to spread the office load of parshad responsibilities, which must be balanced with 
domestic and familial obligations. These relationships can be more segregated, with the parshad 
only taking on specific duties she is comfortable with, or more broadly shared, with both partners 
engaging jointly in a range of parshad activities. Both arrangements appear to put all actors on 
an equal footing. In contrast with highly-dependent women, who typically engage in only the 
minimum amount of parshad responsibilities, the narratives of moderately-dependent women 
indicate that they fully engage in much of the work, but are incapable or uninterested in certain 
aspects, or they must share the responsibility with another due to time constraints. For example, 
Mrs. Manihar meets with constituents, JMC officers, and contractors, but was politically 
inexperienced in campaigning so she relied on her male sponsor to run the entire campaign, like 
Mrs. Mohani in her first term. Mrs. Shrimal engages in nearly all the parshad work, but so does 
her husband to share the load. Notably, several of these women seem to be asserting themselves 
over time and will likely become fully independent in the future, while others appear 
comfortable with the joint responsibility and are unable to assume more. However, these 
arrangements do challenge our standard conception of representative democratic legitimacy, as 
several of the actors involved in these tandem relationships are unelected. Nonetheless, this 
question also encourages reflection on the concept of democratic legitimacy, and its applicability 





They used to say to my father, “Why are you giving her so much freedom, you are 
allowing her to go out of the house and do such things?” But my parents used to say that 
we have faith in our daughter, if she wants to progress in her life we should let her.98 
 
As a woman raised in a traditional Muslim community by progressive parents, Mrs. 
Manihar was accustomed to standing out. Her preference for stylish sunglasses and trendy 
salwar suits continue to grate her relatives, who regularly ask why she does not wear a burqa 
outside of the house. However, she is no stranger to social challenges. Her husband has passed 
away, but even as a widow and single mother, she managed to raise her daughter on her own 
while simultaneously running a clinic and arranging affordable education for Muslim children in 
her neighborhood. Her interest in social service also motivated her to pursue politics when her 
ward was reserved for a woman. She had no political experience, but was well known in her 
community through her clinic. The previous parshad of the ward and a family friend, now 
unable to run due to the gender reservation, arranged for his younger brother to mentor her and 
run her campaign. The ex-parshad came from a famous family in Rajasthani politics, going back 
six decades. They brought her on and treated her like family. He put her in touch with senior 
party leaders and helped her get a nomination. During the campaign, she could relax and let his 
brother guide the campaign to a comfortable victory.  
The parshad and his brother both admire Mrs. Manihar’s courage and work-ethic, as she 
campaigned with them from early morning into the late night, and even alone at times. She takes 
on much of the parshad duties herself, such as meeting with local constituents, especially women 
                                                          
 
98 Interview with female parshad and male sponsor on 04/01/2017 in Jaipur. Parshad set up the interview herself. 
Her male sponsor was present during the interview and answered a few questions, but she provided the vast 




who are more comfortable speaking with another woman. As someone who has challenged 
multiple norms and received considerable social criticism over her lifetime, Mrs. Manihar knows 
the importance of discretion. Local women know they can trust her to keep conversations on 
family  issues private to avoid gossip making its way back to their families. Early on, she relied 
heavily on her mentor and a maternal uncle who knew the JMC well to help find her way around 
the bureaucracy, but she is now able operate primarily independently. She knows she can call 
them anytime if she needs help. She also lives with her parents, who help manage some of her 
JMC work as well. Furthermore, as a woman, she is uncomfortable going out alone after nine in 
the evening, so she will generally take her mother or father with her. Overall, she enjoys politics, 
and will definitely run again in the next election. If her ward is not reserved for a woman, then 
she will look for a nomination to a nearby ward that is. As it stands, she is even contemplating an 
MLA run, but is waiting to see how the field pans out. 
Mrs. Shrimal 
I don’t take help from my family members, but my husband helps me with everything. 
Wherever I go my husband accompanies me.99  
 
Mrs. Shrimal moved all the way from central India to join her husband in Jaipur. Well-
educated, with a master’s degree, and family experience in business, she was well prepared to 
help her husband run several local shops. Despite no political experience, when their ward was 
reserved for a woman, she grew motivated to try her hand and was encouraged by her husband’s 
family, several of whom were well-established politically in this ward. After gaining the 
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nomination, her husband’s family went door-to-door with her asking for votes. Their campaign 
led to a considerable win, more than doubling the opposing candidate’s vote total. However, the 
office itself has taken its toll on Mrs. Shrimal and her husband. They are constantly busy 
listening to constituents, addressing complaints, and haranguing JMC bureaucrats. Mrs. Shrimal 
has no desire to run again in the next election, she wants to return to her shops and spend more 
time with her two young boys, and her husband wants to do the same.   
Mrs. Shrimal’s family has been very supportive during her political run, especially her 
husband’s side. While she does not allow the rest of his family to involve themselves in her JMC 
work, her husband helps her in nearly every part of it. Constituents know they can contact either 
one of them directly to get their needs addressed. Furthermore, wherever she goes, her husband 
accompanies her. She is not defensive about this arrangement, as she is already fairly 
overwhelmed by amount of time and work required to get anything done, and he provides 
welcome help. They both must continue to support their household by maintaining the family 
business on the side, as parshads only receive a minimal allowance every month. Despite having 
no interest in continuing, she counts her experience as a positive one. She feels that she has 
undergone a transformation after engaging in an environment traditionally reserved for men, and 
is glad that the gender reservation is there to ensure other women get the opportunity to have a 
similar experience. 
- 
The narratives of Mrs. Manihar and Mrs. Shrimal illustrate a middle-ground between the 
highly-dependent parshads of Chapter Six and the independent parshads recounted above. These 
two women, along with the six additional moderately-dependent women, are categorized as 




extreme, as these women work in varying degrees of independence from the men around them, 
but none of them appear to be completely dependent nor do any appear to be entirely 
independent. Several seem to be asserting themselves over time, like the story of Mrs. Manihar, 
while others appear more comfortable with the joint responsibility and are unable to assume 
more, like Mrs. Shrimal.  
These narratives demonstrate two outcomes of tandem relationships vis-à-vis the 
development of parshad independence. Mrs. Manihar describes an apparently segregated 
environment of responsibility. From her experience running a public clinic and other social 
work, she is comfortable engaging with her constituents. Due to a lack of political experience 
and connections, she relies on her male advisor, the ex-parshad’s younger brother, to run her 
campaign, provide connections to key party leaders, and on occasion, to smooth her interaction 
with the JMC. On the other hand, Mrs. Shrimal describes a more integrated environment. Due to 
the need to maintain their source of income, their private shop, alongside their official 
responsibilities, they appear to both engage in a range of parshad activities whenever they 
personally have the time. They relied on her husband’s family for political connections and 
support during the campaign, but now that she is elected, both meet with constituents and engage 
with the JMC. Because of their outside responsibilities, neither appears capable of taking on the 
office independently. While she is dependent on him to accompany her when she leaves the 
house, in most other aspects of the arrangement she appears to be his equal.  
Considering the narratives from the beginning of this chapter, a primary question for 
these tandem arrangements is whether they describe parshads who are using the distribution of 
responsibilities to work towards eventual independence, as Mrs. Mohania did in her transition 




arrangements the parshad is not interested in modifying, as appears to be the case with Mrs. 
Shrimal. The narratives describe a range of tandem relationships. Some women appear to be 
using the support and experience of the men around them to assert themselves over time, with 
the goal of becoming completely independent. Such a process is not unique to female parshads, 
as multiple male parshads describe similar journeys of increasing comfort and capability within 
the JMC as they gained experience. Other women are not entirely comfortable or able to interact 
with constituents or JMC bureaucrats on their own, and may always require male support in 
these aspects. Most also have significant domestic and private responsibilities that prevent them 
from dedicating themselves full-time to the JMC.  
These realities make it difficult to designate the tandem arrangement as either a positive 
or negative in terms of democratic representation. On the one hand, we can look at tandems as a 
stepping stone that bridges the gap for so many women who run for office but lack the political 
and social experience required to be an effective parshad. However, if these tandem 
relationships are static, and result in two or more people essentially serving as representatives for 
the duration of the term, with only one of them officially elected by their constituents, then 
problematic questions arise with regards to democratic legitimacy. In the Western context, we 
generally accept the numerous non-elected actors who exert disproportionate influence on an 
elected representative’s decision-making, i.e. special interests and large donors, as a dubious but 
unavoidable feature of a modern democracy. Yet, if such tandem arrangements were actively 
visible within Western representative institutions, I would expect significant public outcry and 
academic claims of undermined democracy, nepotism and ultimately, illegitimacy. Therefore, it 
could be argued that these arrangements at the very least impair democratic development, if not 




Still, it must continue to be noted that voters have not likely been deceived by parshads 
who are either highly dependent on or in tandem arrangements with their husbands or other 
supporting men. These narratives described electoral campaigns that regularly make it clear and 
obvious to constituents that their parshad will likely be dependent to a degree on others. 
Therefore, by voting these candidates into office, often by large margins, most voters appear to 
accept this representative arrangement as appropriate and legitimate. In turn, this dynamic 
encourages further discussion on the concept of democratic representation. Specifically, is 
legitimate democratic representation limited to the elected individual listed on the ballot? Does 
the extension of representative power to individuals not listed on the ballot, but informally 
accepted by the voters to serve as their representative, delegitimize the democratic process? 
Furthermore, would it be preferable for these moderately-dependent women to attempt to take on 
the office alone, even if they do not have the expertise or time? This is often the case with 
women who are new to politics and/or are still normatively expected to maintain their household 
and familial responsibilities while in office. These tandem arrangements may be the only way 
women in these situations can successfully act as parshads. Within this discussion, considerable 
attention must be paid to the role of Western norms, particularly individualism and the 
preeminence of formal rules, in the generation of the concept of democratic representation. 
Given the more communal norms and greater acceptance of informal rules within South Asia, 
perhaps we should reconsider the blanket application of democratic concepts developed for the 
Western context.  
Conclusions 
The narratives of this chapter have shown that women can enter political office entirely 




significant challenges and dramatic responsibilities imposed on these women who choose to take 
on the parshad office single-handedly. Despite often having considerably less political 
experience than their male colleagues, these women embraced their role and frequently made a 
notable effort to reach out specifically to women and children in need. While most women lack 
prior political experience, these independent women have leveraged their social experience 
instead from professional or volunteer backgrounds in social work and education.  
While the narratives from the independent parshads demonstrate that women can assert 
themselves in the JMC, particularly if they have professional or public experience, come from 
relative wealth, and are supported in their endeavor by their families, the tandem arrangements 
highlight a problematic commonality across these narratives. Nearly every woman I interviewed, 
independent or not, was dependent to some degree on male supporters. Specifically, even the 
very independent women, such as Mrs. Chandal and Mrs. Parashar, who even entered politics 
largely on their own, still mentioned that they were dependent on family for income support and 
assistance with household responsibilities. Essentially, these support structures enabled their 
independence. This is partially because the parshad office is essentially unpaid and thus not 
sustaining, but even more critical is the reality that, even after being elected, these women still 
operate within a society that enforces strict gendered roles. These gendered roles place them at a 
political disadvantage in terms of social experience, political experience and networks, and 
bureaucratic and institutional understanding. All of which can be remedied by male support. 
Critically, most of these women would likely not have been successful without the expertise 
provided by their husbands and other supporting male actors.  
Mrs. Mohania, one of the most independent women I interviewed, was quite dependent 




nomination, win the campaign, and manage the office. Mrs. Chandal gained much of her political 
experience serving on campaigns alongside her father when she was young. Mrs. Rawal was 
introduced to local communal leaders and gained an interest in politics through her politically 
active husband and brothers-in-law, and campaigned on his family’s reputation in the ward. Mrs. 
Goswami essentially replaced her husband after a gender reservation blocked him from running, 
and was also able to campaign on his reputation and rely on his expertise to navigate the 
bureaucratic maze. However, each of these women also credited their husbands and family with 
providing the support and acceptance that enabled them to assert themselves. Markedly, several 
husbands provided advice and backing when asked, but were willing to step aside when that was 
no longer required. Several of these women acknowledged that they would likely be unable to 
dedicate themselves to their work if their family was not able to assist them at home. While 
inspiring, these stories also illustrate the annulling alternative. If these husbands and families had 
refused at any point to accept or support her pursuit of political office, then very likely none of 
these women would be in their position. Even the most independent women recounted in their 
narratives important junctures when fathers or husbands had the power to open or block critical 
pathways for political advancement, such as attending college.100 The stark power differential 
between men and women in such a patriarchal society simply does not enable women to strike 
out on their own, as the reservation does not intrinsically grant a woman autonomy. 
While pessimistic, this reality existed before the imposition of gender quotas and I saw 
no indication that patriarchal norms had hardened since the establishment of quotas. Quotas were 
instituted to change this reality over time. However, these narratives demonstrate that patriarchal 
                                                          
 
100 Mrs. Mohania discussed her father’s rejection of her plan to pursue an MBA, and Mrs. Parashar praised her 




norms are stubbornly persistent, and change is extremely gradual. Pessimism should be further 
tempered by a consideration of how we are judging these arrangements. From a Western 
perspective, these narratives are particularly problematic, as we are accustomed to individual, 
elected representatives making independent decisions. However, that reality is certainly 
debatable, and no reasonable argument could be made that representatives in the West are 
absolutely independent. They rely on spousal, familial, and collegial support and advice as well. 
This support is just much less public and observable than in India. Parshads are likely much 
more comfortable advertising and acknowledging the role their family plays because it is more 
socially acceptable in South Asia than it would be in the West. Comparable to previous 
discussions of what constitutes corruption, while acts such as nepotism or gift giving are 
generally abhorred in the Western context, in other social contexts they are understood to be 
necessary and appropriate (De Sardan, 1999). Perhaps we need to rethink what constitutes 
legitimate representation in the Indian context. Debating whether communal representation is 
compatible with true democratic representation is likely a dead end. It is more useful to focus on 
outcomes. The key question is whether communal support, such as that provided by a husband, 
family, or other community member, facilitates or restricts a woman parshad’s legislative ability 
to act on her priorities. Using this standard, reviewing the narratives from the highly-dependent 
parshads of Chapter Six demonstrates that these women were restricted by their communal 
support, and decision priorities were predominantly determined by someone other than her. 
Reviewing the narratives from the independent narratives of this chapter, I argue that these 
women were enabled by their support networks to act on their own priorities. While still 
dependent to a degree on the men around them, this support allows them to act on their own, 




 There are two possible ways of incorporating these findings into the existing literature. 
As women politicians comparable in independence and capability to their male colleagues, the 
independent narratives from this chapter could be interpreted as evidence of the ability of gender 
quotas to improve substantive female representation in positions of power. However, the 
literature requires a direct connection between female representatives and their constituency 
(Mansbridge, 1999; Urbinati and Warren, 2008; Weldon, 2002), which ensures that the women 
elected continue to represent the interests of their constituents, particularly women’s interests 
that have been historically neglected. The continued dependence, even for the most independent 
women parshads, on their male supporters and enablers makes this critical connection more 
tenuous. The literature has traditionally focused on the societal and political constraints that 
restrict women from gaining office, and upon taking office, the continued institutional 
constraints that restrain them from pushing their preferences. However, the literature generally 
assumes that women who take office have personal agency and independence. There has been 
little consideration of women representatives who may continue to be hindered by revocable 
individual agency and independence. As the independent narratives from this chapter and the 
dependent narratives from Chapter Six have demonstrated, familial and societal constraints can 
make it very difficult or impossible for women representatives to fully engage in their office. 
Even if these constraints are lifted to some degree, as they were for the independent women of 
this chapter, they are often revocable. If the men who support these women choose to withdraw 
that support, it is feasible that many of these independent women would lose that independence 
to a considerable degree. Therefore, returning to the literature, the substantive representation that 
has been established by the gender reservation in this case is also tenuous and possibly 




representation for women in Jaipur, but it does indicate that substantive representation is not 
dichotomous, it is more complex. Once established, the possibility remains that it is not total and 
that it can be removed. Therefore, substantive representation should be evaluated along a 
spectrum, as either more or less firmly entrenched and irrevocable.  
This chapter provided a counterpoint to Chapter Six with narratives from independent 
women who were brought in by the gender reservation and have established themselves to be as 
capable as any of their male colleagues. Critically, many of these independent women have made 
politics a career and provide societal exposure that could both encourage voters to revise 
stereotypes and prejudices, and inspire future female leaders. Still, these narratives also 
demonstrate the inescapable constraining influence of their patriarchal environment, as these 
women still rely on male supporters and family who enable them to attain that independence, 
which could be revoked by their enablers at any time. The next and final chapter of analysis uses 
the preceding narratives from both the dependent and independent women to isolate and explain 
the powerful patriarchal norms that create a tension between the institutional quotas designed to 
improve female political participation and the social norms that continue to restrict such behavior 






Chapter 8: Obstacles to Full Participation 
We Indians have this mentality that women belong at home, and now when we are 
forcing them to come out they do not want to. Let’s say this seat got reserved for a 
woman and I asked my wife to fight the election. She would not, she would fight me, but 
she would not fight the election.101 
 
The prevalence and position of dependence among women parshads outlines several key 
dynamics that create a tension between the institutional quotas designed to improve female 
political participation and the social norms that continue to restrict such behavior. Following the 
quote above, parental and societal attitudes, gendered family traditions, societal normative 
constraints on public and political actions, and challenging institutional environments 
significantly restrict the ability of women to enter politics independently.  
Women in Rajasthan are discouraged throughout their lives from engaging fully publicly 
or politically. Even at the peak opportunity for independence, while attending university, women 
are generally much more restrained than men of the same age. After university, most marry, 
which traditionally requires leaving their own family and joining their husband’s. New norms 
and constraints come with this transition, most of which continue to discourage any broad-based 
public or political behavior. Critically, all women, parshad or not, operate within a society that 
emphasizes the need to protect their purity and honor, which often designates politics as an 
inappropriate environment for women to engage in. These factors combine to put aspiring 
women politicians at a serious disadvantage in terms of public and political experience, 
                                                          
 




connections, reputation, and confidence in comparison to their male peers, and forces them to 
rely on men to address these shortcomings. 
This chapter discusses the impact of these societal norms on female political participation 
by comparing the experiences of the highly-dependent women narrated in Chapter Six, and the 
narratives of the independent and moderately-dependent women of Chapter Seven. Comparison 
of these contrasting narratives highlights the persistent patriarchal norms that continue to restrict 
women’s political agency. Parental and societal attitudes on political engagement for young 
women, gendered family traditions that significantly alter the accessibility of the political 
environment to married women, societal normative constraints on women engaging in public and 
political actions, and challenging institutional environments erect barriers across the entirety of a 
woman’s lifetime. These barriers reduce experiential knowledge and political capability for most 
women to the point that to pursue political office effectively, women must rely upon the support 
of men. This reliance often continues after electoral victory. These restrictions make the 
development of full autonomy challenging for most women politicians and thus make it more 
likely a woman parshad entering the JMC through the gender reservation will be highly or 
moderately dependent on men to carry out her responsibilities.  
This chapter works through the societal constraints that shape the ability of women 
politicians to develop full independence in Jaipur. It begins with a comparison of foundational 
female and male political experiences that illustrate a significant gender gap in the development 
of political connections, knowledge and understanding. The chapter then moves to gendered 
family traditions that influence the political development of women, particularly in northern 
India. This section reviews the joint family structure, gender segregation, bridal relocation, and 




the development of participatory norms across women. Following this section, the chapter shifts 
to the broader societal normative constraints that influence the ability of aspiring women 
politicians to act autonomously, particularly when politics is perceived to be an inappropriate 
environment for women to engage in. Finally, the chapter concludes by connecting each of these 
restrictive factors to the development of highly-dependent parshads and the parshad-pati 
phenomenon. Throughout this chapter, examples from the parshad narratives are provided to 
demonstrate each dynamic in action.  
Political Beginnings 
The university experience not only contributes to the development of the knowledge and 
skills valued in the workforce, it also affects social development through public interaction, 
guiding the development of participatory norms and social networks, which in turn guide 
political participation (La Due Lake & Huckfeldt, 1998; Isaksson et al, 2014). For most Indian 
students, the university is their first experience living outside of their natal home and is generally 
one of the first political experiences for students that is independent of their parents. This is 
notably important for young women, for whom public participation of all kinds are often 
discouraged by family while at home. Positioned between the restrictive environments and 
accompanying duties of the natal home and the forthcoming married household, university is a 
unique window of opportunity for many women to expand their public and participatory 
horizons. In the narratives, both women and men suggested that a university education was 




I did not feel any hesitation at first in the JMC. I had been exposed to the outside before, 
while at Delhi University. I believe that if you are more exposed then you will be a better 
parshad as compared to those women who are sheltered.102  
 
Similarly, a male parshad explained: 
From my perspective, women who are well-educated and come from open-minded 
families, where they have had public exposure, they do better (in the JMC).103 
 
Across India, there is near gender equality in higher education enrollment. Data from 
2016 surveys show women at around 46-percent of the total 34 million students in some form of 
higher education nationwide.104 Within the JMC itself, women parshads are as educated as their 
male peers if not better. Of the 23 women interviewed, three had a bachelor’s and eight had 
master’s degrees (48-percent), compared to five men with bachelor’s and two with master’s (39-
percent) out of 18 interviewed. Notably, each of the five women rated as independent had 
master’s degrees, and none of the women parshads with a master’s were highly dependent. In 
comparison, five out of the ten women rated as highly-dependent had less than a tenth-grade 
education, with two reporting no education at all. Still, the contrast is not absolute, several 
highly-dependent women had completed some university, with one completing a full bachelor’s. 
More education appears to assist women in establishing political independence, but does not 
guarantee it. 
While degree attainment may not fully explain independence or lack thereof, a deeper 
look at the college experience indicates that there is a significant difference between women and 
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men. First, a woman’s ability to attend university is still often controlled by a male family 
member, which reinforces men as the primary decision-maker: 
When I got married my husband asked me if I had an interest in education. I said if you 
will allow me to study then yes, I would like to. After that, my husband provided me with 
the best education… then he also suggested politics.105 
My father was orthodox when young, I wasn’t allowed to leave the house and do my 
MBA.106 
 
Attending university also does not always allow a woman to leave her parent’s house. Two 
women parshads reported that they completed their bachelor’s from their family home, only 
traveling for exams. Such arrangements would not provide comparable levels of social and 
political engagement that physically attending a university would. However, nationally women 
compose only 46-percent of total distance learners (comparable to overall university gender 
disparities), so men are just as likely to miss the on-campus experience. Neither a lack of 
educational attainment or on-campus experience seem to explain why women are more likely to 
enter politics as dependents. However, the narratives also suggest that there is a considerable 
gender discrepancy in student politics engagement. While women attend university at a 
comparable level as men, they engage significantly less in university politics than their male 
peers. This is the starting line for many Indian politicians, and their absence puts them at a 
lasting disadvantage. 
We don't just study the books here, we study democracy as well.107 
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The significance of university politics has diminished over the past two decades, but is 
still an important foundation and stepping stone for the aspiring politician in India (Jeffrey, 
2010). The standard path in Rajasthan begins with volunteering and eventually standing as a 
candidate with the local university youth wing of the respective national party, the Akhil 
Bharatiya Vidyarthi Parishad (ABVP) for students who aim to align themselves with the BJP, 
and the National Students Union of India (NSUI) for those aiming for Congress membership. 
The most ambitious students will run under the party banner in elections for the top posts: 
department president, college president, or the highest – university president. The demonstrated 
ability to win a large election at a prominent university, such as university president at the largest 
university in Jaipur, Rajasthan University (RU), can attract the attention of key party leaders at 
the national level.108 National parties follow student elections as an indicator of future political 
trends, and are eager to adopt successful campaigns and candidates.109 Successful student leaders 
then move from student politics into traditional politics, either back in their familial village as a 
sarpanch or pradhan, in the city as a parshad, or even a state MLA if they have the support and 
connections.110 As one male parshad recounted:  
                                                          
 
108 Legends of the power of university presidents are common. No media account can be found to support his 
story, but one student leader recounted the story of Pratap Singh Kachariyawas, an ex-MLA and former Rajasthan 
University president, who was so politically powerful during his time at RU that he prevented the Prime Minister’s 
plane from landing at Jaipur Airport to demonstrate his sway. (Interview with male Rajasthan University student 
politician on 04/11/2017 in Jaipur.) 
109 Interview with local journalist on 04/18/2017 in Jaipur. 
110 Interview with local male journalist on 04/26/2017 in Jaipur. However, as this journalist also pointed out, the 
value of winning university elections has been diminished by the number of students involved in student politics. 
The expansion of universities across the state, public and private, has increased the number of elections, thus 
diluting the value of winning an individual position. Still, winning a university-wide position at a prominent public 





From college on I was very active in student politics. I started with the BJP student wing 
and then I joined BJP and RSS. I have been politically active for 28 years.111 
 
A primary benefit of competing in student elections is building a base of core supporters. 
Electoral competitiveness in India has become more dependent on both financial backing and 
political “muscle” via family and party support networks (Michelutti, 2010; Vaishnav, 2017). 
Successful student politicians can build large teams of fellow students from their respective 
youth wings to support their campaign. If successful, the core of these teams often remains with 
the student leader as they make the jump to local, state or national politics.112 During this period, 
they gain campaigning experience, which is particularly valuable to those who come from 
families without political experience, as this male parshad, who came from such a family and 
pursued student politics for experience, described: 
You learn the democratic setup in student politics, it’s a learning phase… When you are 
involved in student politics you will get good exposure, meeting new people, new 
problems that a normal student would be unaware of.113 
 
This view was shared by a woman currently involved in student politics: 
If you don’t have any background and you still want to make politics your career, or you 
just have an interest in politics, then student politics is the best way.114 
 
Students also gain valuable political connections early on that they will rely on for the 
rest of their careers. The current JMC mayor, himself a former RU president, regularly visited 
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the university after student elections to speak with prominent student leaders.115 Even those who 
only work on the campaigns of successful candidates gain valuable connections. One parshad 
discussed a friend who eventually became an MLA representing Jaipur with Congress:  
One of my friends in student politics ended up running in MLA elections. He had been 
president of the university… I worked for him for 10-15 days during legislative 
elections.116 
 
Student leaders who can catch the eye of established politicians look to them for advice and 
support: 
The connections we make with politicians in college politics, they do not pay immediate 
returns, they are helpful to us in the future, when we become full-fledged politicians. A 
good relationship with a politician will teach you what mistakes they made and what you 
should avoid.117 
 
University presidents can then use the support networks they have built, political connections, 
and campaign experience to launch themselves into state and then national politics. Multiple 
student leaders at Rajasthan University named up to seven current MLAs in the current 
government who had previously been president of RU, several of them cabinet ministers.118 
Others claimed up to 40 of the current MLAs had been prominent in RU politics.119  
Most of the leaders from BJP, and of Congress, have gone through student elections, 
that's why they're here.120   
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Notably, while many male parshads and husbands of female parshads reported 
participating in student politics, no women did.121 This was supported by my conversations with 
current student leaders at RU, all of whom could only recall two or three women who had 
participated in RU elections over the past several years.122 The lack of young women engaged or 
even interested in politics has been noted elsewhere. Lawless and Fox (2013) found that young 
women in the United States are less likely than young men to consider running for office, or to 
perceive elective office as a desirable occupation. Notably, they found a comparable gender gap 
in professions that serve as traditional feeders to political office as well. In turn, the lack of 
participation at the bottom of the ladder exacerbates the lack of women in the higher echelons of 
political power. Lawless and Fox attribute this gap to multiple factors: divergent parental 
socialization of boys and girls, lack of political exposure for girls in school, gender gaps in 
organized sports, lack of social encouragement, and lower individual perceptions of political 
capability. Elder (2004) adds familial responsibilities and relatively few visible women role 
models in politics. Several of these factors appear to be at work in Rajasthan as well, in 
particular: parental socialization, lower political exposure and societal discouragement. 
Politics in general are often seen as unfit and dangerous for Indian women. This 
perception appears to be even stronger for university politics, which are generally perceived to 
be as distasteful as regular politics, if not worse. Although the situation appears to have 
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122 Interviews with male Rajasthan University student politicians on 04/11/2017 in Jaipur. This phenomenon may 
be regional, as one student reported he knew of several women who participated in Delhi University politics 





improved, student politics at Rajasthan University were notorious for vote-buying, intimidation 
tactics, and violence. As one journalist described: 
Student politics… grooms future politicians in the way to win and profit. Dirty politics 
and dirty money are as common in student politics as they are in adult politics…50-60-
percent of student politicians don’t come to the university to study, they don’t have the 
time and that’s not why they’re here.123 
 
Rumors of cooperation between student campaigns and minor local mafia who exchange money 
for student participation in intimidation and extortion efforts are common as well, which 
reinforce existing negative views of university politics.124 Violence has also been an issue. 
Student elections at RU were banned during the 1980s and again from 2003 to 2008, following 
violent protests on campus that resulted in the deaths of several students.125 New rules 
established by the Supreme Court in 2005 are reported to have improved the situation.126 Still, in 
2015, police were called in to quell student rallies at RU that turned violent, resulting in injuries 
to students and police both.127  
The perceptions of student politics as rough, dangerous and dirty combines to create an 
environment seen as inappropriate or even unsafe for women to engage in, which discourages 
participation. Cross-national studies have found that intimidation and fear of political violence 
                                                          
 
123 Interview with local male journalist on 04/18/2017 in Jaipur. Student politics appear to be expensive as well, my 
research assistant described several candidates for university president whose family were known to have sold 
valuable land to fund their campaigns (Interview with local male journalist on 04/26/2017 in Jaipur.). 
124 Interview with male Rajasthan University student politician on 04/11/2017 in Jaipur. 
125 Interview with local male journalist on 04/26/2017 in Jaipur; Interview with male Rajasthan University student 
politician on 04/11/2017 in Jaipur. 
126 The Supreme Court established rules limiting all candidates to one term to remove the student “career” 
politicians who took classes at the university simply to remain in student politics, and established campaign 
spending limits. See: http://indianexpress.com/article/india/india-news-india/jnu-elections-lyngdoh-
recommendations-student-union/ {Accessed 06/24/2018} 
127 See: https://www.hindustantimes.com/jaipur/rajasthan-university-violence-nsui-seeks-action-against-





increases the gender gap significantly in voting across democracies (Isaksson et al, 2013). 
Student leaders at RU report that parents often discourage their daughters while at university 
from either running for office or even voting. Election day has often been the peak time for flare-
ups, so daughters are often kept home from the polls. According to one student politician: 
It is difficult to convince them [women to run for office]. It is even more difficult to 
convince their parents to let them vote… They don't allow girls to go to vote, because of 
the perception. The perception is that we have a very robust and aggressive environment, 
so they are concerned about that.128 
 
Similarly, another student politician argued that women are not drawn to electoral politics: 
Girls don't come in large numbers to vote… It is because the atmosphere is not very 
conducive for that, it is a lot of hassle, and they think it is just a waste of time.129 
 
This situation reportedly results in significantly less participation by young women across 
the board in student politics – fewer candidates, and fewer voters to support those candidates. In 
turn, this deficit both shrinks the pool of qualified women candidates in line to compete for 
traditional political posts, and means that those women who do choose to eventually compete 
generally start at a disadvantage in terms of experience as compared to men. Because women are 
not engaging in student politics to the same degree, they gain less political experience, and they 
do not develop the supporting team, party standing and political connections that their male 
counterparts do, and therefore often must look to these men to provide these critical assets if they 
want to compete politically in the future.130  
                                                          
 
128 Interview with male Rajasthan University student politician on 04/11/2017 in Jaipur. 
129 Interview with local male journalist on 04/26/2017 in Jaipur. 
130 Further research needs to be done on the effect increasing female participation at the university level can have 
on general political engagement as an adult. The university environment could be a prime opportunity to target 





An exception appears to be the women’s colleges and universities. Rajasthan University 
itself has two gender-exclusive colleges, Maharani College for women, and the Maharaja 
College for men. The Maharani College runs its own elections, with a college president topping 
the list. Voter participation is reportedly higher for women at the Maharani College than at RU in 
general,131 and candidates gain experience in campaigning and developing a base of support.132 
As a lower-level position, winning a college presidency provides little guaranteed political 
benefits, but successful college presidents can go on to compete in the much larger, and more 
politically significant, university elections. However, only one woman has reportedly managed to 
make this transition successfully, becoming the first woman RU president in 2011. Several 
women have competed in more recent elections, but lost.133 Furthermore, it appears that many of 
these women were unable or uninterested in leveraging their position into professional or 
political opportunities. According to the current Maharani president: 
There have been 21 Maharani College presidents, I’m the 21st. None of them have gone 
on to get government jobs, none fought elections afterwards, and even if they tried then 
they gave in too easily, accepted defeat too soon.134 
 
She herself planned on competing in upcoming RU presidential elections and credited student 
politics with triggering her political aspirations: 
I saw all of these problems at the college and from this became interested in politics. I 
thought if there was an opportunity, I would contest the elections… Right now, I am 
planning on joining a political party. In the future, I would like to work with a political 
organization.135 
 
                                                          
 
131 Interview with local male journalist on 04/26/2017 in Jaipur 
132 Interview with female Rajasthan University student politician on 05/03/2017 in Jaipur. 
133 The voting population is much larger at RU, over 20,000, compared to the approximately 1,000 voters at 
Maharani. After becoming the first female RU president, Prabha Choudhary is fairly well-known in Jaipur. However, 
she won as an independent, with no party affiliation to build on, and it does not appear that she pursued a political 
career afterwards (Interview with local male journalist on 04/26/2017 in Jaipur). 
134 Interview with female Rajasthan University student politician on 05/03/2017 in Jaipur. 




There are still opportunities for political engagement outside of the university for women. 
Notably however, comparing the narratives of women with political experience to those of men 
shows that even when women do engage politically, it is often to a much lesser degree than men. 
Many men described a lifetime of political engagement: 
I’ve been politically active for 25 years… First, I met with the regional MLA. He came 
with me to meet people in the area. I got his blessings. Then, I came into contact with the 
parshad, we grew closer, became very good friends. We used to go out into the ward, so 
my political activities were increasing day by day.136 
 
In 1967… I joined the Jan Sangh Party. In 1967 there was a huge agitation in 
Rajasthan… in the process 6-7 people were injured or killed. I took all these people to the 
hospital on a handcart. From then I decided I would work for the welfare of society.137 
 
Whereas the women I interviewed with the most political experience describe considerably less 
extensive levels of involvement: 
My husband put me in contact with leaders from our own community. He used to take me 
to all of the small activities happening within our community, public functions. In 2006, I 
got a BJP membership and became a minister in the neighborhood commission.138 
 
I used to help my father in campaigning, handing out election registration cards.139 
 
While additional political engagement for young women is beneficial for their future 
political prospects, it does not guarantee independence. Of the thirteen women who reported 
having no political experience prior to becoming parshad, five were highly dependent, but three 
others were independent. Furthermore, of the ten women who had some political experience, five 
were still highly dependent. A husband of one of these dependent women described how she 
would accompany him to party meetings, and even became vice president of the party’s 
                                                          
 
136 Interview with male parshad on 02/20/2017 in Jaipur. 
137 Interview with male parshad on 10/13/2016 in Jaipur. 
138 Interview with female parshad on 12/10/2016 in Jaipur. 





women’s wing, but still she relies on him for much of the parshad work.140 It appears that even 
the women who are able to engage politically early on are not getting as involved as comparable 
men, and thus the experience does not significantly influence their political development. This 
could be why we see so little variation in dependence between those with and without prior 
political experience.  
Gendered Family Traditions and the “Northern Tradition” 
The literature has extensively evaluated the role of gendered family traditions in 
restricting the political engagement of women in India (Jensenius, 2018). Societal norms assign 
considerable household and familial responsibilities to women, which makes engaging publicly 
outside of the house very difficult (Nath, 1996). Researchers have found that in many cases, 
these demands in turn limit the pool of women available to run for office to largely the 
unmarried or widowed (Singer, 2007). Even the women who do find the time to engage often 
must gain the approval of their family before seeking a political post that will take away time 
available for household responsibilities (Singer, 2007). Without this approval, many women 
would not consider even running for office (Kishwar, 1997). 
Each of these cultural traditions are active and influential in Rajasthan. Following 
university, traditionally most women in Rajasthan quickly enter married life. Although society is 
changing rapidly, particularly over the past decade, most brides in Rajasthan leave their natal 
family and join their husband’s. This not only involves physically moving from her parent’s 
house to her husband’s, but also shifting her obligations to her new household and taking on new 
domestic responsibilities. Critically, she also leaves behind the social circle and connections of 
                                                          
 




her natal family and starts anew within her husband’s. Politically, this essentially forces her to 
either create a support network from scratch or rely on her husband’s. While there are certainly 
differences across families, many new brides are also unable to engage much outside of the home 
due to either lack of free time from household responsibilities and/or normative restrictions 
imposed on women of her new family, which creates an additional barrier to developing public 
experience and a new social network in their affinal home. 
When discussing familial traditions around marriage and kinship, it is crucial to 
distinguish regional differences. India is incredibly diverse, and all generalizations fall short of 
specific realities, but we can roughly differentiate geographically between a northern system and 
a southern system (Dyson and Moore, 1983). The northern system predominates in the 
northwestern states (Rajasthan, Gujarat, Uttar Pradesh, Haryana, and Punjab), and the southern 
system in the south (Kerala, Tamil Nadu, Karnataka, Andhra Pradesh, and Telangana), with the 
middle states of Madhya Pradesh and Maharashtra ambiguously dividing the two regions.141 
Dyson and Moore provide a useful comparison, which, although dated, describes foundations of 
the kinship systems that are still readily observable, particularly in more conservative areas of 
the country such as Rajasthan.142 As they note, these are ideal-typical descriptions that do not 
reflect the many intra-regional variations. Furthermore, the northern and southern systems are 
not diametrically opposed, the difference is “often a subtle one of degree” (57).143 Three 
                                                          
 
141 Dyson and Moore (1983) profess difficulties in mapping the kinship systems of the eastern states of West 
Bengal, Orissa, and Bihar, and as with many analyses of India unfortunately, the north-eastern states are almost 
entirely ignored. 
142 This analysis, as with most of the literature on Indian kinship traditions, is focused entirely on heterosexual 
relationships. 
143 These traditions are generally understood to predate the Muslim presence in India, and likely reflect cultural 
differences between the “Aryan” north and “Dravidian” south. Interesting arguments have been made that the 





common aspects within these systems are particularly applicable to the political engagement of 
women and will be discussed: the joint family socialization process, societal gender segregation, 
and bridal relocation. 
The Joint Family. The traditional framework for the family in India is the “joint family”, which 
traditionally consists of a patriarch and all his lineal male descendants living together with their 
wives and unmarried daughters. Daughters remain in the joint family until they are married, 
when they leave to join their husband’s family. As outside women marry into the family they 
become part of the joint family.144 This system is more common in the north than in the south 
(Dyson and Moore, 1983) and remains the arrangement for 25-percent of all households in 
Rajasthan, which is second only to Uttar Pradesh across the country.145   
The joint family structure preserves the tradition of patrilineal descent, which requires the 
resocialization of new members, such as new brides, to ensure commitment and loyalty to their 
husband and male in-laws. New brides under the northern system generally enter the family 
hierarchy at the bottom, and tend to be dominated by the senior wives of the family. The 
resocialization process can be a markedly negative experience for northern women, who are 
often treated with initial suspicion, and effort is made to ensure that she realigns her own 
interests with those of her husband and his kin. Women are often expected to understand that 
                                                          
 
south. However, Dyson and Moore (1983) argue that such generalizations are problematic, given the massive 
socioeconomic differentiation within the northern and the southern regions. 
144 The federal government has created a special Hindu United Family (HUF) tax category, which provides special 
filing status on income taxes for joint families. See: https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/money-you/united-a-
hindu-family-gains-divided-it-loses/articleshow/6212396.cms {Accessed 06/24/2018} 
145 Most northern states have around 20% joint family households. In comparison, the largest share of join 
households in the south was 17% in Kerala. See: http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/several-states-in-north-





their own wishes and interests are subordinate to those of the family group. A key element in this 
process is cutting women off from their natal family to ensure their commitment. Women raised 
in communities who follow the northern system are less likely than those in the south to 
regularly interact with their natal kin after marriage (Dyson and Moore, 1983).146 
Many parshads I interviewed were members of joint families, and the narratives present 
mixed opinions on the effect the structure has on the political fortunes of women. Some praised 
the support having so many women under one roof provided by relieving them of some domestic 
responsibilities:  
Since I live in a joint family I have no domestic responsibilities, so I can dedicate myself 
to my JMC work.147  
 
However, others questioned the additional restrictions entering a joint family can impose: 
Usually in joint families, daughters-in-law are treated differently by their father-in-laws 
than their own daughters, but he treats me the same. In joint families you will see that 
there are so many social taboos, such as purdah, but I was given an open environment. 
My father-in-law has always encouraged me to act as his own daughter.148 
 
Following the discussion on communal support from Chapter Seven, joint family 
structures can be either supportive or restrictive. The key question is whether the joint family 
facilitates or restricts a woman parshad’s legislative ability to act on her priorities. As the 
narratives above illustrates, if the joint family supports a woman’s political participation, it can 
                                                          
 
146 Because women are expected to leave their natal family, parents traditionally expect little support or assistance 
from their daughters after marriage. This tradition likely has considerable influence on a range of societal and 
regulatory norms: the preference for sons over daughters and the resultant skewed gender ratio, education and 
support of daughters, and the development of rules governing the transmission of property rights come to mind. 
This is an area in need of significant research. 
147 Interview with female parshad on 12/10/2016 in Jaipur. 




be a crucial support that frees her up from her domestic responsibilities. However, joint families 
still often reinforce conservative social norms, which in many other cases likely restrict the 
ability of a woman to participate. Scholars have argued that the joint family is more effective at 
enforcing gender restrictive norms than the nuclear family structure (Luschinsky, 1962, cited in 
Dyson and Moore, 1983). By their nature, joint families put women in close contact with the 
male elders whose approval is often required to pursue a political career. Therefore, it would be 
very difficult, even inconceivable in many cases, for a woman to disregard an elder’s prohibition 
and still engage politically. Her standing and safety within the household could be considerably 
jeopardized.  
Gender Segregation. The last narrative of the previous section spoke specifically of purdah, 
which literally translates to “curtain”. This refers to the tradition of socially isolating women, 
with an approximate goal of protecting their chastity, and thus the honor of the family, which is 
more common in the north than in the south. As with any patriarchal society, controlling female 
sexuality tends to translate into restrictions on personal movements and isolation from the 
opposite sex. Hindu families who enforce purdah generally discourage female members from 
leaving the house, and if they do, they often wear a veil over their face, comparable to the burqa 
Muslim women may wear.149 When men not of their family are inside the house, women 
practicing purdah may stay unseen in other rooms, or they may veil themselves in their presence. 
Again, various methods of controlling female sexuality are present across India, but tend to be 
stronger in the north (Dyson and Moore, 1983).  
                                                          
 
149 As with certain Islamic traditions the level of purdah varies. Hindu women observing purdah may cover their 




Varun and I never directly asked a family if they enforced purdah, but during at least two 
interviews with the husbands of parshads living in joint families, the experience indicated that 
purdah was likely part of the reason we did not speak with the parshad. During the first, while 
we spoke with the husband out on the porch, surrounded by his male kin, he mentioned that his 
wife was inside but made no mention of her joining us.150 During a second, all we ever saw of 
the parshad was her arm when she handed in her business card for us at the end of the interview 
through the door that went to rest of the house, which her husband took and then promptly 
locked the door.151    
Overall, purdah is a symptom of a broader system of gender-segregation norms for 
communication and social interaction that tend to be more common under the northern system. 
Men are expected to associate with men and women with women. Women are especially 
discouraged from associating with men outside of their family. This norm is particularly true 
before marriage, but tends to maintain a degree of influence even after. Notably, male 
communication networks tend to be inaccessible to women, and vice-versa (Dyson and Moore, 
1983).152 This normative expectation has a range of influence on female political engagement. 
As with findings from the United States, the inability of women to regularly associate with men 
publicly makes getting access to sponsorship and patronage, and thus advancement, much more 
difficult, and is partially to account for gender disparities across industries (Hewlett et al, 2010). 
Men tend to be better-connected and more powerful than women, and gaining their support is 
key to political success in any environment. Moreover, this norm also encourages women to 
                                                          
 
150 Interview with husband of female parshad on 11/10/2016 in Jaipur.  
151 Interview with husband of female parshad on 01/11/2017 in Jaipur. 
152 Dyson and Moore (1983) also argue that female-specific communication networks are a primary medium for 




work in socially approved areas of employment, where they will only interact with other women 
(Dyson and Moore, 1983). By its nature, democratic politics is decidedly not gender exclusive, 
which makes it a socially restricted area for many women in Rajasthan. 
Men within a woman’s affinal family are also less likely in the northern system to enter 
into social, economic and political relationships with men from her natal family. Men in the 
northern system tend to limit their relationship to their own kin, men they are related to by blood 
(Dyson and Moore, 1983). As one male parshad commented, his brother was very helpful in 
establishing political connections: 
My elder brother has been active in social services and helps me a lot, we go together to 
meet people, because he’s more well known, my elder brother will take me to meet 
officials, and connects me with people.153 
 
Following the joint family hierarchy, who a woman’s husband chooses to associate with 
generally guides who she associates with. Therefore, this restriction on the development of 
relationships to the husband’s kin only further ostracizes a woman from her natal family and 
makes her more dependent on her husband’s kinship networks. 
Relocation. Marriage is often accompanied by geographical relocation. Women in the north are 
much less likely to marry geographically-proximate men familiar to them and their family. They 
are more likely than their southern counterparts to physically move significant distances to join 
their husband and his family (Dyson and Moore, 1983). The narratives affirm this tradition, as 
                                                          
 





the husbands of two highly-dependent women parshads revealed that their wives had moved 
quite far to join them in Jaipur: 
She was born in a village in a nearby district (about 3 hours by car)… After marriage she 
moved with me to Jaipur.154  
She was born in… (a nearby state). Her father was an accountant, because of my job we 
shifted to Delhi. After our marriage she came with me to Jaipur.155 
 
Comparatively, no men mentioned moving to join their wife’s family. Many men had a long 
family tradition in Jaipur, and were often well-known in their neighborhood:  
My family has lived here for 150 years so everyone knows us. They come directly to our 
home usually… People come all day long, it’s very informal, they can come to us 
anytime.156  
For the last two generations my family has lived in this area.157 
 
When combined with the normative expectations on separation from natal kin, physical distance 
further separates a woman from the support networks of her natal family, and makes her more 
reliant on the networks of her husband and affinal family. Furthermore, these women also likely 
face the stigma against newcomers and preference for locals that is common in JMC politics. 
Multiple parshads mentioned the political advantages being “a local” conferred on their 
campaigns. It reduced the need to knock on every door to improve name recognition:  
I didn’t need to campaign because I am a local and was already attached at the ground 
level to people. There was a belief among people that if they came to me then I would 
take care of their problems. These elections are very personal…158 
 
                                                          
 
154 Interview with husband of female parshad on 11/23/2016 in Jaipur. 
155 Interview with husband of female parshad on 01/11/2017 in Jaipur. 
156 Interview with husband of female parshad on 11/28/2016 in Jaipur. 
157 Interview with husband of female parshad on 03/22/2017 in Jaipur. 





I believe that if you live in the same area you represent, this gives you an upper hand in 
campaigning. Since my family has been here a long time, people know me.159 
 
Voters also tend to prefer local candidates, both for the personal connection and the trust created 
by long-time residence. Several parshads and their spouses expressed the belief that long-term 
residency in Jaipur bolstered their electoral prospects: 
Since I am a bona fide resident of this area, they’ve known me since my childhood. I 
have been living with them for a very long time. I fought my election among them. They 
knew me well, which was a plus, as they were very clear on my image.160 
 
 Being a local is particularly important in making parshads accessible to constituents: 
 
People have an expectation that the parshad should be a local. If you fight an election 
here, but people have to travel far to get to your house, they don’t want that. People like a 
parshad who is a local and whom they have known for a while.161 
 
Domestic Responsibilities. Moving beyond the north/south dichotomy, women across India are 
saddled with extensive domestic responsibilities. Depending on the level of her new family’s 
wealth, women entering an affinal household are generally given the heaviest load. This may 
decrease over time in larger families as younger wives join the family and take on these 
responsibilities, or if the family is able to hire outside help. Several women parshads mentioned 
the difficulties they faced in balancing their official responsibilities alongside caring for their 
family and managing the house: 
                                                          
 
159 Interview with male parshad on 11/11/2016 in Jaipur. 
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Women already have the responsibility of the household, and you can’t afford to work as 
a parshad all the time, you have to look after your family as well.162  
Along with this [being parshad], I manage my kids, my family. I have to go to family 
gatherings alongside my JMC work. I am doing all my domestic duties alongside my 
JMC work.163 
 
Balancing parshad responsibilities alongside raising young children is particularly problematic 
for parshads who are also mothers:  
It has been very difficult for her to manage the JMC and the household. She does not 
have any household help, and is the mother of a baby and a young boy.164 
 
Mothers are expected to be the primary caretakers of children, especially the very young. 
This responsibility can make engaging fully as parshad challenging for mothers both in terms of 
time availability and in terms of normative expectations. The narratives provide several 
examples that illustrate social expectations that women should stay at home with their young 
children. One husband discussed his wife’s need to stay at home after giving birth, despite being 
elected parshad:  
Women don’t go out into the field [public], but I don’t believe that women can’t go into 
the field. In my case she was pregnant after we got elected, and now we have a very 
young daughter, so it’s not possible for her to go into the field because she would have to 
take our daughter and she’s too young to go out into the field.165  
 
For many women, this responsibility does not diminish until the children grow older: 
My husband is very helpful also… He tells me that now that our children are older, I 
should focus on my JMC work, he can help with the house.166 
 
                                                          
 
162 Interview with husband of female parshad on 03/27/2017 in Jaipur. 
163 Interview with female parshad on 04/07/2017 in Jaipur. 
164 Fieldnotes from interview with female parshad on 10/20/2016 in Jaipur. 
165 Interview with husband of female parshad on 03/22/2017 in Jaipur. 




Previous research has found that women in India with more domestic responsibilities are less 
likely to be politically active and compete in local elections (Chhibber, 2002). Chhibber finds 
that as time spent on household duties increased, the likelihood that a respondent was a candidate 
in local elections decreased. Conversely, as women become more independent of responsibilities 
at home, they become more active participants in political life. As expected, those women who 
do compete tend to have a higher family income, which allows them to hire outside help to free 
them from some household duties. Interestingly, the selection effect that Chhibber describes 
should make it more likely that the women who are able to compete in parshad elections are 
independent, as they would have considerably more time to dedicate to politics than the women 
who are saddled with more domestic work. However, this selection effect assumes the agency of 
these women. As the narratives from Chapter Six demonstrated, many women parshads who are 
highly-dependent did not independently make the decision to run for office. They were often 
encouraged, convinced, or basically told they were running. Agency was primarily in the hands 
of their husbands or fathers in these situations. Furthermore, these women likely knew from the 
beginning that their husbands would be carrying out most of the responsibilities, and thus the full 
parshad burden would not fall on them. Both dynamics create a disconnect between household 
responsibilities and the decision to compete in elections, which makes the selection effect largely 
inapplicable in the cases of highly-dependent women. However, Chhibber’s argument does 
appear to apply to the ability of women to attain independence while in office. The primary relief 
for Indian women at home is the contribution of family or the hiring of household help to assist 





My family gives me support so I have no problems on the domestic front.167 
 
We live in a joint family so there was always someone to help look after children.168  
 
Sometimes I have to go out [on parshad work], and my child is young, but my mother-in-
law is here to take care of her... Since my family is very supportive I don’t find it overly 
difficult to manage these things.169  
 
In comparison, one independent woman parshad who did have help at home contrasted 
her own experience to the challenges other women parshads often faced in managing the office 
and family responsibilities, which encourages them to leave parshad work to their husbands: 
 
In many cases when a seat is reserved for a woman, her family or her husband pressure 
her into running, but then the husband will run the office. Due to their family 
circumstances, often these women have the double responsibility of both household and 
JMC. But since I live in a joint family I have no domestic responsibilities, so I can 
dedicate myself to my JMC work.170 
 
Notably, all five women parshads who were marked as independent mentioned in their 
narratives that they had help at home with household work.171 On the other hand, only two out of 
the ten women parshads marked as highly-dependent mentioned having help at home. While not 
a systematic comparison, as parshads were not specifically asked during the interviews if they 
had help at home, the parshads who mentioned it generally brought it up on their own, it appears 
                                                          
 
167 Interview with female parshad on 11/30/2016 in Jaipur. 
168 Interview with husband of female parshad on 11/10/2016 in Jaipur. 
169 Interview with female parshad on 03/27/2017 in Jaipur. 
170 Interview with female parshad on 12/10/2016 in Jaipur. 
171 One parshad did not mention it verbally, but her household help was present during the interview, doing the 






reasonable to assume that help at home makes it more likely a parshad will be more 
independent, but does not guarantee it.172  
 As discussed in Chapter Seven, a key enabler for most of the independent women is 
likely wealth and class. Four out of the five independent women lived or worked in locations that 
indicated relative wealth. Wealth and class can make the path to independence for women 
politicians significantly easier. Naukars (house servants) can be hired to take over household and 
familial responsibilities and free up time for political work. Women from the upper-classes also 
receive more education and come from more educated parents, which often translates into a less 
constraining youth that allows for more public and political experience for young women. Still, 
several highly-dependent women appeared to come from relative wealth as well, so the 
correlation is not absolute. Wealth may make independence more likely, but it does not 
guarantee it. 
Work Outside the Home. As women are freed of domestic responsibilities, they are also more 
likely to work outside of the household, which again encourages more active participation in 
political life (Chhibber, 2002). Working outside both indicates a more open familial attitude on 
female behavior and assists a woman in asserting a more independent role within the household 
by providing both income and public experience. Furthermore, cross-nationally, Iversen and 
Rosenbluth (2008: 486) find that “as women enter the labor market, they become part of 
networks and organizations (such as unions) where they are more likely to be exposed to 
political discussion and advocacy, which in turn encourages interest and involvement in 
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politics”.173 India overall continues to have very low rates of female labor force participation. At 
30-percent of the total eligible female population, India is well below the global average of 50-
percent, with the gender gap between working males and females one of the highest across G-20 
economies at 50-percent (Das et al, 2015).174 Rajasthan itself has above average levels of female 
participation in the workforce at 35-percent, which are only 16-percent lower than male levels, 
but still far below global averages.175  
These conclusions are partially born out across the parshad narratives. Out of the 23 
women interviewed, only seven reported working outside the house prior to becoming parshad 
in some form of paid work, with teacher being the primary occupation, while 14 of the 18 men 
reported working, mainly running private businesses. However, while one of the ten highly-
dependent women reported working outside the house, she was a teacher in a government school, 
only two of the five independent women as well reported working. This is not the stark contrast 
we would expect based on the literature discussed. Interestingly, most of the women who 
reported working (four) were categorized as moderately-dependent. This corresponds with the 
finding from their narratives that most moderately-dependent women appeared capable of taking 
on the parshad duties, but did not have the time due to outside responsibilities such as running 
the family shop. However, the narratives do support Chhibber’s (2002) assertion that public 
experience is important. For many of the female parshads, instead of paid work, this consisted of 
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volunteer work in their communities. Ten women reported engaging in volunteer work 
supporting the community, alongside thirteen men, and all five independent women reported 
doing so. In comparison, only two of the ten highly-dependent women parshads reported 
engaging outside of the house in any form. Moreover, nine out of the 23 total women reported 
rarely engaging outside of the house in either work or social activities, generally describing their 
lifestyle as “housewives”, and seven of these women were highly-dependent.176 For these 
women, the public engagement required by the parshad office was a significant and often 
intimidating change for them: 
My life has changed after becoming a parshad, before I never went out, but now I have 
to.177 
My wife does have problems in the general board meetings of the JMC, its evident that 
she has been a housewife for a very long time and now suddenly has to go out in public 
and speak in support of people’s problems.178 
 
Comparatively, several independent female parshads spoke of the public experience they gained 
from volunteering in their community: 
I was constantly in social work related to women before being a parshad. I was also 
managing an education institution by myself, and taught there.179  
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Before becoming a parshad, I was a housewife, but was very active in social work. There 
are plenty of NGOs working in this area… I used to work with them regularly. Secondly, 
I am very active in spiritual programs as well.180 
 
And previous work outside often initiated political engagement: 
I wasn’t interested in politics, I wanted to do social service, to help the people in the 
slums. I started my social work in a slum area. I worked for children to get an education, 
for women to get exposure outside of the household so they can do things on their own… 
Once my oldest son was old enough, when the next elections came up and the seat was 
reserved for a woman, local people demanded that I run for the parshad seat.181 
When asked about challenges for women entering politics, several male parshads agreed that 
having prior social experience outside of the house made it much easier for women to make the 
transition. A summary of one of these conversations after the recorder was turned off: 
There is a difference between a housewife and a working woman coming into politics. 
Housewives do not have the general experience of being outside the home and interacting 
with people, or an understanding of the basics of city and infrastructure workings. While 
working women have a better understanding of these things, they in turn don’t have the 
time to dedicate to their political work, because most wives, working or not, are still 
expected to take care of household chores and responsibilities. Both facts disadvantage 
women in comparison to men, who have both the understanding and the time to devote to 
politics. Therefore, women are initially dependent on men to get anything done in the 
JMC, as they don’t have the experience.182 
 
In sum, participation in the workforce appears to be low among female parshads prior to 
running for office, but this does not appear to significantly influence independence, as both 
highly-dependent and independent women do not report working much. Simply the act of getting 
out of the house in independent activity, such as community service, appears to be the critical 
variable. This is where many of the independent women took an interest to politics, gained 
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public experience, and established an identity and confidence independent of their family. Most 
highly-dependent women did not have this experience and thus did not receive many of these 
benefits, which likely made politics a daunting prospect to take on independently.  
Societal Normative Constraints 
For women who have been able to establish a level of independence in their familial 
environment that allows increased engagement in politics, prevailing societal norms create an 
additional barrier to participation. As with student politics, the political environment in general is 
often perceived as unsuitable for women, both due to disreputable associations and the need for 
action that is allegedly difficult for women to perform. These normative beliefs have deep 
cultural roots that are changing, but very slowly and with strong resistance. Furthermore, these 
perceptions are not entirely restricted to men, as several narratives and participant observations 
demonstrate that women themselves are hesitant to fully engage in the political environment, 
primarily due to a lack of experience, overwrought bureaucracy, and highly masculinized norms 
of engagement. Overall, the combination of socially-imposed constraints with the political reality 
creates an environment that discourages women from participating, and for those who do, 
significant obstacles exist that make full and successful engagement very difficult. Below, I 
highlight the societal perception of politics as dirty and its constraining effects on women, note 
the similarities between Hinduism and Islam in the establishment of this constraint, and discuss 
the difficulties women face in entering challenging political environments.  
Dirty Politics and Protection. As with student politics, the political environment in general is 
seen as a polluted arena, which is both populated by corrupted actors and contaminates those 
who enter it. This perception often leads to familial resistance to proposed candidature, even for 




My family’s attitude towards this [politics], since none of them are connected to politics, 
is that they think it’s a dirty job, and dirty people join it, or they become dirty after 
joining. So, my family was against it. Simple, clean people should not join politics.183 
 
And this male parshad: 
My parents were initially against me running, they said it [politics] is a criminal 
profession, in which people don’t care for simple or honest people. At that time there 
were people who gave it a bad image by threatening people.184 
  
This perception is certainly not unique to Rajasthan or India, but when combined with the 
normative need to preserve women as pure and unsullied that is culturally common in South 
Asia, it creates a particularly significant barrier to entry for women.  
More importantly, female political participation challenges the cultural imposition of a 
gender-exclusive responsibility upon women to preserve their family’s standing and “honor”. 
Returning to Dyson and Moore’s (1983) “northern system”, the patrilineal normative structure 
alloys male “honor, reputation, and consequently their power” to the chastity and purity of their 
female members (44). The connection between male honor and female purity stems from the 
traditional role women play in the production of heirs and the formation of alliances through 
marriage. Any action that challenges this purity, i.e. a woman’s engagement in a polluting 
activity such as political engagement, threatens both a family’s reputation, and by “tainting” the 
woman involved, weakens the patriarch’s ability to gain further power and influence by marrying 
her off, as her desirability as a bride may diminish. Again, this dynamic does not prevail to the 
same degree across all of India, it is less common in the south, but it does continue to hold 
significant sway in societal perceptions and thus women’s political engagement in more 
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conservative areas such as Rajasthan. Narratives from several husbands discussed how important 
“female dignity” is and how easily it can be sullied: 
I believe that when you allow women to go onto the battlefield (the political 
environment) you never know what someone might say about her or to her. I believe that 
we hold our own dignity in our hands. That’s why she takes on the responsibility of the 
household, and work related to the JMC (bureaucracy), but not the public dealing... You 
are never sure how people will behave with a woman, so we don’t want her to be 
involved in that. Therefore, it is only me who does the [public parshad] work and other 
issues.185 
 
And male parshads on the breadth of restrictions imposed: 
Women differ from men in a few cases, she won’t be able to go out into her ward late at 
night. Indian culture also restricts some actions of women, like they cannot hear swear 
words, they can’t be angry at someone, and they cannot go alone. All these things make 
them different from men.186 
 
One father, who was running the seat for his recently elected daughter, discussed how her 
obscurity could protect her from insult: 
When such a young girl comes into politics… people make inappropriate and insulting 
comments about her, like she doesn’t deserve the position. So, the fact that people don’t 
know her could save her from these comments. 
 
He also noted how his support for her political engagement was unusual:  
Even though I support my daughter, this situation is uncommon, most daughters would 
have less support.187  
 
Discussing the aspects of the job that were difficult for women, other men argued that 
“fieldwork”, engaging with constituents and contractors, was problematic for women: 
Sometimes you get calls very early in the morning or late at night, times when a lady is 
unable to go out into the field, so men have to go. Also, people use bad language 
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sometimes, and sometimes, when you are unable to fulfill everyone’s goals, you get 
cursed at.188 
 
Other professions were understood to be better suited for women:  
I believe that this [parshad] is a field job, and in India sitting jobs are considered better 
for women. In this job you have to hear bad language from people, people who don’t 
understand the system and use foul language.189  
 
Notably, these norms have been internalized or accepted by many women parshads, both 
independent and dependent, who claimed that going into the field and interacting with the public 
was difficult and problematic at times, particularly at the beginning of their term: 
Initially it was uncomfortable being a woman going out and meeting with constituents, 
but that has disappeared.190  
 
Companions were often necessary: 
The only difference from male parshads is that we are unable to go alone to many places. 
We have to have a driver or a companion, then we can go. If a woman can drive, then she 
can go by herself. The main problem is that I need a companion with me all the time.191  
 
When I can, I go out, but when its late, after eight or nine pm, then I will take my mother 
or father with me, as I am a lady, I prefer to not go out after nine pm.192 
 
The narratives also speak to class-based restrictions on female movement, specifically the 
perceived danger of going into lower-class areas and being around men alone: 
The problem I faced was that since it (part of her ward) was a slum area, because of the 
population’s bad habits, drunkenness, after eight pm, it was not a good place for a woman 
to be around. So, I could only campaign during the day in these areas. The men there are 
gone during the day because they are labor workers, so I could campaign when only 
women were around…  
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Conditions improved when her campaign shifted to higher-class neighborhoods: 
 
In the second election, I could campaign till 11pm instead, better educated, safer 
environment.193  
 
However, some women parshads argued that being a woman can make constituent engagement 
easier: 
I think being a female candidate was also a benefit for me. People are not as blunt as 
usual, and secondly, female voters were very impressed by me. Every time I would visit a 
house, they would offer me tea or coffee. Sometimes they would say, oh you are Sama 
Goswami, we have seen your posters on the street.194  
 
The external constraints imposed by a patriarchal society and the internal constraints 
imposed on themselves by women combine to make politics a very difficult arena for women to 
enter, and if they do, extremely challenging to act autonomously within. Notably, many of these 
constraints can be ameliorated by the presence of a male family member. Accompanied women 
can stay out later, engage with more constituents, and work with contractors to a greater extent 
than unaccompanied women, as the social censure decreases and women tend to feel safer. 
However, this also encourages dependence on male family members. 
Religious Influence: Hindu versus Muslim Norms. A note on the role of religious norms should 
be made to address inevitable questions on differences between parshads from Hindu and 
Islamic communities. The role of religion in generating social values that restrict the ability of 
women to engage in politics has been well documented (Norris & Inglehart, 2001). Specifically, 
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religion influences gender-specific participatory norms that govern political engagement. As 
Isaksson et al. (2014) point out, Islam is commonly singled out as a religion which singularly 
reinforces traditional gender norms that discourage female political participation (Blaydes & 
Linzer, 2008; Inglehart & Norris, 2003a, 2003b), or at least Islam in the Arab world (Norris, 
2009). The narratives from Muslim parshads do label Muslim communities as restrictive for 
women, as the husband of one parshad described their campaign: 
She (his wife) had a team of 15-20 women. The women’s team went door to door, 
because in Muslim communities, women usually do not come out of the house, and the 
women’s team could go inside the house (where men could not).195  
 
When discussing with a husband the reasons for why his parshad wife was unable to engage 
fully in her work: 
Another reason is that in the Muslim community, the movement of women is very 
restricted.196 
 
A woman parshad commented on her community’s resistance to her habit of not donning the 
burqa at all times: 
We are Muslims, and we all have those relatives who comment on how she does not wear 
the burqa like the others, but in reality, I still wear the burqa whenever it is required. 
They used to say to my father why are you giving her so much freedom, you are allowing 
her to go out of the house and do such things.  
 
Although she also questioned the traditions of some of her Hindu colleagues: 
Most of the women parshads I know are not very active, sometimes people will come 
from different wards to me for signature on their behalf. Sometimes women parshads 
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don’t want to come to the office, because they want to keep the purdah, why didn’t they 
have their husbands run instead for the office?197 
 
I interviewed four women from Muslim communities, and three of them were highly 
dependent on their husbands or fathers. While significant, it does not negate the fact that the 
remaining seven highly-dependent parshads came from Hindu communities. Following the 
discussion on joint families and the practice of purdah, many Hindu communities assign 
powerful gender roles that restrict the public engagement of women comparative to certain 
Islamic practices. From personal experience, I found that many Hindu women were just as 
constrained and restricted from public activity as their Muslim counterparts.198 As in many 
countries where Muslims are the minority, in India much is made of the practice of wearing the 
burqa, but less outrage is expressed regarding purdah. At least in the Indian context, 
axiomatically characterizing Islam as more repressive for women and other religions as less so is 
not accurate. From my experience, a conservative household is a conservative household, 
whether Hindu or Muslim. More useful insight will be gleaned by investigating the influence of 
pervasive communalism, ethnic violence, governmental negligence, and lack of public services 
on the preservation of patriarchy in an oppressed community. 
Difficult Environments: Negotiating the Bureaucracy and Legislators. Across women and men, 
parshads face considerable difficulties in dealing with both the bureaucracy of the JMC and with 
one another. Parshads must regularly interact with JMC bureaucrats to push through constituent 
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requests for public benefits and to receive approval for ward projects that rely on JMC funding. 
Nearly every parshad mentioned that working with JMC bureaucrats was very difficult, 
particularly in their first term before they “figured it out”. Complaints range from officials 
ignoring their requests, a lack of funding, partisan discrimination, a lack of cooperation from the 
mayor’s office, complex paperwork and documentation requirements, confusing departmental 
jurisdictions, corrupt contractors, the list goes on. Both women: 
I don’t think any of the parshads understand the JMC process completely.199 
 
The bureaucracy is the major problem in working with JMC, they constantly give you the 
run around, bring this document, bring that document.200 
 
And men: 
All the departments for development in Jaipur, PHED, JDA, RSEB, they do not work in 
sync. They lack communication, which results in one job having to be done again and 
again.201 
There are so many liabilities and restrictions when working with the JMC. We have 
problems with both obtaining funds and getting through the bureaucracy. Problems with 
authority and funds. Bureaucracy is all over the place.202 
 
However, the challenge for women is enhanced by a bureaucracy that is overwhelmingly 
dominated by men, as these male parshads discussed: 
It can be difficult for women to do this (parshad work), because before the elections they 
had not had this sort of exposure. Suddenly they come into this job and they have to get 
their work done through male officers, and the male officers can be aggressive. This can 
be hard for women.203  
 
If male parshads have to literally fight with JMC officers to get their work done then that 
means its likely much worse for women parshads. For example, there is a parshad from 
my MLA constituency, she cried one time when arguing with the officers. She had tears 
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in her eyes when trying to deal with a request for manhole covers and sewer jetting 
machines. This problem is not due to the inability of the female parshad, it is because of 
the bureaucracy. The JMC officer corps is not very good.204 
 
Several women parshads specifically emphasized that their lack of experience when they joined 
the JMC made it especially difficult, but improved over time:  
Initially it was very difficult to interact with officials, I didn’t have experience with that. I 
didn’t know if what they were saying was positive or negative, but now I understand the 
system and process well.205 
 
I was hesitant to ask officers to assist me or to get work done, but over time I have 
become more experienced and comfortable getting things done.206  
 
Those women who did not face considerable trouble often relied upon their husbands to smooth 
the interaction: 
Working with the JMC I don’t have any problems, because I had the support of someone 
in the JMC, and my husband is in the construction business.207 
 
My husband helped me a lot, starting from the campaign and asking for a ticket 
(nomination) to my working style in JMC – how I should talk with officers and other 
work-related help was provided by him.208 
 
Legislative bodies in India also continue to be uncomfortable environments for many 
women because of patriarchal norms. Women often face harassment and slander is common by 
their male colleagues, who do not see political engagement as appropriate for women (Guha, 
1974). In the JMC, no woman mentioned serious harassment from their colleagues, but the JMC 
is a challenging environment for all new parshads, particularly women. The general board 
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meetings (GBM) are a prime example. These meetings are usually held monthly, and are an 
opportunity for parshads to discuss and debate important issues. Most importantly, they provide 
a platform for all parshads to let the executive and bureaucracy know what issues their 
constituents face that are not being adequately addressed by the JMC. However, this 
environment tends to be aggressive, intimidating, and highly masculinized. Several women 
parshads discussed the challenge they faced in GBM discussions: 
My husband pushes me to speak more in meetings, so now I have started to speak more, 
you have to speak in meetings to make sure others know the problems your ward is 
facing.209 
 
Her husband tells her to speak in the JMC meetings as she is very hesitant to do so. He 
says if you don’t speak then you won’t make any progress. If you want to say something 
then just say it.210 
 
Correspondingly, several men commented on the difficulties that their wives and other women 
parshads, particularly those without significant public experience, have had when they are thrust 
into the spotlight: 
She (his wife, the parshad) does not get the chance to speak much at the meetings, 
because a few people speak for a long time and very loudly.211 
 
Still, a few men mentioned facing this problem as well: 
It was difficult for me in the beginning for me to speak in the big JMC general body 
meetings. I was worried about making mistakes, what will I say, how will I say it.212  
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Upon attending these meetings myself, I found the environment quite intimidating and 
overwhelming at times as an observer in the public viewing gallery, let alone on the floor itself. 
From my fieldnotes for the first meeting: 
The first thing I notice when I enter the gallery is the prevalence of men. There are only 
men across both the viewing and media galleries overlooking the floor. The gallery 
becomes packed over time, at least 100 at the high point. The lone exception was an older 
woman who offered me food, and later one more woman came in to sit next to a man, 
probably her husband. She really stands out. However, you get used to it over time, as 
most public areas and businesses tend to be dominated by men in Jaipur. On the floor 
itself, the only women are the parshads themselves. The center table for top JMC 
officials is entirely men. These are the officials all parshads must interact with at some 
point to get their work done, projects approved, and funds allocated.213 
 
Floor speeches by the parshads themselves were generally centered on complaints of 
JMC or mayoral inaction, or calls to action on important issues. These speeches were regularly 
interrupted by other parshads who loudly call out their support or objections to what is said. It 
often appears to be centered on displays of dominance, again from my fieldnotes: 
Men often engaged in a bait and switch tactic against their opponents. They wait for the 
target of their attack to respond to their accusations, then after a few moments they start 
shouting them down. It appears to be a way to demonstrate superiority, particularly for 
the media cameras and constituents in the viewing gallery, who regularly chuckle and 
clap at the displays. 
 
Women who attempt to engage are often unable to compete: 
Mrs. Goswami stands up in the middle of one of the male parshad’s longer speeches and 
tries to object to what was being said. I cannot hear her as she is drowned out by the 
continual shouting, and eventually she sits down. The men just keeping going, arguing 
and yelling unperturbed. She raises her hand, apparently asking the mayor to recognize 
her, no one does. This is the only time I see anyone raise their hand the whole day. She 
tries to get in her objection once more, and is again unsuccessful. Her voice is not loud 
enough to be heard as the men shout at each other. She gives up, visibly frustrated…It 
becomes obvious that unless you can physically shout down the people speaking, you are 
not likely to get a comment in. 
 
                                                          
 




Mrs. Mohania tries to cut into the shouting match that followed the speech on cow 
protection. She only manages a few audible sentences in the tumult, and stops trying after 
a minute. As she tries to argue with the mayor, her mic keeps turning off and she keeps 
turning it back on. Everyone is yelling over each other. 214 
However, one experienced, older woman was able to quiet the crowd and make an extensive 
point, perhaps because of her standing: 
Mrs. Tiwari stands up and gives an extended speech, with very little interruption. She is 
older, perhaps respect is being shown to an elder?215  
 
The second meeting I attended quickly progressed from verbal quarrels to physical altercations. 
Much of the Congress opposition, sensing the unpopularity of the mayor and an opportunity to 
embarrass him when they were allegedly not given the agenda ahead of time, left their seats and 
gathered in front of the mayor’s desk, chanting and yelling: 
It is all men at the front of the group except for one older woman. The rest of the women 
are at the back of the group. The male parshads chant loudly over the official report 
being read by the mayor. Women are not participating in the shouting or chanting, they 
generally stand quietly at the back of the group, or stay in their seats. The BJP majority 
pounds their tables in support of the official report…After returning to their seats for a 
time, 15 male parshads come back up to the mayor’s desk and continue yelling and 
chanting. Eventually, for reasons unknown to me, one male parshad is bodily picked up 
by four security guards and carried out of the chamber.216 
 
This aggressive legislative environment composed of large numbers of men is likely very 
intimidating for women parshads, especially when intensified by traditional norms that 
discourage female public engagement with men. Adding to the pressure, during my participant 
observations I saw several husbands and fathers of multiple parshads in the gallery, whom I 
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recognized from previous interviews, watching and occasionally gesturing towards their parshad 
down on the floor. These normative pressures combine to significantly constrain the vocal 
engagement of women parshads in the general board meetings. While a small number of men 
dominated the overall debate, most male parshads got in a word at some point. However, the 
opposite appeared true for women. Generally, four to five at most tried to engage regularly in the 
meetings I attended, with a few more who spoke rarely. Most women sat together in groups 
chatting amongst themselves but never publicly speaking, often veiled and separate from the 
men. The only exception was the required public account of their ward each parshad was 
required to give, as one-by-one, every parshad would stand up and address the whole chamber, 
many from a prepared statement.217 
Patriarchal Norms Create Dependence 
The comprehensive circumscription of women from the public realm via normative 
constraints and gendered family traditions across Rajasthan has established a system that brings 
new women each electoral cycle into the political arena with little political experience, few 
political connections and little standing within their party, who are often uncomfortable in public 
spaces, and finally, continue to be normatively discouraged from engaging fully in the political 
office. Furthermore, as discussed in Chapter Three, with only five incumbents out of 31 women 
currently in the JMC, any experience gained by women while in office is generally lost with the 
significant turnover. Based on this reality, it is no surprise that many of these women are 
dependent on men who do have the necessary experience, connections, social agency and 
                                                          
 




sanction needed to gain electoral office and effectively carry out the responsibilities of that 
office.  
Across the narratives of female parshads, nearly everyone mentioned some degree of 
male sponsorship, ranging from men who provide initial assistance in campaigning or interacting 
with the bureaucracy before stepping aside, to men who assist in the daily activities of the office 
in a cooperative arrangement, to the men who push their wives or daughters as proxy parshads in 
the election then assume most of the official roles themselves. Sponsorship has been 
demonstrated to be key to success elsewhere, as women who lack a sponsor in the US are much 
less likely to progress in the business world than those who do (Hewlett et al, 2010).    
Male involvement is crucial from the beginning. When asked about what drove their 
political interest, many women parshads (or their husbands) described the pivotal role male 
family members played in their entry into politics. Both highly-dependent women: 
In her family, there were no political relations at all. As you can see, nobody in my 
family was in politics, so all the ideas of social service and politics came from me [her 
husband].218  
Her family doesn’t have any connection to politics, it all started with me [her husband].219 
 And independent women: 
My father in law was in politics for a long time and encouraged me to stand for election 
in 2009. My father and mother had little political interest or connections.220 
My husband has been a big support for me. Since I had no political background, I was 
unaware of the ins and outs of politics. My husband helped me a lot, starting from the 
campaign and asking for a ticket.221 
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In all these cases, men are essential to gaining political office. Political connections are key in 
Rajasthani politics to both the party nomination process and to running a successful campaign. 
Following Dyson and Moore’s (1983) discussion of the northern kinship system that is common 
in Rajasthan, relationships are often gender exclusive, with the closest ties between men, 
particularly natal brothers. Therefore, to gain access to important men, aspiring women 
politicians generally need to go through a male intermediary. Furthermore, as women join their 
new affinal families upon marriage, they lose their natal ties and must adopt the networks of their 
new family, which generally run through her husband or father-in-law. 
Within the narratives, male parshads were much more likely than their female colleagues 
to be personally connected to key political agents. 20 parshads overall reported having some 
form of general connection either to the party, to local or state-level political leaders, community 
leaders, or JMC bureaucrats. Of these, 12 were personal connections (generally friends, 
colleagues, or family), but only four women had these close relationships. The remaining eight 
parshads with general connections only had second-hand connections that ran through 
intermediaries. All were women. Men are much more likely to have close, personal connections 
with key agents than women.  
Key to this discrepancy is the simple fact that men dominate both the bureaucratic and 
political realms. Data at the state level is difficult to obtain, but 2010 surveys across the national 




percent.222 It may be slightly higher in the lower, state-level services, and have improved in the 
past decade, but likely only marginally. Correspondingly, out of 200 MLAs in the Rajasthan 
Legislative Assembly, only 27 are currently women, and of the eight MLAs elected in Jaipur, 
only one is a woman. Regardless of where parshads turn to in the bureaucracy or higher-level 
politicians, they are largely dealing with men. This is borne out in the narratives as well. Of the 
20 narratives that described general connections with a key agent, only four of these agents were 
women, the rest were men: 
My husband’s eldest brother has been active in politics for the last 35 years. My husband 
has six brothers and he’s the youngest. They were all kind of involved in politics, the 
eldest brother the most... When my husband got a government job he also left politics, 
but he wanted to still be active, so he asked me to get involved in politics. My husband 
got me in contact with leaders from our own community.223 
 
As discussed in the previous section, relationship norms that discourage inter-gender interaction 
outside the family force women to network with key male sponsors through male family 
members, often their husband or father-in-law: 
Before only my husband was active in politics, for 40 years. When I became a parshad, I 
had no previous political experience, affiliation, or interest. I was behind him. He has 
known the current MLA for the last 40 years.224 
 
Alternatively, women must network with men who they are comfortable with from within their 
community. As the sponsor of one female parshad described during an interview, male 
sponsorship is often integral to receiving a nomination and winning a campaign: 
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When we decided to project her as a candidate, my elder brother met with her and took 
her under his guidance. First off, we pushed for a ticket from Congress. In this, my 
brother helped her meet with the most senior leaders in the party. My family has a great 
history in Rajasthan politics. In the 1956 elections, the first, my grandfather became 
Deputy Home Minster, in 1980 my uncle became MLA from this constituency, in 1998 
again my uncle was elected as MLA, and then became a Minister. This tradition is carried 
on by my elder brother who was parshad for this area for the previous 10 years. We 
brought her along. We knew her from childhood, she was like family to us. She has been 
a person always associated with my family. We believed in her. She was a good 
candidate, with a passion for helping people. We started our campaign by taking her 
around the ward. In the end we won the election very easily.225  
After gaining office, connections are also important to accomplishing goals, particularly 
delivering public goods to the parshad’s ward. The most useful connections go through the JMC 
bureaucracy itself, the officers who approve requests, disburse funds, and arrange for work to be 
done; through the local MLA, who can pressure the bureaucracy or fund projects themselves 
from a personal MLA fund they have access to; or through the mayoral office, which can also 
influence the bureaucracy or approve funds for specific projects. Both male parshads rely on 
these connections: 
Initially, I also struggled in the JMC for the first time, but slowly I got the hang of things. 
Whenever some work was getting delayed, I contacted my MLA and with their help, all 
my problems were resolved.226  
 
And female parshads: 
Because the parshad quota budget isn’t always enough, there are some issues in dealing 
with problems, so I focus on the most problematic areas first, and then if it gets out of 
hand I’ll go to MP/MLA for help. A lot of work has been done through their funds.227  
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Gaining this kind of access does not appear to be an issue for women. 26 parshads overall 
reported receiving or expecting to receive some assistance/contribution to their ward from the 
mayor’s office, or their respective MLA or MP, and 15 of these were women. However, as 
discussed, these relationships likely go through male intermediaries.  
Finally, given the gender disparity in political experience discussed previously, men are 
more likely to have the background and know-how required for effective campaigning, winning 
elections, and engaging the bureaucracy. As one woman described, her entire campaign was 
managed by a male sponsor: 
Mostly, women parshads are dependent on their fathers and their husbands, but since my 
husband has died, I don’t have that luxury... My whole campaign was managed by the ex-
parshad himself... In the election, I didn’t know about anything, it was all managed by 
him.228 
 
Men also have more experience in engaging with the JMC bureaucracy. As this same parshad 
describes, her male sponsor was helpful in getting her acclimated to the point that she can now 
act independently:  
I was not very active in politics before, so I was not familiar with how the JMC works. 
But the ex-parshad from my area, he gave me training. To be honest, it didn’t take very 
long to figure it out. I also used to go with women to deal with pension and other related 
problems at the JMC, and in this way I learned a lot… I know the JMC works in a 
particular way... In that, my maternal uncle helped me a lot. He told me how to prepare a 
tender, meet the CEO, take files from the mayor, but slowly I got better and now I work 
independently. Still, if I need help I can call him anytime.229 
This narrative demonstrates both why so many female parshads are dependent on the men 
around them, but also how many women have used that experience as a foundation to assert 
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themselves. Finally, men are also much more likely to have the neighborhood experience and 
name recognition key to winning over voters. This female parshad discussed using her 
husband’s reputation from his time as a parshad previously in her campaign: 
Now many people knew my husband, and we already had an image… I had a signature 
line… I would say, “you should visit our older ward, if anyone can say that our old 
parshad (her husband) was inactive or didn’t cooperate, then don’t vote for me.”230 
 Conclusions 
The prevalence of dependence among women parshads highlights the tension between 
the institutional quotas designed to improve female political participation and the persistent 
patriarchal norms that continue to restrict such behavior. This chapter has described and shown 
how parental and societal attitudes on political engagement for young women, gendered family 
traditions that significantly alter the accessibility of the political environment to married women, 
societal normative constraints on women engaging in public and political actions, and 
challenging institutional environments erect barriers across the entirety of a woman’s lifetime. 
These barriers reduce experiential knowledge and political capability for most women to the 
point that to pursue political office effectively, women must rely upon the support of men. 
Overall, this reliance significantly reduces the ability of institutional quotas to bring women into 
office who can substantively represent their constituents.  
In Chapter Seven, I demonstrated how several women in the JMC have become as 
independent as their male colleagues by leveraging male support when required and over time 
developing and maintaining autonomy. However, even in those cases, male support continued to 
be integral to their continued autonomy, and thus could be revoked. Problematically in terms of 
                                                          
 




establishing sustainable substantive representation for women, this dynamic demonstrates that 
gender quotas are unable to completely overcome the persistent patriarchal norms that have been 
described in this chapter. While a quota can put a woman in office, it cannot ensure her 
independence. This weakness in the gender quota institution, and possible methods of addressing 





Chapter 9: Conclusions 
Soon after the 73rd and 74th amendments instituted gender reservations within a broad 
national and even international push to begin to address gender inequalities in governance 
institutions, Indian activists and feminists, while embracing the change, warned against “tokens 
and show-pieces” that utilize the women’s movement vocabulary without putting the concepts 
into practice on a comprehensive scale (Ramachandran, 1995: 49). Governmental agencies, 
politicians, NGOs, and the private sector are often willing to advertise their commitment to 
gender equality policies, particularly if additional funding is attached; however, the actual 
effectiveness of many of their efforts have been questioned. As discussed in Chapter Three, 
comparable questions on the gender reservation system have been raised on similar grounds. 
Despite the effective implementation of the reservation for over two decades, gender inequalities 
remain in party hierarchies, women continue to be kept out of key governance posts, and 
numbers at the state and national level have barely improved.  
The narratives from this book have illustrated the ability of husbands and fathers to 
manipulate the reservation system for their own benefit; however, it is evident that equality 
would be worse without it. Certainly, the parshad-pati phenomenon does not empower women 
nor address gender inequality. Moreover, it could be argued that the public demonstration of 
such obvious gender exploitation hurts gender equality efforts. The display of continuing voter 
acceptance of severe gender power imbalances may reinforce patriarchal societal norms and 
discourage the development of future women leaders. While the reality of the observed situation 
could prompt a declaration that the gender reservation has failed, instead this reality indicates 
how critical it is. Without it, gender equality in institutions such as the JMC would surely be 




participation discussed in Chapter Eight. However, attempting to determine the overall success 
or failure of the gender-reservation system based on this cross-sectional analysis of one point in 
time is not appropriate or practical. It will take decades more to truly determine whether the 
reservation contributed to gender equality in the long-term. Instead, this analysis should 
encourage a reexamination of what we expect from institutional efforts to impose gender 
equality. While useful, these institutions must function within the society that they are implanted, 
and the power of electoral institutions to modulate the influence of incredibly powerful 
patriarchal norms is limited.  
Below I review how persisting patriarchal norms and institutional vulnerabilities were 
shown in this dissertation to consistently undermine the intended goal of quotas in enhancing 
gender equality. I then discuss how, despite these undercutting factors, the reservation still 
provides essential support to the development of gender equality in India, particularly in 
comparison to the absence of a reservation. Next, I argue for revising our expectations on the 
ability of institutional fixes such as gender quotas to deliver comprehensive gender equality 
quickly in highly patriarchal environments. Finally, I conclude with possible institutional 
changes that could improve the effectiveness of the gender reservation system and areas for 
future research. 
The Persistence of Patriarchal Norms 
Persisting patriarchal norms embolden ambitious husbands or fathers who are blocked by 
the gender reservation, or unable to win on their own, to seek power through their wives or 
daughters. These same norms pressure these women to accept the parshad-pati arrangement as 
appropriate and discourages resistance. These norms also encourage voters to accept such 




within a patriarchal society has placed most of them at a severe political disadvantage and forced 
them to rely heavily on men and their families. Ideally, the support these agents provide enables 
them to act independently, but given the continuing dependence of these women, the withdrawal 
or modification of this support would considerably weaken their ability to remain independent. 
Most of these women would likely not have been successful without the expertise provided by 
their husbands and other supporting male actors. Furthermore, this reality emphasizes that the 
reservation does not intrinsically grant a woman independence. If these husbands and family had 
refused at any point to accept or support her pursuit of political office, then very likely none of 
these women would have been able to run, regardless of the reservation. The patriarchal family 
structure continues to grant male elders the power to open or block critical pathways for political 
pursuit and advancement.  
This dependence among women parshads highlights the tension between the institutional 
quotas designed to improve female political participation and these persistent patriarchal norms 
that continue to restrict such behavior. Parental and societal attitudes on political engagement for 
young women, gendered family traditions that significantly alter the accessibility of the political 
environment to married women and saddle them with considerable domestic duties, societal 
normative constraints on women engaging in public and political actions, a patrilineal familial 
structure that requires women to prioritize the interests of her husband and his family, and 
challenging institutional environments erect barriers across the entirety of a woman’s lifetime 
that an electoral institution is unable to eliminate. These barriers reduce experiential knowledge 
and political capability for most women to the point that to pursue political office effectively, 





These findings demonstrate that many of the normative restrictions that have checked 
female representation in India since independence persist. Women are still unable to conduct 
open, public campaigns and interact with constituents independently, as such outgoing behavior 
is often perceived as inappropriate for women (Singer, 2007). Women candidates are still 
hampered by fiscal and social constraints, as they are usually economically dependent on male 
family members (Guha, 1974). Institutional restrictions have persisted as well. A key restraint on 
growth continues to be party nominations. Parties are often only willing to field women 
candidates in areas they are confident of winning (Spary, 2007; Jensenius, 2018), thus limiting 
the ability of women to compete outside of gender-reserved districts.  
Institutional Vulnerabilities 
These narratives also demonstrate that the reservation as an electoral institution does not 
act independently of social norms. The core goal of the reservation is to modulate existing 
patriarchal norms that discourage the engagement of women in politics by setting aside a portion 
of political space exclusively for women. However, as these narratives reveal, the effect is not 
unidirectional. Patriarchal norms persist in the electoral space and have even manipulated the 
reservation to male advantage. The parshad-pati phenomenon exposes the inability of the 
reservation institution to prevent such an appropriation of electoral power. To prevent such 
electoral ploys, all democratic institutions rely on the discernment of voters as a backstop. When 
the voters do not censure, there is little the institution is able to do independently.  
Core democratic theory places the responsibility of choosing both desirable public 
officials and holding those who circumvent representational norms to account squarely on the 
voter (Ferejohn, 1999; Cheibub and Przeworski, 1999). Institutional design can influence both 




information available to the voter for their decision-making. Institutions can also reject 
unacceptable candidates with relatively objective characteristics, such as gender or a criminal 
history. However, such an institution has little ability to curb the parshad-pati phenomenon. 
Electoral institutions have little ability to discern between dependent and independent candidates, 
as the characteristics of each are subjective. It is difficult to envision a set of electoral laws that 
are specific enough to block highly-dependent candidates from competing in elections while still 
ensuring equal access. For example, raising minimum education requirements may combat 
dependency to some degree, but carry with it the real risk of shutting out candidates from 
disadvantaged communities. Without excessive censuring bureaucracy that would likely push out 
more women candidates than it would help, this problem cannot be legislated away. Only if 
voters change their mind on the appropriateness of parshad-patis will the current situation 
change. Voter acceptance of the parshad-pati phenomenon likely reflects common perceptions 
on the appropriateness of women in politics and their ability to succeed in such a masculine and 
challenging environment. Constituents may foresee benefits for their ward if their institutionally-
mandated female representative is in practice replaced by a man.231 This again illustrates the 
power of social norms over institutions. 
The number of highly-dependent candidates also reveals supply-side issues. A patriarchal 
environment that is often resistant to the public and political participation of women has led to a 
shortage in qualified and committed female candidates. While reservations are effective at 
establishing a minimum number of women office holders, they cannot guarantee an adequate 
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number of competitive candidates to fill those spots. While every male parshad interviewed 
described some form of past political involvement, the majority of women interviewed reported 
having no political experience prior to running for parshad. The ability of an electoral reservation 
to correct this discrepancy is limited unless it was massively expanded into additional 
institutions.  
This dissertation has also begun to answer two core questions put forth by the literature: 
do reserved seats enable women to win unreserved seats (Yoon, 2016)? Can reserved seats 
become a floor to increase representation for women, rather than a ceiling (Paxton & Hughes, 
2016)? As Chapter Three demonstrated, gender reserved seats in Jaipur have not enabled women 
to win unreserved seats to a significant degree at any level of government. Furthermore, the 
restriction of women largely to gender-reserved seats could illustrate a possible ceiling emerging 
that caps female representation at the quota established level. However, the reluctance of parties 
to nominate women outside of gender-reserved seats, and a lack of strong women candidates to 
compete in them are more to blame for any ceiling than the quota system itself. Still, these 
findings demonstrate that one of the primary long-term goals of a gender quota system – to 
develop a cadre of experienced women politicians who can compete on an equal footing with 
their male counterparts (Deininger et al, 2011) is not being realized to a significant degree. 
However, as I discuss at the end of this chapter, small changes to the reservation system could 
partially address these shortcomings. 
Reservation Benefits 
As noted, across the narratives of female parshads, nearly everyone mentioned some 
degree of male sponsorship. However, this sponsorship was not always constraining, as many 




stepped aside, or they continued to assist in the daily activities of the office in a cooperative 
arrangement. While certainly suboptimal, especially given the veto power many of these men 
still have over the political career of their wives or daughters, this reality does not necessarily 
indicate a failure of the reservation system. Again, this indicates how critical it is. If women 
parshads are still this dependent two decades into the reservation system, it is difficult to 
imagine how much more difficult it would be without the gender reservation.  
If we look at the state and national levels of government, where there are no gender 
reservations, not only are the numbers of women in office much lower, but the class of 
candidates is much different. High numbers of female politicians at these levels come from 
political families. For a woman, coming from a dynastic family helps overcome some of the 
barriers that make participation difficult for most women. These families provide the name 
recognition, contacts and funding that most aspiring women politicians lack (Jensenius, 2018). 
Furthermore, women who come from dynastic families tend to receive more support and 
encouragement than the average Indian woman, and their political participation is more likely to 
be socially accepted due to their status (Singer, 2007). Without gender reservations, we would 
likely see a similar selection effect at the local level as well.  
Given the patriarchal context, regardless of whether we consider the gender reservation a 
success or not, the fact that millions of women have achieved positions of power across urban 
and rural governance institutions (Jensenius, 2018) is undeniably positive. Whether these women 
act as proxies, work in tandem relationships, or are fully independent, most of these women 
would likely not be in politics without the reservation. Varun, my research assistant, gave me his 




Without reservations, I don’t think women would run for parshad because it takes so 
much work to get elected – they have to go outside in the streets, for such a low position. 
Politics is a dirty profession. It’s not for the soft-hearted who just want to help people. Its 
cut-throat, you must be ruthless to win, and women cannot always be like that. And, 
fathers will not encourage their daughters to go into politics if they themselves were not 
in politics. If he is in politics he can be her godfather and protect her from criticism and 
insults, and bring her into his position. But if not, then no, because he has to get her 
married, and grooms may not understand or be okay with them doing the parshad 
work.232  
 
His comments likely reflect the views of most Indians on women in politics and it demonstrates 
how difficult it continues to be to encourage women to participate. Most of the women we 
interviewed claimed that they likely would not have been interested or able to pursue such a 
career without the gender reservation. Even male parshads agreed that the reservation has been 
critical to creating opportunities for women to succeed politically: 
I believe that the gender reservation encourages female participation in politics. Since we 
are equal in population, we should have equal rights also. You have to give them a 
chance. Men and women are equal at every level, and this reservation gives them a 
platform to come forward. We [society] believe that they are not capable of doing the 
work, but if you will not give them a chance to be completely involved, then how will 
they become capable of doing this work?233 
And the husbands of female parshads: 
On the 30-percent reservation, I believe that women should be given a chance. If they are 
not given a chance then women will not come to understand the JMC. Let’s say my wife, 
who was a housewife earlier. She would know nothing of the JMC without the 
reservation, but the reservation gave her the ticket, and now she is a parshad and knows 
everything about the JMC. She can talk to the officials and can address issues in the 
general board meetings. It makes a huge difference in their life, the reservation. Men 
already know about these things, the JMC, etc., but women need a chance to also learn 
about these things.234   
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Furthermore, the women who become independent or semi-independent provide societal 
exposure to female leaders that could encourage voters to revise stereotypes and prejudices 
regarding female political leaders, which has been cited as key to improving the political 
participation of young women Elder (2004). While these narratives do not speak to constituent 
behavior, other research has found that gender reservations are also effective at shifting 
perceptions, at least in the rural Indian context (Beaman et al, 2009). Several male parshads in 
the JMC were optimistic that the reservation was having this desired effect: 
I believe that women parshads are as efficient as men can be. If we think that women are 
weak or cannot work, it is our own misconception. Take the example of our country. 
Whenever there is a work assigned to a woman, she has done it better than a man. This 
reservation has given them a chance to work. I believe that if you give her a chance, she 
will show you how efficient she can be. Without giving her a chance we can keep saying 
she is not capable of that, she cannot do any work… A lady who can manage a 
household, which is so hard to do, why would she face any complications with a field 
job?235  
Furthermore, as stereotypes and gender restrictions are broken down, female political 
participation increases. Gleason (2001) found that MLA districts with a history of female 
representation have higher female voter participation. Alongside role models, greater societal 
acceptance in turn may further encourage female candidature as the social costs of political 
participation decrease. 
Revised Expectations 
It must be reiterated that voters have not likely been deceived by parshads who are either 
highly dependent on, or in tandem arrangements with, their husbands or other supporting men. 
                                                          
 




These narratives illustrate electoral campaigns that regularly make it clear and obvious to 
constituents that their parshad will not be an independent actor. Therefore, by voting these 
candidates into office, often by large margins, most voters appear to accept this representative 
arrangement as appropriate and legitimate. In turn, this dynamic encourages further discussion 
on the concept of democratic representation. Specifically, is legitimate democratic representation 
limited to the elected individual listed on the ballot? Does the extension of representative power 
to individuals not listed on the ballot, but informally accepted by the voters to serve as their 
representative, delegitimize the democratic process? Within this discussion, considerable 
attention must be paid to the role of Western norms, particularly individualism and the 
preeminence of formal rules, in the generation of the concept of democratic representation. 
Given the more communal norms and greater acceptance of informal rules within South Asia, 
perhaps we should reconsider the blanket application of democratic concepts that were 
developed in the Western context.  
These narratives demonstrate that patriarchal norms are stubbornly persistent, and change 
is extremely gradual. However, pessimism should be tempered by a consideration of how we are 
judging these arrangements. From a Western perspective, these narratives are particularly 
problematic, as we are accustomed to individual, elected representatives making independent 
decisions. However, even in the West that reality is certainly debatable, as no representatives are 
entirely independent. To differing degrees, all representatives rely on spousal, familial, and 
collegial support and advice as well. This support is just much less public and observable than it 
is in India. Parshads are much more comfortable advertising and acknowledging the role their 
family plays in their office because it is more socially acceptable in South Asia than it would be 




context. Debating whether communal representation is compatible with true democratic 
representation is likely a dead end. It is more useful to focus on outcomes. The key question is 
whether communal support, such as that provided by a husband, family, or other community 
member, facilitates or restricts a woman’s legislative ability to act on her priorities. Using this 
standard, while many parshads were obviously restricted by their communal support, other 
women were enabled by their support networks to act on their own priorities. While still 
dependent to a degree on the men around them, this support allowed them to act on their own, 
likely at a level they would be unable to if that support was withdrawn. 
 Furthermore, we need to reconsider how we apply the concept of substantive 
representation. The narratives from Chapter Seven demonstrated that woman can enter the JMC 
comparable in independence and capability to their male colleagues, and are thus evidence of the 
ability of gender quotas to improve substantive female representation in positions of power. 
However, the literature requires a direct connection between female representatives and their 
constituency (Mansbridge, 1999; Urbinati and Warren, 2008; Weldon, 2002), which ensures that 
the women elected continue to represent the interests of their constituents, particularly women’s 
interests that have been historically neglected. The continued dependence, even for the most 
independent women parshads, on their male supporters and enablers makes this critical 
connection more tenuous. However, I argue that this does not mean that the gender quotas are 
unable to establish substantive representation for women in Jaipur, but it does indicate that once 
substantive representation is established, the possibility remains that it is not total and that it can 
be removed. Following the literature’s early push to move beyond the simple dichotomy of 
descriptive representation to the more nuanced substantive representation, this dissertation has 




representative’s autonomy, it can be partial or total, it may also be dependent on the support of 
another and thus revocable.  
Possible Institutional Improvements 
This dissertation has illustrated the often-unexpected problems that emerge when 
embedding an institution within a society. We cannot assume either that the institution will be 
able to exclude or overcome normative influences, or that normative influences that we 
inherently rely on in other contexts will be present across all societies and voters. While we may 
expect Western voters to largely reject a parshad-pati candidate, there is no inherent reason we 
should expect all societies to do the same. These narratives have also demonstrated that gender 
quotas are not quick fixes, and often have unforeseen side-effects, such as the blocking of the 
disadvantaged candidates it was designed to support discussed in Chapter Three. However, 
gender quotas have been instituted in many different forms across the globe, and adjustments to 
the current system could provide improved outcomes. Below, I discuss three possible 
modifications to the quota system that might be particularly helpful in improving the 
independence of women who enter through the gender quota system: expanded quotas, removal 
of the ban on consecutive reservations, and pay and training increases.  
Expanded Quotas. An increasing number of countries have instituted much more comprehensive 
gender quotas that apply broadly across government positions, such as cabinets, public 
administration and the judiciary, and even into the public sphere, such as labor union 
directorates, civil society organizations, and chambers of commerce (Piscopo and Muntean, 
2018). As an example, France passed an electoral gender parity law in 2000, which mandated 
equal gender representation in Senate and European parliamentary elections, and eventually 




and sports federations (Piscopo and Muntean, 2018). Following France’s example, one 
alternative in India could be to expand the gender reservation at the local level to a higher 
number, such as 50-percent, to bring more women in and possibly encourage greater 
independence across all female members. However, this likely would not erase the parshad-pati 
phenomenon, as panchayati raj institutions in Rajasthan do have a 50-percent gender reservation 
and there are still reports of extensive spousal involvement and interference (Beaman et al, 
2010). Furthermore, expanding the reservation does not address the lack of strong women 
candidates.  
Expanding gender reservations to the state and national levels, or even further into more 
governmental institutions and/or into the parties themselves could partially improve the numbers 
of strong women candidates. Group reservations already extend across all governmental 
institutions. By massively expanding the number of women in positions of power, such a move 
could both help women develop the experiential knowledge they need to be politically 
competitive in the absence of a reservation, and would require parties to build up larger cohorts 
of women candidates to compete for these positions. However, by relying on a reservation-style 
system, women will continue to only compete against women, which, as discussed in Chapter 
Three, may make not make them more competitive against men in the absence of a reservation. 
Furthermore, the expansion of the gender reservation could entrench an institution that is 
optimally temporary. Like the group reservation system, which has become politically 
untouchable, as the number of voters who benefit from a reservation increases, the more 
politically untenable it becomes for representatives to remove or modify it in the future. If the 
ultimate goal is to remove the gender reservation at some point in the future, after women have 




Another alternative could be a shift from a reservation quota system to a candidate quota 
system for women. Such a system would require parties to grant a specified minimum number or 
percentage of nominations every election to women, but specific districts would no longer be 
reserved for women. Htun (2004) argues that candidate quotas make more sense for women, as 
gender “crosscuts” political cleavages, while reservations suit ethnic groups, as these groups tend 
to align within existing cleavages. Reservations work for ethnic minorities because they 
incentivize the establishment of group-centered parties that can cater to the collective interests of 
a minority group, but simultaneously can push women’s issues lower in priority. Instead, 
candidate quotas make space within existing parties that are already aligned along existing 
cleavages, which allows women to assume a more prominent role within the party. Such a 
system could force parties to develop stronger women candidates, as they would often have to 
compete with politically experienced men. However, such a system in India would likely face 
several problems.  
First, candidate-quota systems cannot guarantee a minimum female representation, as all 
women candidates could theoretically lose, particularly if the party stands them in weak districts 
it expects to lose to protect its male candidates (Jensenius, 2018). Significant research in other 
countries has also shown that male-dominated parties have found many ways to subvert 
candidate quotas implementation (Jones, 1998; Jones, 2004; Schwindt-Bayer, 2009; Krook, 
2010). Candidate quotas work better in party-list proportional representation systems, where 
parties can be required to place women higher on the list and thus in a more winnable position. 
This is not possible in India’s SMD system. Second, candidate quotas are often abused or 
ignored if not strictly enforced (Schwindt-Bayer, 2009). In a country such as India, where parties 




disregarded. Finally, unless candidate quotas are attached to minority requirements, which would 
be difficult to do bureaucratically, then women from disadvantaged communities would likely be 
shut out (Hughes, 2011). As discussed in Chapter Three, women from the reserved communities 
(OBC/SC/ST) are already less likely than forward-caste women to challenge men in open 
elections. 
Allow Consecutive Gender Reservations. Instead of attempting to institutionalize gender equality 
by extensively expanding proscriptive rules, several small adjustments to the current system 
could yield improvements over time. The first would be to remove the prohibition on 
consecutive gender-reservations for a single ward. As discussed extensively, women entering 
politics have very little public experience, particularly political experience, and therefore rely on 
men to rectify that deficit. Furthermore, low incumbency rates result in most female parshads 
leaving after only one term, which prevents them from developing the expertise and support 
needed to compete with men in open-gender elections. As demonstrated in Chapter Three, the 
removal of a gender-reservation makes it much less likely a woman will return for a second term. 
By allowing a ward to be reserved consecutively, or even encouraging it by reserving a ward 
automatically for consecutive terms, the reservation system would likely increase the number of 
women with extensive political experience. It is notable that the group-reservation lottery has no 
restriction on consecutive reservations, and even weights certain wards to make it more likely 
they will be reserved for specific groups consecutively. The primary issue with expanding this to 
gender reservations is that while the group-reservation rules benefit men from those favored 
communities, these suggested changes would not benefit men and would therefore likely face 




Increase Pay and Training. Another small adjustment would be to increase the capabilities of the 
women already in office, primarily by increasing pay and providing training. As discussed in 
Chapter Seven, even independent women are still dependent to a degree on their spouses and 
family for support, especially financially. Parshads are currently only paid a modest stipend to 
cover expenses, which is not nearly enough to support an individual. By providing better pay, 
women parshads would become more financially independent of their husbands and possibly 
more able to shed some of their household responsibilities as well by hiring domestic help.  
Nearly every woman I interviewed brought up the considerable challenges they faced 
when they entered the JMC, both with public engagement and the bureaucracy. While it may be 
difficult to “train” parshads to be more comfortable in public, they can be trained in the 
functioning of the JMC bureaucracy. One of the key roles male supporters played for women 
parshads was to lead them through the bureaucratic maze, which most male parshads already 
had some experience with. Gajwani and Zhang (2008) also found that women sarpanchs in the 
rural PRIs also struggle to understand the large amount of paperwork and complex bureaucracy 
they have to deal with, and that training was generally inadequate and provided too late. By 
providing some initial training, women could be given a leg-up towards closing this experience 
gap. Several parshads suggested this themselves: 
It’s very hard for the younger parshads, those with less experience, there should be 
training for them.236 
 
                                                          
 





Some training apparently already exists. Parshads reported a training program in Delhi, five 
hours away, after the 2014 elections, but very few attended.237 Furthermore, the parties 
themselves organize workshops prior to the general body meetings for their own parshads, but 
these were more centered on the agenda, speaking roles, and voting guidelines. Otherwise, 
parshads are just encouraged to go to the JMC library and teach themselves.238 Therefore, a 
comprehensive training program focused on providing all parshads with an in-depth 
understanding of the institution, that was easily accessible in Jaipur, and provided regularly 
could be significantly helpful in helping new parshads establish themselves independently.  
Future Improvement 
Overall, rapid improvement would require a combination of more highly-qualified 
women interested in competing politically and greater electoral censure of dependent less-
qualified women would be required to push parshad-patis out. However, much of the impetus 
for such change cannot be instigated by the electoral institution itself. Change must occur 
socially. As long as patriarchal social norms continue to discourage the political participation of 
women and sanction parshad-patis, there will be issues suppling enough quality candidates to 
compete in the gender-reserved seats and men will continue to put their wives up as candidates. 
Still, given the electoral success of independent female parshads, there does not appear to be a 
comprehensive social stigma against independent women in politics. As the supply of 
independent female candidates increases, perhaps in the long-term they will even start to push 
                                                          
 
237 Interview with male parshad on 03/21/2017 in Jaipur. 




out the parshad-patis electorally, particularly if combined with a campaign to encourage social 
censure.  
Improving the Indian gender reservation system, and the overall effectiveness of gender 
quotas worldwide, will require additional research, particularly on the interaction between 
institutions and the society they are designed to modify. As this dissertation has demonstrated, 
electoral quotas do not operate in a normative vacuum, they are heavily influenced by societal 
norms, and therefore their effectiveness across cases, across societies, varies significantly. Future 
research should look to expand on this single-case study, both across India and cross-nationally, 
especially in less-studied non-Western societies.  
Within India, understanding would be considerably improved by expanding research 
outside of the hard-cases – highly patriarchal societies such as Rajasthan, into the regions of 
south and north-east India where such norms still exist, but are less powerful. The challenges that 
restrict substantive representation in Jaipur should not be taken as universally applicable across 
India, as patriarchal norms vary regionally. This expansion will allow for comparison between 
environments, which will better define the specific societal dynamics that restrict, and the 
dynamics that empower, the development of female political independence within a gender quota 
system. Furthermore, while the depth of the single-case study allows for the investigation of the 
causal mechanisms that restrict women from developing political power, breadth through 
additional cases can allow us to begin to determine the actual causal effects of specific normative 
practices and institutional rules. India’s federal system allows for some variation in reservation 
rules across states, such as minimum candidate qualifications. For example, variation in 
education requirements should be incorporated into future work to see if they can restrict 




This dissertation has illustrated the importance of critical gateways most women must 
pass through on the path to becoming a representative that can encourage or discourage 
independence, such as student politics, marriage traditions, and family practices. Each of these 
gateways were covered in this dissertation, but would benefit from a deeper analysis based in 
more comprehensive data. My interviews with student politicians demonstrated the potential 
value of a focused effort on one of these gateways in developing our understanding of the 
formative processes that can improve or restrict the supply of strong women candidates. Further 
research needs to be done on the effect increasing female participation at the university level can 
have on general political engagement as an adult. The university environment could be a prime 
opportunity to target female participation improvement, with an aim to boosting lifetime political 
engagement. Perhaps the most important gateway is the party nomination process. Nomination is 
generally decisive to electoral success, and as this dissertation and other research has shown, 
parties continue to resist the nomination of women outside of gender reserved seats. Several 
explanations have been proposed here and elsewhere centered on enduring patriarchal skepticism 
of women candidates and their ability to compete. However, very little is known about the 
perspectives and actions of key agents in the opaque nomination process. A qualitative 
investigation of nomination practices and the role of gatekeepers such as regional MLAs could 
provide insight into why parties nominate so few women to compete in open-gender seats. Of 
particular interest would be the rational calculus these gatekeepers make between nominating 
strong women candidates who can expand the party’s reach, and nominating weaker candidates 
who are less likely to pose a future challenge to themselves.  
Furthermore, as discussed, the establishment of a gender reservation at the local level has 




To determine how and when the reservation can serve as a platform to higher office, a broad data 
collection effort that tracks the career pathways of successful women in state and national 
politics to determine how many started in a gender-reserved parshad ward is needed. Such 
research will contribute to determining if the gender reservation system is serving its intended 
function as a pipeline to develop female political talent to serve at the highest levels. If the 
parshad position is essentially a dead-end, with very few women progressing to higher levels of 
government, then it is not serving its purpose. 
Along these lines, the literature would also benefit from historical examination of the 
rapid institution of the gender reservation system in 1992. This dissertation has shown that 
certain features of the reservation system, such as the restriction on consecutive gender 
reservations and limiting reservations to the local level, appear designed to protect the powerful 
male politicians who approved it. Archival research and qualitative interviews could provide 
insight into the decision-making process that designed the reservation system to investigate the 
possibility that the system was instituted primarily as a release valve to discourage future 
demands for larger gender quotas, particularly at higher levels, rather than to primarily improve 
female political representation. Quotas are never instituted by objective actors without self-
interest, and such research would improve our understanding of why quotas are instituted and 
how concerns about power and job security can bias quota design.  
Finally, this dissertation has posed several theoretical questions on the concept of 
democratic representation that should be addressed. Specifically, is legitimate democratic 
representation limited to the elected individual listed on the ballot? Does the extension of 
representative power to individuals not listed on the ballot, but informally accepted by the voters 




considerable attention must be paid to the role of Western norms, particularly individualism and 
the preeminence of formal rules, in the generation of the concept of democratic representation. 
Given the more communal norms and greater acceptance of informal rules within South Asia, 
there needs to be greater discussion on the blanket application of democratic concepts that were 
developed in the Western context.  
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